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Abstract
This dissertation is about the roles of party branch secretaries in the villages after the 
introduction of Reform in late 1978. There are approximately 730,00 such individuals 
in China. This dissertation argues that the strategy of nominal encapsulation adopted 
after Reform (1978) leads to the emergence of four roles to be played by village party 
secretaries: two roles assigned by the state (state agent and entrepreneurial agent) and 
two roles demanded by their fellow villagers (moral middleman and lineage patron).
It further argues that the adoption of the roles of moral middleman and lineage 
patron is essential to the maintenance of their authority in their villages on which the 
roles of state agent and entrepreneurial agent are based. I term this phenomenon the 
"ruralisation of authority." If village party secretaries wish to play the roles assigned 
by the state by relying on the authority which comes from the state, it will be 
impossible to do so unless their authority is endorsed by their fellow villagers who 
demand that they play the roles of moral middleman and lineage patron. This 
dissertation, thus, rejects the totalitarian paradigm which sees party secretaries as the 
arm of the state who blindly obey their masters at the expense of their fellow 
villagers; it also contradicts the corruption paradigm which views party secretaries as 
parasites who amorally corrode the state for the sake of their private interests. The 
thesis of ruralisation of authority takes a middle ground: while recognising the 
authority of the state, it also suggests that the demand and structure of villages are 
important in legitimating the authority of the party secretary. Thus, it is possible to 
conceive a village party secretary who simultaneously plays four roles despite the 
apparent conflicts.
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INTRODUCTION
I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
This dissertation is focused on the "village party branch secretaries" (nongcun 
dangzhibu shuji) of which, according to the latest available figures (1991), there were 
about 732,000 throughout China.1 What do we know about them? Writing in the 
1960s, when a village was part of a commune and was called a "production brigade," 
A. Doak Barnett detailed the work of party secretaries, and concluded: "The Party 
secretary outranked everyone in the brigade and was universally recognized as the top 
local leader."2 Indeed, he was nicknamed "village emperor" ftu huangdri.
After the introduction of Reform in 1978, the work of party secretaries 
changed. Scholars offer conflicting pictures with regard to their new roles. 
Observations by Gordon White and Ch’i Hsi-sheng are two good examples. In his 
recent article, on the one hand, White points out that "the authority and integrity of 
the hegemonic political institution, the Communist Party, [...] have continued to 
decay;" but on the other hand, he maintains that "the networks of Party-state control 
in the countryside appear to have remained more solidly intact and effective (though 
this varies widely from area to area)."3 Ch’i Hsi-sheng, however, comes to a 
different conclusion, saying that the rural Party secretaries have only limited roles to 
play. He writes: "[...] the rural leaders’ capacity to serve as the party’s transmission 
belts had deteriorated to an alarming degree. Even the rural rectification campaign
lwJiagiang nongcung iiceng zuzhi iianshe" (Strengthen the construction o f  village-level organization), 
Zhongguo nongve nianiian. 1991 (China Agricultural Yearbook, 1991), Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1991, 
p. 141
2
Barnett, A. Doak Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1967, p. 367
3White, Gordon. "Democratization and Economic Reform in China," The Australian Journal o f  
Chinese Affairs. No 31, January, 1994, pp. 74-75.
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failed to arrest this trend, and it is highly unlikely that it will be reversed in the 
foreseeable future.4
This dissertation will address one core question: how has the work of the 
village Party branch secretaries changed after Reform (1978)? What roles are they 
playing in their villages? Do they only play one role or several roles? The term "role" 
is defined as "clearly articulated bundles of rights, duties, obligations, and 
expectations that guide the characteristic conduct of persons assuming such positions 
in a social system."5
This study will examine the two possible sources of the roles which a village 
party secretary may play: the central leadership and the village community where he 
lives.6 This approach is legitimate given the fact that village party secretaries are 
located at the interface between the state and society. As a party official, he will 
certainly do his best to complete the work as assigned to him by the central 
leadership. As a member of his village community, he also has to meet the demands 
from his fellow villagers. Here, I acknowledge the strength of the pressures exerted 
by the village community on a party secretary.
The enquiry about the roles of a village party secretary will also show how 
the roles fit within the framework of the exercise of authority in a village. This is a 
basic question in the study of politics in general. In our case, it is even more pertinent 
given the fact that the Chinese Communist Party (thereafter: CCP) is trying to 
establish its authority in China, not the least in the countryside, as its authority is 
waning due to the introduction of market economy since 1978.7
The scope of this study is to map out the roles that all village party secretaries 
in China may play. This study, accordingly, does not detail the differences of the role
4Ch’i Hsi-sheng, Politics o f Disillusionment, the Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping. 
1978-1989. New York: M .E. Sharpe, 1991, p. 234.
5Knoke, David Political Networks. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 7.
6Without being insensitive to women, throughout this dissertation the personal pronoun used for party 
secretaries is "he" for practical reason as well as for factual reason. The latter means that the majority o f  
party secretaries in China today are men, although there are a number o f  women.
7Ding, X .L. The Decline o f Communism in China. Legitimacy Crisis. 1977-1989. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994.
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performance across regions (North and South) or across economic performance of the 
regions (rich and poor). In terms of time, this study is about village party secretaries 
in China during the period of Reform. As a staring point, I select the year when 
Reform was officially started, that is December 1978, the occasion of the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee. It terminates in 1995 as this dissertation 
comes to its final writing.
n . SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This study will show that, as a result of the introduction of Reform in 1978, village 
party secretaries not only play one role (to manage organization affairs) but also four 
other roles: the role of state agent, the role of entrepreneurial agent, the role of moral 
middleman, and the role of lineage patron. The first two roles originate "from above" 
and the last two "from below."
This study is significant for four reasons. Firstly, the disaggregation of the 
four roles has not been identified in the existing literature. Party secretaries are more 
than becoming political middlemen,8 or simply implementing policies.9 Nor have 
they lost their power entirely.10
Secondly, this study will also shed light on how the relationship between the 
Party and society is being renegotiated in contemporary China. How does Leninist 
party (CCP) adapt itself to the new environment? The finding of the two roles "from 
above" shows that the central leadership does make a great effort to modify and adapt 
the roles assigned to the party secretaries in the countryside. The role of state agent 
and the role of entrepreneurial agent are two roles which cannot be directly associated
8Duan Shunchen Village Leadership in Contemporary China, unpublish. PhD dissertation, University 
o f  Sussex, 1994.
9Rozelle, Scott D. The Economic Behavior o f  Village Leaders in China’s Reform Economy, 
unpublish. PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1991.
10N ee, Victor, "Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism; Between Redistribution and Markets 
in China," in American Sociological Review. LVI, June 1991, pp. 267-282; arguing in the same line but 
from different perspective, see Whyte, Tyrene, "Political Reform and Rural Government,” Deborah Davis 
and Ezra F. Vogel (eds.), Chinese Society on the Eve o f  Tiananmen. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press; 1990: pp. 37-60.
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with a Leninist party which is originally designed to carry out revolution.
Thirdly, this study reveals the changing basis of authority in villages after the 
introduction of Reform in 1978. To complement some studies on peasant activism 
after Reform, this study presents additional information about Chinese peasants who 
manage to put pressure on their party secretaries in the exercise of authority. Peasants 
do not only start the Reform,11 and transform China,12 but also condition the 
exercise of authority by village party secretaries.
Fourthly, from the theoretical perspective, the finding of this study should 
inform the way we conceptualise the relations between the state and society in a 
country where a large population resides in villages.13 The debates so far 
concentrate on whether or not the state can reach society,14 and tend to forget to 
ask the mode of the relation between the state and society.15 As this study will 
show, the penetration of society by the state or the permeation of the state by society 
are actually mediated through human agencies who serve a unique function of "shock 
absorber" to absorb pressures from both the state and society.
in. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
After this introduction, the following chapter will present the theoretical framework 
as well as the methodology. In Chapter Two, titled "The making of a party 
secretary," I briefly describe the process of the election of a village party branch
^Kelliher, Daniel Peasant Power in China: The Era o f Rural Reform 1979-1988 New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992.
12Zhou, Kate Xiao How the Farmers Changed China. Power o f the People. Boulder, CO; W estview  
Press, 1996.
13Two important theoretical contributions in this field are: Gellner, Ernest Nations and Nationalism. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1983, pp. 13-14; Giddens, Anthony The Nation-State and V iolence. Volume Two o f  
A Contemporary Critique o f  Historical Materialism. London: Polity Press, 1985, especially pp. 61-82.
14Shue, Vivienne The Reach o f the State. Sketches o f  the Chinese Body Politic. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1988.
15This is not to deny that Shue has made great effort in identifying the pattern o f villages in M ao’s 
era (which she calls "honeycomb pattern"), but she fails to do so in her analysis o f villages in Post-Mao 
era.
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secretary. This should provide a good background for the following four chapters 
which will successively discuss the four roles of a Party secretary: state agent,
entrepreneurial agent, moral middleman, and lineage patron. Chapter Seven is to bind 
together the previous four chapters by discussing the thesis of "the ruralisation of 
authority." In the final chapter, I will draw some conclusions and discuss the 
theoretical implications of this study on the relations of the state and society in post- 
Mao China.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter will be divided into three major sections. The first reviews the pertinent 
secondary literature relevant to the village Party secretaries. In the second section I 
will explicate a theoretical framework to understand the new roles of the village 
Party secretary. The final section will describe the methodology.
I. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A long time ago, Rousseau remarked:
"I conceive that there are two kinds of inequality among the human species; 
one, which I call natural or physical, because it is established by nature, and 
consists in a difference of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of the 
mind or of the soul: and another, which may be called moral or political 
inequality, because it depends upon a kind of convention, and is established, 
or at least authorised, by the consent of men. This latter consists of the 
different privileges, which some men enjoy to the prejudice of others; such as 
that of being more rich, more honoured, more powerful or even in a position 
to exact obedience."1
This simple distinction might have contributed to the launching of French Revolution 
which demands were "egalite, liberte, fratemite." But, obviously, it has become the 
main driving inspiration to the socialist thinkers from Saint-Simon down to Marx. It 
was Marx who eventually formulated a programme, in his Communist Manifesto, for 
the communists to set up a classless society.
However, as exposed by Djilas, the victory of the communist parties around 
the world, ironically, create a "new class." This class is not based on their ownership 
of the means of production, but simply on their being the members of the Communist 
Party. As Rousseau boldly said, they are "more rich, more honoured, more powerful
b.J . Rousseau, A Dissertation on the Origin and Foundation o f the Inequality o f  Mankind. Everyman 
edition, p. 160.
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or even in a position to exact obedience."
The existence of this group o f people have attracted the attention of students 
of communist affairs in the 1950s through 1970s. They immediately realised that 
cadres were indeed those people who enjoyed wealth, power, and status. 
Furthermore, cadres played important role in almost every aspect of people life. Both 
major and minor decisions are made by them. Finally, cadres were knitted into a very 
complex and vast system; it cuts across vertically and expanded horizontally. It is not 
easy to decipher the system and its effect on society.
A. First generation
The most important representative of the first generation of China scholars paying 
attention to cadres is A. Doak Barnett. His greatest contribution was that, for the first 
time, he described in great detail the activities of cadres in his book, Cadres. 
Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China.2 To be sure, when he wrote 
the book, China was a country behind the "bamboo curtain," no information flowed 
out of China, not to mention information about the Party and cadres. As he admitted 
himself, "the bulk of what we know has been derived from painstaking analysis of 
material published on the China mainland." This information, then, is complemented 
with that collected through interviewing emigres in Hong Kong.
In his book, Barnett apparently did not attempt "to present general theories;"3 
he simply provides a detailed description of cadres at the ministerial, county, and 
commune levels. Here, we obtain Barnett’s definition of cadres: "In its broadest 
sense, it includes all those, both Party members and non Party cadres, who hold any 
post as functionary in the bureaucratic hierarchies in China, from top to bottom."4 
Barnett observed that the opposite of cadres (ganbu) is the masses (gunzhong), and 
the difference lies that in the fact that cadres belong to the ruling elite and this
2
A. Doak Barnett, Cadres. Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China. N ew  York: 
Columbia University Press, 1967, Preface," p. x.
3Ibid., p. xi.
4Ibid.. p. 39.
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difference forms a gap which "steadily widens." Barnett adds that this difference is 
also felt "even at the lowest levels." Furthermore, "the cadres tend to regard 
themselves, and are clearly regarded by the Chinese masses, as a group apart because 
of their power and authority."5
This theme flows throughout Barnett’s book. At the commune level, he 
described the structure and operation of the Party and administration. Clearly, the 
cadres dominated in the rural areas; from commune down to team, the Party 
members concurrently held key position in village administration. Both at the 
commune level and production brigade level, the Party secretaries became the top 
men. The Commune Party Committee secretary was the "undisputed top leader," and 
the Brigade Party Branch secretary "outranked everyone else in the brigade and was 
universally recognised as the top local leader."6 No Party organization existed at the 
team level.
The brigade Party secretary’s power was affirmed by his position in the Party 
Branch Committee which, according to Barnett, was "the top decision-making body 
in the brigade."7 This committee directed the teams. Barnett writes:
"The brigade, for example, laid down specifications concerning the crops they 
grow, and outlined general production targets, although it did consult with the 
teams before doing so. Many of the teams’s basic obligations were defined, 
in fact, in contracts which they signed with the brigade. The brigade also 
informed all teams of their obligations regarding both the land tax and the 
compulsory sale of grain and sizable range of other commodities."8
Barnett, in fact, also informs us that the Party and the brigade management committee 
is merged. The majority of the members of the brigade management committee were 
functionaries at the Party branch committee. "When the Party leaders met as members 
of the Brigade Management Committee they simply wore different hats and dealt
5AI1 those in the brackets, see Ibidem.
6Ibid., p. 346 and 367.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.. p. 420.
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with more routine, day-to-day operational problems."9 Here, Barnett seems to 
suggest that this arrangement is the source of Party’s total dominance in the 
brigade.10 The Party secretary had, therefore, unchallenged power.
John Lewis’ book, Leadership in Communist China.11 complements Barnett’s 
description of Party secretaries since it is devoted to the question of the leadership of 
the Chinese Communist Party. More specifically, it focuses on the Party during the 
period of Great Leap Forward, 1958-1962. Like Barnett, he also tries to scrutinise 
the internal operation of the Party, from its techniques of leadership, its philosophy, 
its concept of "mass line," its structure, etc. The cadres receive one full chapter of 
discussion.
Writing with the same concern about institutions, Lewis also finds difficulty 
in defining the cadres. However, he makes a breakthrough in discussing the working 
principle of cadres, that is the democratic centralism. This principle is applied within 
the context of two types of cadres.
Lewis observes that the two types of cadres are leading cadres Hingdao ganbul 
and working cadres (gongzuo ganbuL Leading cadres made the broad decision 
through consultation with working cadres; they cannot make arbitrary decision. 
However, consultation does not mean that decision is made through voting. "All party 
meetings are convened by leading cadres and led by those cadres. Leading cadres 
absolutely determine the formulation of general policy directives. Without this 
determination, the party leaders assert, centralization would fall victim to ’extreme 
democratization.’"12 The working cadres, after the decision, "have the continuous 
responsibility to conduct investigations, to supervise implementation, and to submit 
reports on the results of their investigations and the implementation of assigned
9Ibid. p. 369.
10"If Party primacy was striking at higher levels, it was even more so in the brigade. In fact, the 
Party’s dominance in Brigade B was total." Ibid.. p. 367.
^John W. Lewis, Leadership in Communist China. Ithaca: New York: Cornell University Press,
1963.
12Ibid.. p. 191.
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tasks."13
Lewis also suggests that the distinction between leading cadres and working 
cadres is to be seen from one’s level and point of view. To the county Qdan) Party 
committee, the Party branch secretary is a working cadre; to the Party branch 
committee, s/he is a leading cadre.14 In this sense, a Party branch secretary has 
double function: "a two-way communicator between the upper echelons and the broad 
masses".15
Within the context of the Party branch, Lewis says that his position is 
"probably the most critical in the entire party organization." Not only that he must 
guarantee the leading role of the Party in China, but also that on him depends "the 
success of balanced external and internal operation of the party and the supervision 
of the elite standards of the vanguard." This is why the Party secretary "assumes 
over-all responsibility at the lower level and is the key administrative link to the rank 
and file through them to the Chinese people."16
Lewis does not describe the specific tasks of a Party secretary in a brigade. 
However, he notes two things. First, he mentions the interpenetration of party .and 
government. If this surprises Barnett, Lewis says that it is not something illegal. "The 
merging of party and government organs is prohibited at all levels except for the 
departments at the commune level and below."17 The purpose is "to strengthen the 
party’s leading role."
Secondly, he also mentions the dissatisfaction among brigade cadres who lost 
their power since winter 1961 when production teams became the basic level of rural 
accounting and production. "The consequent shift of power to team cadres met 
serious resentment among brigade and commune cadres who were left with vague 
powers to coordinate plans, to urge cooperation among teams, and to organise
13ibid.
14Ibid.. p. 192.
15Ibid.
16Ibid.. pp. 137-138.
17Ibid.. p. 217.
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ideological indoctrination."18 Contrary to Barnett’s observation, Lewis argues that, 
in the early 1960s, a brigade Party secretary, although held a powerful position, did 
not play important roles in society; the team leaders had more influence.
Franz Schurmann addresses the subject from a sociological perspective, and 
goes one step further. He does not only describe the position of cadres in the whole 
system, but also their pattern of behaviour. He agrees with Barnett and Lewis that the 
term "cadre" is hard to define because it includes the double meaning of both 
personal leadership and institutional leadership which, theoretically, are mutual 
exclusive. 19 A cadre is a person with two functions: "combat leader" and "official," 
or in Chinese communists’ terminology, they are both "red" and "expert". If "red" 
is stressed, a cadre is to act according to values, ethos or ideology and see things in 
terms human solidarity. A cadre is to build networks of mutual involvement through 
personal relations. If ’expert’ is emphasised, a cadre is to act according to rules and 
regulations and see things in technical rather than human terms. A cadre, then, likes 
to enforce compliance from his/her subordinates. 20
Schurmann does not speak directly about the Party secretaries. He argues that 
there is a continuity of China before 1949 and China after 1949. According to 
Schurmann, every social system is guided by "a trinity of ethos, status group, and 
modal personality." Whereas in traditional China it was represented by Confucianism, 
the gentry and the pater familias (iiazhangL in post-1949 China by communism, the 
Party and the cadre respectively.21 It can be inferred that, according to 
Schurmann, a village Party secretary as a cadre also functioned as what a iiazhang 
did in the traditional China. He sees the whole village as his family and he himself 
as the head of the family. Compliance was sought through the authority as family 
head. The figure of a father is important here; he gives directives and commands to 
the villagers as if he gives them to his children and grandchildren. The difference
l8Ibid.. p. 233.
19Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization, second edition. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California; 1968, p. 165.
20Ibid.. p. 166.
21Ibid.. p. 7.
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lies in that he is "the revolutionary leader in an organization." In addition to that, "he 
is young, not old; he is a leader, not a conciliator; he operates in the public realm, 
not in private.1,22
A village Party secretary is, therefore, seen as a "red cadre." This fits Lewis’ 
description of a cadre who should be ready to sacrifice himself for the sake of the 
people. He should give example to his fellow villagers of being a good communist. 
Schurmann predicts, however, that, being a red cadre, a village Party secretary will 
face challenges from "expert cadres," the educated professional. How did they 
translate their authority in the countryside? This question is left unanswered by 
Schurmann. He briefly writes: "Party cadres still sit in the committee of the 
production brigade, but they may no longer impose plans from above."23 Obviously, 
he is less interested in the question of cadres’ behaviour than in the organization. As 
the title of his books clearly demonstrates, Schum ann’s concern is to show how a 
new organization was bom in China and how ideology helped "to cement" this 
organization.24 This functionalist approach seemingly does not allow him to pursue 
further the more concrete questions.
From these three works, we are informed of minute details of the internal 
operation of the CCP and state administration. This information is useful, especially 
at the time when China was closed to the outside world. Their works, however, give 
the static aspect of institution and present a picture of China as a totalitarian, or at 
least, authoritarian regime. Both Barnett and Lewis present us a picture of cadres as 
"instruments" of the central leadership. A cadre is basically an agent. S/he does what 
his/her ask him/her to do. His/her activities simply reflect the policies set by the 
central leadership. The image of China’s cadre system is one of a straight-jacket. 
Everything flows from top to bottom without any deviation or variation. Schurmann, 
indeed, adds new dimension to it when he says that a cadre is a replica of the old 
jiazhang. Yet it basically does not alter the image.
22Ibid.. p. 8
23Schurmann, op .cit.. p. 494.
"Just as the ethos held the social system together, so does ideology hold organizations together;" 
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B. The second generation
The work of sociologists William Parish and Martin Whyte broke new ground. As 
the title of their book indicates, Village and Family in Contemporary China.25 they 
shift their attention from national perspective to the local-level one. This book, by 
combining documentary research and interviews with emigres in Hong Kong, tries 
to describe changes that took place in the villages since the communist regime took 
power in 1949: institutional arrangements, family organization, ritual, conflict. This 
book, therefore, is rich of detailed information on village life between 1969-1974.
Parish and Whyte indeed do not overlook the roles of rural cadres, especially 
those at brigades and teams. They discover that cadres at the grass-root level were 
not agents of change in their villages. Although they were Party members, they did 
not seek to alienate their neighbours and relatives. Unlike cadres at the communes 
who are outsiders, the primary social ties and loyalties of village cadres laid within 
the village. "They are tied to the people they are trying to lead by kinship and past 
histories of cooperation and competition, and if they cannot maintain the respect of 
local peasants they can easily be pressured to resign." 26 This partly explains why 
the central leadership was unable to use coercion in implementing its policies.
Control from superiors cannot be said to be non existent. There was 
ideological control; a cadre got his/her position because of demonstrated loyalty to 
the party. Administrative control is also operative: " A recalcitrant village leader will 
soon find his village without the supplies of fertiliser, machinery, and other goods 
that can be allocated only through the state apparatus, and unable to get loans for 
needed improvements."27 Furthermore, a commune vice-secretary might also come 
to the village and intervene, even take over village leadership.
Nevertheless, not much could be done to curb the power of a village cadre, 
especially the brigade Party secretary. Parish and Whyte note: "As at the commune
25Parish, William L. and Martin King Whyte, Village and Family in Contemporary China. Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago Press, 1978.
26Ibid.. p 328.
27Ibid., p. 38.
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level, the party secretary stands above all the others in power and prestige."28 His 
power was such that he could transform himself into an oppressive leader dominating 
all major decisions in a village. For instance, during the Cultural Revolution, urban 
sent-down youths initiated a movement to oust a brigade Party secretary of a village; 
they started by collecting information. Peasants, knowing that while the youths could 
leave the village and they had to stay, refused to cooperate for fear of retaliation by 
the brigade secretary in the future. According to Parish and Whyte, this phenomenon 
is closely related to the fact that "the Chinese do not have the ideal of a rotating 
leadership but encourage leaders to serve as long as their service is approved by both 
the party and the people they lead,1'29 Once someone became a leading cadre, and 
did not commit any serious offense, he or she could stay in power as long as s/he 
wants.
What is the incentive to become a Party secretary? Parish and Whyte notice 
that a Party secretary did not have much chance to enrich themselves or be promoted 
to higher posts. Some of them might be better off than their fellow villagers, but 
they were not terribly rich. As a matter fact, it was not easy to carry out the job of 
a brigade Party secretary because he was under constant watchful criticism from 
above and below.
Here Parish and Whyte discover two possible motivations. The first was 
ideological motivation. Although, a cadre was not a Maoist zealot, he might take the 
job out of a kind of "general sense of duty or obligation." For example: "A party 
member reluctant to take a post is told that ’a good party member doesn’t let the 
people down.’"30 The second motivation was autonomy and opportunity. A brigade 
Party secretary (and other leading cadres) enjoyed relative autonomy in their daily 
routine than ordinary peasants. In addition to that, "they have more opportunity than 
others to learn new things, to apply their skill and know-how, and to associate with
28Ibid.. p. 37.
29Ibid.. p. 108.
30Ibid.. p. 106.
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more powerful leaders outside of the village."31 It seems, then, that power and 
prestige was the strongest incentive.
The relationship of a brigade secretary (and leading cadres, in general) with 
their kin was not clear. Parish and Whyte argue that, although they might offer some 
help and benefit to their relatives, it was quite risky business. They find, for instance, 
that all the sons of leading cadres could go to higher schools and that those who had 
elder brothers as leading cadres, became functionaries in the village as well. This, 
however, seemed to be a very minor operation. "Being bom into the family of a 
village leader clearly has some advantages, but those cadres who show blatant 
favouritism toward kin are likely to lose their posts and have no privileges to 
transmit.1,32 Parish and Whyte tend to hold the view that the clan (which is 
traditionally strong in Guangdong Province) played very little influence in politics in 
the villages.
The finding of Parish and Whyte slightly alter the image presented by Barnett, 
Schurmann, and Lewis. They discover that cadres, especially the brigade Party 
secretary, were entangled in various different types of activities which lay outside the 
boundary of Party’s job description. On the one hand, they show that village cadres 
cared a great deal about their relatives and kin, and quite often, did not hesitate to 
lend a helping hand to them. On the other hand, cadres, including were indeed under 
strict supervision by the commune cadres. They had to please their superiors as well 
as their fellow villagers. A brigade Party secretary, therefore, was portrayed as 
someone who knows how to navigate between a rock and a hard place.
Nevertheless, it must be said that it is not quite clear as to the degree and 
substance of the deviation by cadres. For instance, in what issue was a brigade Party 
secretary able to deflect the decision of the central leadership? Using what strategy 
did they manage to do it?
C. Third generation
The last question is a question which has to be answered by the next generation.
31Ibid.
32Ibid.. p. 114.
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Interestingly, many of the third generation of Chinese scholars in the US engage 
themselves in the study of village politics.33 This is, in part, stimulated by the rise 
of "peasant studies" in the West which took up its momentum in the late 1970s, and 
in part, by the decline of totalitarian model as a tool for analysing communist 
countries.
The work of Jean Oi, however, follows on to the work of Parish and 
Whyte.34 Oi not only recognises the power possessed by cadres, but also points out 
that village cadres use their power to deflect one crucial policy from the central 
leadership - grain procurement policy. Contrary to common knowledge, Oi 
demonstrated that peasants, during Mao’s period, were able to bend the policy 
through a patron-client strategy. For example, a team leader was a patron to the team 
members, but he was a client to a brigade cadre who, likewise, was a client to a 
commune cadres.
This network of patron and clients made the state policy of grain procurement 
ineffective. Right from crop estimation to delivery of grain, the state was simply 
prevented from knowing the real situation. The mechanism of control was debilitated 
because each patron and each client helped each other to benefit each other.
The crucial link was at the brigade level. As cadres at brigades were local 
peasants and not on the state payroll, they were most willing to protect the grain from 
state extraction.35 Furthermore, the life and death of a brigade depended on its 
teams. They had to persuade team leaders to pledge the amounts they would send up 
to the brigade which were used to fund meetings, administrative costs, welfare costs, 
agricultural investment, etc. Therefore, "brigades had an interest in allowing teams
33 ■ . . .Blecher, Marc. "Leader-Mass Relations in Rural Chinese Communities: Local Politics in
Revolutionary Society." Ph.D. diss. University o f  Chicago, 1977; Burns, John P. Political Participation
in Rural China. Berkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 1988; Butler, Steven. "Conflict and Decision
Making in China’s Rural Administration, 1969-76." Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 1979; Meisner,
Mitch. "In Agriculture Learn from Dazhai: Theory and Practice in Chinese Rural Development." Ph.D.
diss. University o f  Chicago, 1977; Shue, Vivienne. Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics o f
Development Toward Socialism, 1949-1956. Berkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 1980; Siu,
Helen F. Agents and Victims in South China. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989; Zweig, David.
Agrarian Radicalism in China, 1968-1981. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
^ O i, Jean C. State and Peasant in Contemporary China. Berkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 
1989.
35Ibid.. p. 89.
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some leeway to keep more than the legally allowed share of the harvest."36
The collusion between brigade cadres and team cadres was inevitable. Not 
only did brigade cadres need the support from the team cadres, the team cadres also 
needed brigade cadres. "A team leader cultivated a relationship with the brigade 
leader to receive special consideration in matters such as allocating quotas, granting 
loans, procuring scarce goods, generally acquiring extra resources, and, equally 
important, regulating policy.”37 On the top of that, brigade cadres were obviously 
capable of being protectors in the struggle session; they could warn team leaders of 
impending investigations, particularly those by higher-level officials and outside work 
teams.
Oi argues that patron-client relationships like this are basically relationships 
of exchange between two actors of unequal status. The team cadres saw their brigade 
leader as someone powerful which could provide them with material benefit and 
protection, whereas the brigade leader might get grain and labour which was 
important to run the brigade, and more importantly, "face.” However, this 
relationship was not an anonymous and cold relationship; between the patron and the 
clients there should exist a "special feelings" (ganging) which might grow before or 
after the relationship is established. Patron-client relationships, thus, were more than 
guanxi.38
How did a rural leader establish himself as a patron? According to Oi, this 
was not because the patron is well-off. "Local patrons derive their power from their 
position to allocate essential goods and services rather than from private ownership 
of the bases of patronage. "39 Therefore, he was not as independent as the traditional 
patron, such as a landlord. He must be able to strike a balance, not to upset both the 
state (from which derives his position) and the team leaders (on whom he relies for
36Ibid„ p. 125.
37Ibid.. p. 128.
38Ibid.. p. 129 & p. 131,
39Ibid., p. 153.
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support).40
However, one thing is not clear in Oi’s work: who is the brigade leader? Is 
he the brigade head or the brigade party secretary? Our reading of Barnett, Lewis, 
and Schurmann indicates that the most powerful person in a village is the brigade 
party secretary. Does Oi mean it as well? Judging from the list of interviewees 
(Appendix B), none of them is a village Party secretary. This may partly explain why 
Oi was not alerted to the supremacy of a village Party secretary.
Two books, one by sociologists and another by an anthropologist, provide a 
more detailed description of the brigade Party secretaries. Chen Village41 contains 
a story of a village in South China. Unlike previous literature, it tells a story of a 
village that had to undergo the ever-changing policies imposed by the Central 
government. The three authors draw our attention to the campaigns and struggles that 
the whole village had to go through. It started with the Small Four Clean Up in the 
early 1960-s, through the Cultural Revolution, and ended up with Anti Lin Biao and 
Anti Confucius in the early 1970-s.
What makes this book more interesting is that the authors describe the political 
conflicts which involved two powerful cadres in the village: Qingfa (Party Secretary) 
and Longyong (brigade headman). Both men were involved in a bitter struggle; each 
tried to get rid of the other. Qingfa was first that took the advantage of the Small 
Four Clean Up Campaign; he succeeded to get rid of Longyong whom Qingfa viewed 
as a potential rival. Qingfa’s victory, however, only lasted for a short time, because 
the following campaign, Four Big Clean Up, was harsher than the former. Qingfa 
was severely criticised, attacked and deposed from his position as party secretary.
Two years later, at the end of the Cultural Revolution, Longyong’s victory 
was complete. In its attempt to restore public order, the Central government decided 
a new campaign of "cleansing the class ranks". This time Qingfa was not only 
criticised and attacked, but also sent to the village prison ("the cowshed"). From 
1966 to 1980, Longyong enjoyed his power as "local emperor" (despite the fact that
40Ibid.. pp. 144-145.
41 Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, Jonathan Unger, Chen Village: The Recent History o f  a Peasant 
Community in Mao*s China. Berkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 1984.
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he was not a Party secretary). In 1980, Qingfa, surprisingly, was restored to his 
former position as party secretary.
The story of Chen Village reveals three important things. Firstly, it reveals 
for the first time the conflict between cadres in a village. Previous literature provide 
us with a picture of a united and cohesive team of cadres who work together to 
achieve the common goal. Qingfa and Longyong did not see eye to eye in many 
different issues, and this became the source of their conflict. Apparently, at the 
bottom line, this conflict is more of a private than ideological rivalry.
Secondly, the Party secretary was indeed engaged in patronage activities with 
his lineage, but this patronage was not as effective as it is described in Oi’s book. 
Qingfa was apparently the patron of his kin who lived in Team No. 6. At the same 
time, he was also patronizing Team No 1 who was grateful to him for his help in 
solving the problem of selecting team head. To both teams Qingfa gave the best 
lands. "And to strengthen his hand, when recruiting new people for the party or for 
new brigade-level party posts, Qingfa tended to look toward the teams with which he 
had established special relationships.1,42
This patronage, evidently, was not proved to be quite effective. No one could 
save Qingfa’s downfall; his clients were forced to participate in criticizing him in the 
struggle sessions. This happened again in 1968. Qingfa was not only humiliated but 
also sent into the "cowshed" for almost one year. His kin and clients, in fact, also 
had to pay the price for recognizing Qingfa as their patron. After Qingfa was re­
installed as Party secretary in 1980, he continued to provide favour to the members 
of his lineage. Again, it did not help much. This time he had to accept the worst: he 
was deposed from his power, and also expelled from the Party (1983).
The only occasion when Qingfa’s influence was directly felt was the period 
after his first downfall. At that time Longyong, as the head of the brigade 
management committee, found himself in an extremely difficult situation as teams - 
persuaded by the example of Team No 6 - did not lend support to him. Longyong 
tried to mobilise the teams to do village projects, but Team No 6 whose leader was 
Qingfa’s brother-in-law simply ignored his authority. "When this production resisted,
42Ibid.. p. 35.
19
the other teams also balked."43
Thirdly, this book also reveals the real role of a Party secretary. Since the 
downfall of Qingfa in 1963 (?) to 1983, Chen Village had three Party secretaries: 
Chen Jinyi (1963-1980), Chen Sunwang (1983-1985), Chen Baodai (1985—  ). It is 
quite obvious that those Party secretaries were overshadowed by Longyong. He was 
actually "the local emperor" for the rest of the period after the downfall of Qingfa. 
He was the man behind the prosperity of Chen village in the early 1970s. "Even the 
interviewees who strongly disliked Longyong grudgingly admitted to us that he was 
an astute economic manager and a prime mover behind the village’s 
industrialization.1,44
The Party secretaries were all lame ducks in front of powerful Longyong. 
"Jinyi was too junior in prestige, too inexperienced, inarticulate, and indecisive to 
wield effective power on his own. He would have to turn to Longyong."45 Sunwang 
was not interested in his job,46 while Baodai was "Longyong’s man."47 It is not 
quite clear, however, if this phenomenon is quite widespread in China. The power 
of Longyong seemed to derive more from his personal charisma rather than from his 
office.
Huang Shum-ming’s book, The Spiral Road, was originally written "to 
illustrate changes in Lin Village"48 The technique he uses is to invite a cadre to 
speak about it. Coincidentally, the cadre is the village Party secretary. This book, 
thus, also records what a Party secretary thought about reform. Beyond that, as the 
technique requires detailed background, Huang’s book contains a rich data of the 
activities of a Party secretary in a village. It is, in fact, a book about a village Party
43Ibid.. p. 128.
44Ibid.. p. 222.
45Ibid.. 99.
46Ibid.. 131.
47Ibid.. 286.
48Ibid, p. 6.
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secretary. 49
Ye Wende, the Party secretary, was undoubtedly the most powerful figure in 
the village. He made decisions, he gave commands, and he supervised daily affairs 
in the village. His day started in the morning with a meeting. The brigade head, the 
head of the brigade Women’s League, the brigade clerk, came to his office and sat 
around the Party secretary. "Most of these gatherings are quite informal."50 Huang 
noted: "Although the brigade-level officials seem to have daily duties, they generally 
defer important decisions to Ye."51 In the face of threat from decollectivization, he 
did not hesitate to boast: "Today, even after dismantling the brigade and team 
collectives, I still maintain unchallenged power in this village."52
Party secretary Ye clearly saw that the position of village Party secretary was 
much more desirable than that of "national cadre" (guoiia ganbu) at commune or 
county. He argued that becoming a national cadre was not a promotion. "A national 
cadre may sound prestigious, but there are also many dead-end jobs in the national 
bureaucracy. A rural cadre serving as brigade Party secretary commands a few 
hundred people. He is the de facto ruler of the brigade. But a national cadre may 
have only a dozen street sweepers under his command."53
His power indeed originates from the position of Party secretary. However, 
this formal power alone was not enough. The network of friends and kin helped to 
bolster his power; they were mostly friends he knew since early 1960s when they 
were together in a workteam. Huang Shu-ming testifies: "I was often amazed by the 
seemingly inexhaustible social connections of Ye. He knew many important people 
in the commune, the district, and the city offices on whom he could call in time of
49 Huang Shu-min. The Spiral Road. Change in a Chinese Village through the Eves o f a Communist 
Party Leader. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989.
50Ibid.. p. 106.
S1Ibid.. p. 107.
52Ibid.. p. 162.
53Ibid.. p. 134.
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need."54 Party secretary Ye himself believed that connection was "my major political 
capital."55
From Huang’s account, it is apparent that Party secretary Ye played three 
important roles in his village. First of all, he functioned - in Huang’s word - as a 
"benevolent county magistrate, the so-called father-mother official, of imperial 
China." Although a bit exaggerated, he further specifies it: "He literally wrote the 
laws and ordinances for villagers, presided over the litigations, and dispensed justice 
in whatever way he saw fit." 56 This is well illustrated in a case where a woman 
reported to the Party secretary that she was slapped her face by her cousin. According 
to the village ordinance, the man should be fined RMB 10. However, Party secretary 
Ye released the man, saying that the woman deserved the slap because she provoked 
the anger of the man. "You have to know them well, including their personalities and 
behaviour pattern."57
Secondly, Party secretary Ye functioned as economic middleman. When 
assumed the post of Party secretary in early 1978, he encouraged Team No. 5 and 
other teams to set up sand brick factories. To overcome the difficulty of obtaining 
credit, he said: "For large sums of capital, I would go to the commune’s Cooperative 
Credit Association or the China Agricultural Bank for loans."58 He could even raise 
funds by borrowing money without interest from other government enterprises. 
Seemingly, his vast connections contributed a lot to this role. "I was merely using my 
connections to set up trading relationships for two parties who otherwise would not 
be able to deal directly."59
Thirdly, Party secretary Ye functioned as a protector of his village. He knew 
that he had to please two masters, the government and his fellow villagers. As a cadre
^ Ibid.. p. 69.
55Ibid.. p. 84.
56Ibid.. p. 107.
57Ibid,, p. 108.
58Ibid., p. 139.
59Ibid.t p. 145.
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he had to obey the government directives and policies, but, as a villager, he had to 
protect the well-being of his village and fellow villagers. Despite this dilemma, Party 
secretary Ye was convinced that his village should come first. "My principle of 
administration, based on past experiences, is to be protective of the villagers’ interests 
as much as possible."60 This is clearly demonstrated in the case of family planning. 
He was willing to pay RMB$ 5,000 to save four babies (despite the fact that one 
woman had been forced to have an abortion).
There is no doubt that the work of Huang Shu-ming has thrown light on many 
dark sides of the activities of a village Party secretary. All previous studies indeed 
have pointed out that the village Party secretary was the most powerful leader, but 
they provided us with few specific details. This can be understood by the fact that 
previous studies were conducted indirectly. They never met any Party secretary.
Despite this breakthrough, this book is not entirely dedicated to the study of 
village Party secretaries. As an anthropologist, Huang was more interested in culture 
and cultural change. It can be said, therefore, that no real systematic study on the 
political role of village Party secretaries has been done. The works of the third 
generation as a whole, however, clearly shattered the myth of totalitarian model; it 
radically altered the view that China is ruled in lockstep. Cadres are human beings 
with blood and flesh. They are not the instruments of the central leadership, and they 
are not a cog of a gigantic machine.
As human beings, they have fear and hatred. These inevitably colour their 
interaction, even within the strict command structure. As other normal human 
beings, they have families, relatives, and friends. Typically in China, they are part 
of a wider kinship network, and they simply cannot ignore them or shun them away. 
The brigade Party secretaries are actually not merciless bureaucrats.
D. C urrent debate
The current debate tries to assess the power of rural cadres after the introduction of 
the household responsibility system. There is a strong suggestion that rural cadres
60Ibid.. p. 186.
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clash with new elites emerging as a consequence of reform. Rural cadres still retain 
their power and status, but the new economic elites had more courage to challenge 
their authority. White points out: "Whereas in the commune system political and 
economic power had tended to ’fuse’, the reforms have fostered a process of 
separation into two power-systems, one based on formal politico-administrative 
authority and one on control over economic resources (including scarce skills).61 The 
newly established "villagers representative assembly" which is to possess a high 
degree of control power, poses another challenge to the party cadres. They can no 
longer impose their own agenda; and in some cases, they are even forced to retreat 
from their decision.62
Nee maintains that the introduction of Reform has rendered rural cadres 
without power. Basing his argument on market transition theory, he argues that "as 
the allocation of goods and services shifts to the marketplace, power is mediated more 
by transactive exchanges and less by administrative fiat.”63 Cadres lost their 
redistributive power which was very substantial during the commune period; their 
power has been taken over by the market mechanism. In this circumstances, the 
clientilist politics in the villages was made obsolete.64
Oi, on the contrary, claims that rural cadres still retain a high degree of 
power. This is reflected in their ability to "extract and direct investment and to
61 White, Gordon, "Riding the Tiger: Grass-Roots Rural Politics in the Wake o f  the Chinese Economic 
Reforms," Ashwani Saith (ed.), The Re-Emergence o f  the Chinese Peasantry, London: Croom Helm; 
1987: pp. 258.
62Lawrence, Susan V. "Democracy, Chinese Style," The Australian Journal o f  Chinese Affairs. No. 
32, 1994, pp. 61-68.
63N ee, Victor, "Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism: Between Redistribution and Markets 
in China," in American Sociological Review. LVI, June 1991, pp. 267-282; arguing in the same line but 
from different perspective, see Whyte, Tyrene, "Political Reform and Rural Government," Deborah Davis 
and EzraF. Vogel (eds.), Chinese Society on the Eve o f  Tiananmen. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press; 1990: pp. 37-60.
64 "Market transition theory contends that the value o f personal connections with cadres is a function 
o f the extent to which the allocation o f resources - factor, product, capital, and labour - remains bounded 
by the redistributive economy." Ibid., p. 279.
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allocate rural industrial profits, the mainstay of village income."65 Rural cadres 
manipulate the loopholes in existing fiscal policy to benefit themselves. Like their 
predecessors in Mao period, they are able to protect the interest of their village and 
promote its interest at the expense of the state. Obviously, here, Oi pushes her 
previous model on corrupt cadres further.
Despite these debates, no progress has been made with regard to the role of 
the village Party secretaries. All of the recent literature evidently make no attempt 
to sort out the village Party secretary from other village cadres. This is either because 
the roles of village Party secretaries in the villages are so minor that it can be 
ignored, or because there is no significant difference between village cadres who hold 
leadership post and those who do not. Both arguments, however, are easily defeated 
because all major studies from previous period point to the other direction.
D. Assessment
Cadres have become a subject that has drawn the attention of quite a number of 
scholars. Understandably, this is simply because cadres play such a crucial role in a 
society under a communist regime. Scholars from the first generation down to the 
third generation spent much time and energy to decipher the complex system of 
cadres which stretch from Beijing to the remote rural areas.
There is a clear pattern of the progress of these studies. The first generation 
present cadres as obedient agents who follow the instruction from the central 
leadership closely. This can be attributed to the popular paradigm of that time, the 
totalitarian paradigm. The image is one of a straight jacket. The second generation 
slightly altered this image by saying that cadres in the countryside had to 
accommodate their role to the village situation. They did have to obey the instruction 
from above, but somehow, they managed to bend it a little bit.
The third generation successfully opens the Pandora’s box: rural cadres go
65Oi, Jean. "The Fate o f  the Collective after the Commune," Deborah Davis and Ezra F. Vogel 
(eds.), Chinese Society on the Eve o f Tiananmen. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1990: pp. 
15-36; this argument is further developed in her latest article, "Fiscal Reform and the Economic 
Foundations o f Local State Corporatism in China," World Politics. XLV (1), 1992, PP. 99-126.
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their own way, pursuing their own interest. The image of a straight jacket becomes 
a myth. The decline of totalitarian paradigm has provided a new dimension to social 
research. More attention was paid more to the human aspect than to rigid institution. 
Scholars were excited to find that even in a society under a communist (totalitarian) 
regime there were still human beings with flesh and blood.
Thus, one can observe a radical shift in the understanding of cadres in China: 
from one which is stiff and straight to one which is soft and bent. People no longer 
view cadres as obedient agents but as officials with strong vested-interest. There is 
even a suggestion that current rural cadres are merely corrupt satraps!66 I would 
term this pattern of thinking as "the corruption paradigm," a paradigm which centres 
on the deviant behaviour of Party cadres to the extent of committing corruption.
The totalitarian paradigm and corruption paradigm both have their weaknesses 
and strengths. The difference between the totalitarian paradigm and corruption 
paradigm lies in the answer that they give to the question: what shapes the behaviour 
of cadres? To those who hold to the totalitarian paradigm, the behaviour of cadres is 
totally shaped by rules and regulations.67 Rural officials become obedient agents to 
the extent that they become mechanised. Their behaviour simply reflect state policy. 
To those who subscribe to the corruption paradigm, the behaviour of rural officials 
is shaped by vested interests either originating from the village community as a whole 
or from their private interests. Rural officials bend or even ignore rules and 
regulations from the state, and go their own way. Their behaviour simply reflect 
amorality.68
The totalitarian paradigm is obviously unrealistic in its assumption about
^U nger, Jonathan. "State and Peasant in Post-Revolution China". Journal o f  Peasant Studies: October 
1989: p. 135
67Totalitarian paradigm is best represented by the works o f  Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 
In their description, party members and cadres are highly selective and elitist, and are put under the rigid 
hierarchy and centralized power. "The membership is made to feel part o f  a constructive machine, led by 
dynamic leaders, achieving unprecedented goals. Their personal identity is submerged in the totality o f  the 
party, and the might o f  the party becomes a source o f persona] gratification." (p. 53) See, Friedrich, Carl. 
J. and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autocracy. Second edition, N ew  York: Preager, 
1965.
68The best known work based on this paradigm is one by Banfield, E.C. The Moral Basis o f a 
Backward Society. New York: Free Press, 1958. He uses the term "amoral familism" to describe the 
behaviour o f  rural officials in southern Italy.
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human nature. It is difficult to imagine human beings behaving like a machine. The 
corruption paradigm corrects this error. The state rules and policies are not fully 
implemented by rural officials. Nevertheless, corruption paradigm also contains two 
weak points. The first is more empirical than theoretical: data from the field reveal 
that village corruption in whatever form is not unlimited. Either their superiors or 
their villagers put limits on the corrupt behaviour of the cadres. The second has 
something to do with the epistemological assumption contained in the corruption 
paradigm. On this I will discuss at length below.
The theoretical assumption of the corruption paradigm is the ideal type of a 
rational bureaucracy which is systematically proposed by Max Weber. A rational 
bureaucracy, he said, must be rational and eliminate "love, hatred, and all purely 
personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation."69 Weber 
even said that bureaucracy has to be "dehumanised." Bureaucrats simply act on the 
basis of rationality: "precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, 
continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction, and of 
material and personal costs. "70
However, it must also be made explicit that rational bureaucracy - in 
Weber’s conceptualization - is not expected to be found everywhere. Rational 
bureaucracy is closely linked with capitalism. "Today, it is primarily the capitalist 
market economy which demands that the official business of public administration be 
discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with as much speed as 
possible. Normally, the very large modem capitalist enterprises are themselves 
unequalled models of strict bureaucratic organization."71 In other words, the advance 
of bureaucratic rationality is an inevitable component of the growth of capitalism.72
Weber unambiguously states that rational bureaucracy will only be existent in
69Max Weber, Economy and Society. Vol. II, Berkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 1968,
p. 975.
70Ibid.. p. 973.
71Ibid.. p. 974.
72 •Giddens, Anthony Politics and Sociology in the Thought o f  Max W eber. London: Macmillan Press, 
1972, p. 47.
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urban society. This is related to the internal prerequisite of a rational bureaucracy, 
that is money economy.73 Money is necessary to the success and maintenance of a 
rigorous mechanization of the bureaucratic apparatus because salary is connected with 
the opportunity of a career. 74 Clearly Weber does not imagine that rural societies 
can develop a rational bureaucracy: "Hence the degree of administrative
bureaucratization has in urban communities with fully developed money economies 
not infrequently been relatively greater than in the contemporaneous and much larger 
territorial states."75
The corruption paradigm, therefore, cannot be used to analyze rural society 
because it is not within the scope of Weber’s ideal type. It is solely applicable to 
capitalist urban society, but less so to rural society. China’s rural society is a society 
which possesses all rural characteristics notwithstanding the presence of a rationalised 
bureaucracy.76 Like any developing country, China is characterised by internal 
"dualism," meaning "the coexistence of modernised centres together with large 
agrarian regions in which cash-crop economies predominate.1,77 This dualism, in 
fact, consists of asymmetrical divide where rural society constitutes the majority of 
the population.
It becomes obvious that while the totalitarian paradigm overemphasises the 
rules and regulations, the corruption paradigm one-sidedly focuses on the non- 
rational character of human behaviour. Corruption paradigm, evidently, downplays 
all non-rational action as corrupt in favour Weberian rational typology. As such, 
corruption paradigm falls into the trap of value judgement. Indeed, which is "bad"
73Ibid.. p. 964.
74Ibid.. p. 968.
75Ibid.
76Despite the emergence o f  rational bureaucracy, curiously, communist regimes tries to maintain the 
continuance o f  rural society. Although it is never pronounced officially, a communist regime strategically 
wants peasants to remain peasants. This actually can be attributed to the fact that within Marxist 
movements there is a strong bias toward peasants. See, Bideleux, Robert Communism and Development. 
London: Methuen, 1985, p. 1 and p. 134.
77Giddens, Anthony The Nation-state and V iolence. Volume Two o f  A Contemporary Critique o f  
Historical Materialism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985, p. 274.
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for the state is not necessarily so for the village community.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this dissertation, therefore, I contradict the previous arguments contained in both 
by the totalitarian paradigm and corruption paradigm. I will argue, instead, that the 
behaviour of village Party secretaries is shaped both by the Party rules and peasant 
community. My argument is grounded on the theory on "nominal encapsulation" 
introduced by Bailey. This concept argues that if village society is nominally 
encapsulated by the state, then the village can retain its unique interests; it enjoys a 
certain degree of autonomy from the state, and ultimately can generate increasingly 
assertive peasant villagers. In this situation, rural leaders, who are state agents, are 
located at a very pivotal juncture: if they want to exercise their authority, then they 
must be able to accommodate the pressures of both parties. They need both the state 
and the village as the source of legitimization of their authority. This attempt results 
in what I term "ruralisation of authority." I will elaborate this framework in three 
steps.
A. Nominal encapsulation
Reform in communist countries is a highly complex process. Holmes, for one, argues 
that Party control diminishes as its legitimacy deteriorates among the population. The 
Party in the beginning of its reign relied heavily on the "man who guided the 
revolutionary takeover," but this situation cannot be sustained as the revolutionary 
leaders passed away. The population which now consists of younger generations and 
"people who are still hostile to it" will withdraw their support unless change in the 
economy is carried out.
Holmes says that under new leaders the Party has to carry out reform, and to 
operate "more in bi- than in its former essentially uni-directional manner." The Party 
must demonstrate "a greater willingness to listen to the people than before."78 In
78Holmes, Leslie, Politics in the Communist World. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 140.
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other words, the Party control is to be loosened; this, in turn, will legitimise the
advent of new leaders.
Johnson, in similar vein, argues that as the party embarks on modernization,
it has no other choice but to loosen its control.79 Economic modernization in
communist countries, he says, is like a "built-in boomerang." 80
"[...] by the time the modernised sector of the mobilization regime is 
manufacturing jet aircraft, computers, and nuclear reactors, its role structure 
has become extraordinarily specialised and complex. At this point the regime 
is forced to relax some of its clearly dysfunctional controls (such as the use 
of terror), thereby the door to the possibility of rising demands that the basic 
developmental imbalance be corrected,"
Johnson argues that from economic point of view, modernization requires "a certain 
degree of tranquillity" and, more importantly, a high degree of efficiency. It cannot 
afford political intervention arising out of ideological consideration. The Party must 
relax its total control over society.81
The arguments developed by both Holmes and Johnson are illuminating. 
Reform, either because of the advent of new leaders or of modernization, compels the 
regime to relax the control of the Party. To be able to survive, the regime must - 
paradoxically - share some of its power with society.
In China, this process took place not long after Mao Zedong, the paramount 
revolutionary leader of China, died in 1976. The reformers headed by Deng 
Xiaoping, after ousting Hua Guofeng, embarked on the path of Reform in 1978. As 
predicted by Holmes and Johnson, in order to support the Reform, Deng initiated a 
number of policies of relaxing political control. Indeed, in the early years of Reform, 
China saw the rise of democracy wind as demonstrated by the Democracy Wall.82 
The relaxation of control as a result of Reform is summarised by Harry
79Johnson, Chalmers "Comparing Communist Nations" in Chalmers Johnson (ed.1 Change in 
Communist System s. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970, pp. 1-32.
8QIbid.. p. 22.
81Ibid.. p. 23.
82MacFarquhar, Roderick "The Succession to Mao and the end o f Maoism, 1969-82," in Roderick 
MacFarquhar (ed.) The Politics o f China. 1949-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 
321-325.
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Harding in five points:83
(1) Encouragement of a reconciliation between the party and society by 
reducing the scope and arbitrariness of political intervention in daily life;
(2) expansion of opportunities for popular participation in political affairs, 
albeit with limits on both the form and content of political expression;
(3) efforts to revitalise all institutions of governance, by restaffing them with 
younger and better educated officials, and by granting them greater autonomy 
from party control;
(4) measures to restore normalcy and unity to elite politics, so as to bring to 
an end the chronic instability of the late Maoist period and to create a more 
orderly process of leadership succession; and
(5) steps to redefine the content and role of China’s official ideology, so as 
to create a new basis for authority in contemporary Chinese politics.
The relaxation of control takes a more radical form in the countryside than in 
the cities. While the work unit system fdanwei) is still kept in place in urban areas, 
the commune system - the parallel system in the countryside - was abolished. If 
during the commune era life in the villages was highly regimented, after Reform 
(1978) peasants are freed from all bondage. The state in China removed all 
oppressive control over villages which is manifested in six areas:
(1) politics: the three-tier commune structure is replaced by a looser structure 
(township and villagers’ committee) in which peasants can enjoy a high degree 
of autonomy;
(2) economy: the planned system of production, distribution and consumption 
is replaced by the household responsibility system which allows peasants to 
produce according to their wish;
(3) social mobility: although the hukou (residential registration) system has 
not been formally abolished, peasants are free to travel or move any where in 
China without the need for permission from the authority;
83Harding, Harry "Political Development in Post-Mao China," in A. Doak Barnett and Ralph N. 
Clough (eds.), Modernizing China. Post-Mao Reform and Development. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, 
p. 17.
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(4) religion: peasants are not prohibited to believe in religion or folk religion;
(5) social structure: households become the basic accounting unit of society, 
replacing the production teams.
(6) social relations: the removal of class-labels terminates the state-made 
discrimination.
To describe this situation I borrow the concept developed by F.G. Bailey, 
’nominal encapsulation,’ a concept which describes the relations between the state and 
the villages where the state encapsulates the countryside at the nominal degree.84 
What has happened in the countryside since Reform (1978) is basically a new effort 
by the state to encapsulate the villages in new way by retaining only the basic 
structure. Instead of making peasants live in "honeycomb pattern" of villages85 or 
in a "caste-like system,"86 the state releases them by breaking the rigid structure of 
the commune and restores their autonomy. This situation is "nominal" only in 
comparison with that of the commune era when peasant lives were highly regimented. 
Thus, the term "nominal encapsulation" is used within the perspective of China’s 
internal historical changes, and not in world-wide comparative perspective.87
The nominal encapsulation brings two immediate effects. The first is that it 
restores the enthusiasm of the peasants to produce more grain and to start enterprises 
(village-owned or private). The spectacular increase of grain production as well as 
rapid development of village enterprises are testimony to this.88 Secondly, it also
84The opposite o f  nominal encapsulation are "predatory encapsulation" or "radical encapsulation," 
each o f them demonstrates a higher degree o f  encapsulation. Bailey developed these concepts to analyze 
a village in India. Bailey, F.G. Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology o f  Politics, New York: 
Schocken Books, 1969, pp. 149-152.
85Shue, Vivienne The Reach o f the State. Sketches o f  the Chinese Body Politics. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1988, p. 50.
86Potter, Sulamith Heins and Jack M. Potter, China’s Peasants. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990, pp. 296-312.
87Bailey, in fact, argues that all the developing countries invariably adopt the strategy o f "radical 
encapsulation." Ibid.. p. 151.
88Ody, Anthony J. Rural Enterprises Development in China. 1986-1990. Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 1992.
32
helps to enhance the assertiveness of peasants after Reform (1978). Freedom and 
assertiveness are linked to each other: because they know that they have freedom, 
therefore they become assertive. This assertiveness is manifested in various forms 
such as acts of non-compliance, protests,89 rebellion, violence.90
B. Redefinition of roles
The nominal encapsulation has a direct and significant impact on the roles of village 
party secretaries. Although the presence of the party branches in the villages were not 
affected by changes as a result of decollectivization, and they continued to retain their 
preeminent position in the villages, the new political structure as well as the assertive 
peasants make the old roles of party secretaries of the commune era ("the commander 
in ch ie f) increasingly untenable. To cope with the new situation, new roles have to 
be redefined both by the state and society.
First, from the state perspective ("from above"), the central leadership asks 
the party secretaries to continue to stay in their villages.. Yet, given the situation of 
nominal encapsulation, the central leadership asks them to be "state agents" and 
"entrepreneurial agents." The role of state agent refers to the job of implementing 
all policies of the state intended to promote agriculture with final end to extract the 
surplus. I include the enforcement of birth-control within the role of state agent. It 
must be noted here that I do not make a distinction between "the state" and "the 
Party" as, in terms of policies, they are indistinguishable.91 The term "state"
89O’Brien, Kevin J. and Lianjiang Li "The Politics o f  Lodging Complaints in Rural China," China 
Quarterly. No. 143, September 1995, pp. 756-783.
90Perry, Elizabeth "Rural Collective Violence: The Fruits o f Recent Reforms," Elizabeth J. Perry and 
Christine Wong (eds.), The Political Economy o f  Reform in Post-Mao China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985, pp. 175-192.
91 *There are, however, a number o f  attempts to draw a sharp distinction between the state and the
Party; see, for example, Shirk’s distinction o f  the Party and the state as one o f  "principal" and "agent." 
Shirk, Susan. The Political Logic o f Economic Reform in China. Berkeley, CA: University o f  California 
Press; 1993; pp. 55-56. For a detailed description o f the current relationship between the Party and the state 
in China after Reform (1978), see Cabestan, Jean-Pierre La ysteme politique de la Chine nopulaire. Paris: 
PUF, 1994, pp. 215-222.
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includes both the state and the Party.92 The role as entrepreneurial agent refers to 
his job to accelerate economic growth in the village with xiaokang (comfortable life 
level) as target. It is a job with a mandate to start an enterprise, to raise fund for it, 
and to run it.
Secondly, from the society perspective ("from below") village party secretaries 
are under considerable "moral obligation" to accommodate to the demands of his 
fellow villagers and members of their lineages who are uninhibited in showing their 
assertiveness. Firstly, their fellow villagers demand that the party secretary becomes 
their protector against undesirable state policies. This is a role which I term "moral 
middleman" because he interrelates the village and the township and at the same 
time, protects the interest of his village simply on the basis of moral considerations. 
Secondly, the people from his kin (who also resist similar state policies) demand that 
they give them special preferences over those who do not belong to the lineage.93 
I term this role as the role of "lineage patron."
The pressures "from below" are real and unavoidable. One factor which 
contributes significantly to this is the fact that village party secretaries are invariably 
local peasants. Being a local peasant, a village party secretary cannot act as a stranger 
who may be able to make a cool decision on all crucial and vital issues in the village. 
The fundamental reason for this is that a village is - in Bailey’s words - a "moral 
community" where the interaction of its members is characterised by continuous 
judgment of right and wrong.94 Madsen pushes even further by saying that in such
92I am referring to the definition by Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’Leary o f the state: "all 
institutions which are differentiated from the rest o f its society as to create identifiable public and private 
spheres." Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’Leary, Theories o f the State. The Politics o f  Liberal 
Democracy. London: Macmillan, 1987, p. 2.
93
Few who have delved into the intricacies o f  Chinese history would deny that kinship groups (based 
on patrilineal descent) have played a leading role in political and economic affairs. Lineages, clans and 
surname groups were found in all levels o f society; member o f  China’s ruling elite often used the bonds 
o f common descent to serve their own political ends;" James L. Watson, "Chinese Kinship Reconsidered: 
Anthropological Perspectives on Historical Research," The China Quarterly. No. 92, 1982, pp. 589-627.
^B ailey , F.G. "The Peasant View o f the Bad Life," in Teodor Shanin (ed.), Peasants and Peasant 
Societies. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971, p. 302.
34
a community there exist "moral discourses" which shape the behaviour the leaders.95 
The enhancement of village as moral community, in the last analysis, cannot also be 
separated from the situation of nominal encapsulation which serves as a precondition 
to it.
Hence, after Reform (1978), under the situation of nominal encapsulation, 
both the state and society (village community) redefine the roles for the village party 
secretary: state agent, entrepreneurial agent, moral middleman, and lineage patron.
C. Ruralisation of authority
This situation puts the party secretaries under double pressure as each side demand 
complete allegiance. This is clearly reflected in the study by Rozelle. On the basis of 
his vast observations and interviews with 75 township and village leaders in Jiangsu 
Province and Hubei Province, he systematically describes six goals that a village 
leader has in mind: status, promotion, job security, independence from higher 
officials, personal profit, and commitment to the village.96 The first three goals 
apparently reflect village leaders’ dependence over their superiors. High status is 
obtained through the achievement of programmes set by the township, whereas 
promotion and job security are decided by their superiors at the township and the 
county. The last three items reflect, on the other hand, village leaders’ concern of 
their personal interest and dependence over their constituents.
Rozelle makes a strong point in arguing that "they must balance the interests 
of the township officials with those of their local constituents."97 A Party secretary 
cannot ignore the instruction from higher authorities and at the same time cannot 
overlook the interests of his fellow villagers. If he leans too much toward his 
superior, he will lose support from his fellow villagers. If he is too much in favour
95In his book, Madsen distinguishes, during the Maoist period, three moral discourses, Confucian, 
Liuist and Maoist, but each has its own paradigm which is irreconcilable to each other. Madsen, Richard, 
Morality and Power in a Chinese Village. Berkeley, CA: University o f California, 1984.
OX
Rozelle, Scott D .op.cit.
97Ibid.. p. 31-32.
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his fellow villagers, he will loose his position. He must be able to shoulder all the 
burdens imposed by both sides, and by bearing all those responsibilities, he will 
please both parties.
In other words, a party secretary has to be able to balance the pressures which 
come "from above" (the state) and those "from below" (village community). On the 
one hand, as demanded by his superiors, he will play the role of "state agent" and the 
role of "entrepreneurial agent." On the other hand, to accommodate to the demands 
of his fellow villagers and his lineage, he will have to play the role of "moral 
middleman" and the role of "lineage patron." I describe the phenomenon of a 
village party secretary playing four roles to accommodate double pressures as the 
"ruralisation of authority." "Authority" is defined as "a basis for the securing of 
assent or compliance concerning a decision or course of action." 98 The term "rural" 
is used to refer to a complex reality of peasants and peasant community. The concept 
of ruralisation of authority is to explain the process of a village party secretary 
adopting four roles as a result of the interaction between the state and peasants.
Authority conferred by the state to a village party secretary is to enable him 
to incur compliance from the villagers. The two roles from the state (state agent and 
entrepreneurial agent) are performed on the basis of such authority. Yet, contrary to 
Weber’s expectation, this authority is rendered ineffective if it is not endorsed by the 
population,99 and according to its specific values and beliefs.100 As made clear 
above, in the village context, rural population or peasants endorse an authority only 
insofar as the person concerned show the ability to protect their interests vis-a-vis the 
state. The adoption of the roles as demanded by peasants (moral middleman and 
lineage patron) is therefore part of the attempts of a village party secretary to show 
to his fellow villagers that he is able to do the job they demand. In this way, his 
authority is endorsed by peasants according to peasants’ values and beliefs, or his
98Roberts, Geoffrey K. A Dictionary o f Political Analysis. London: Longman, 1971, p. 14.
99Friedman, Richard B. "On the Concept o f Authority in Political Philosophy," in R. Flathman (ed.), 
Concents in Social and Political Philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1973
100Flathman, Richard E. The Practice o f Political Authority. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1980.
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authority is ruralised.
To sum up, the argument of this dissertation proceeds as follows. As China’s 
central leadership embarks on the path of reform, the CCP undertakes the policy of 
relaxation of political control which, in the countryside, takes form of nominal 
encapsulation. Nominal encapsulation, in turn, shapes the behaviour of the village 
party secretaries toward the ruralisation of authority which combines four distinct 
roles in one hand, two from the state (the role of state agent and the role of 
entrepreneurial agent) and from society (the role of moral middleman and the role of 
lineage patron). Schematically, this argument can be described as follows:
NOMINAL ENCAPSULATION --------- >  RURALISATION OF AUTHORITY
III. METHODOLOGY
Ideally, a hypothesis is tested through one of three strategies: case study, comparative 
methods, and quantitative methods.101 The case study is to be adopted if the 
researcher wishes to construct a full portrait through close analysis; it basically 
emphasises, in Ragin’ words, many features but less cases.102 The quantitative 
method, conversely, is used to obtain broad knowledge of relations among variables. 
Thus, it covers many cases but less features. The comparative study stands between 
the two extremes where "there are too many cases for close, detailed investigation of
101Ragin, Charles C. Constructing Social Research. London: Pine Forge Press, 1994.
102Ibid.. p. 78.
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each case, but too few for quantitative analysis."103 This strategy allows us to 
identify and uncover complex patterns of similarities and differences.
The latter strategy seems to be most appropriate for testing the hypothesis of 
this study. For instance, we select a dozen of villages which are randomly selected 
in the whole of China, and spend one month at each village to conduct in-depth 
interviews with the village party secretaries. In addition, we also conduct a national 
survey of village party secretaries to complement the in depth-interviews. However, 
given the sensitive nature of the research, it is impossible to conduct such a strategy 
of research. Although China is more open to foreign researchers, research on the 
roles of village party secretaries remains politically sensitive.
Therefore, the hypothesis of this study is tested through a survey of published 
documents. The chapters on roles assigned by the central leadership are grounded on 
the survey on documents released by the office of the Central Committee of the CCP 
and handbooks designed to provide guidance to party branch secretaries. As to the 
chapters on roles demanded by the villagers, the approach is to gather as many cases 
as possible, both from newspapers and journals. Then, this data is corroborated with 
statistics by Chinese scholars in China, to arrive to a level of generalisation and 
overcome subjective bias. To check and clarify certain topics which are not 
immediately clear from published documents, I made several visits to a village to do 
observation.
Below, I explain the quality of the sources of my database.
A. Published documents
Oksenberg classifies five types of published documents in China: (1) the mainland 
press - books, journals, and newspapers - and monitored radio broadcasts; (2) 
interviews with and publications of former residents of Mainland China; (3) accounts 
by people who have visited the mainland; (4) Chinese fiction, particularly novels and 
short stories; and (5) secret Chinese documents and other data obtained covertly and
,03ibid.
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released by non-PRC agencies.104 In a later article, Oksenberg indicates that China 
in 1990s provides unprecedented wealth of primary da ta /05 He notes several novel 
developments in terms of the availability of primary sources: first, the "documentary 
collections" on high-level politics from the inception of the party to the Deng era; 
secondly, local gazetteers and archives at the local levels; thirdly, statistical 
information in the form of statistical yearbooks, encyclopedias, compendia, and 
almanacs. 106
How reliable is the Chinese media? It is pertinent here to quote a statement 
by a researcher on Chinese media:107
"Mass media may show deviation from the official party line as a result of 
intraparty struggles, relaxed control from the party center, existence of liberal 
local leadership, vested interest in particular issues, genuine beliefs on the part 
of journalists, as well as attempts to lure audience and advertising money."
This does not mean that Chinese media is as free as that in the West; it only indicates 
that, for researchers, the media can provide valuable data as they are not put under 
strict control as before.
For this dissertation I rely on three types of published documents: 
newspapers, journals, and books; all of them are in Chinese and published in China.
a. Newspapers. Newspapers have been widely used by scholars as primary
104Oksenberg, M ichel. "Sources and Methodological Problems in the Study o f  Contemporary China." 
Chinese Communist Politics in Action. A. Doak Barnett (ed.) Seattle: University o f  Washington Press, 
1969, pp. 577-606.
105Oksenberg, Michel "The American Study o f  Modern China: Toward the Twenty-first Century," 
in David Shambaugh (ed.) American Studies o f Contemporary China. Armonk, NY: M .E. Sharpe, 1993.
i06On this point, he remarks: "China is now the best recorded o f  the developing countries." Ibid.. 
p. 335.
107Chan, Joseph Man "Calling the Tune without Paying the Piper: The Reassertion o f Media Controls 
in China," in Lo Chi Kin et al. (eds.), China Review 1995. Hong Kong: The Chinese University o f  Hong 
Kong, 1995, p. 5 .10 .
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resources.108 As Schurmann has expounded, Chinese newspapers invariably are 
structured according to one principle, "from top down and from bottom up."109 
There are two types of articles which transmit policies from the central leadership, 
and there are two types of articles which illustrate the implementation of the policies 
with concrete stories from everyday life. "Concrete experiences are stressed because 
the Chinese Communists believe that policies are best understood in practice."110
The first type of the article usually contains success story of fulfilling a certain 
target of a policy, the second takes the form of criticism and it is always directed 
against individuals. Both types of articles, in my case, are about individual Party 
secretaries, one is a good Party secretary and another is a bad Party secretary.
Two major newspapers become my main sources: Renmin ribao (People’s 
Daily) and Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily). The latter contains more cases about 
village Party secretaries than the former because Peasants’ Daily is intended to 
addresses the need of peasants directly. Specifically about Nongmin ribao. according 
to Gordon White, recently, it does not only function as the state’s loudspeaker but 
also society’s voice.111
"Another source of political pressure on agricultural issues, which only 
emerged during the reform era, was the media, in particular the Peasants’ 
Daily (Nongmin ribao') which increasingly took on the role of advocating 
rural/agricultural interests, particularly from the mid-1980s onwards as the 
condition of agriculture deteriorated."
b» Journals. Journals often contain quantitative information acquired through a
108Walder, Andrew G. "Press Accounts and the Study o f  Chinese Society," China Quarterly. No. 79, 
1979, pp. 588-607.
109Schurmann, on .cit.. p. 66.
li0Ibid.. p. 64.
111White, Gordon Riding the Tieer. The Politics o f  Economic Reform in Post-Mao China, London: 
Macmillan, 1993, p. 90.
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survey.112 Stanley Rosen categorises three types of journals which contain survey 
research conducted by Chinese social scientists:113 first, academic/professional 
journals published by social science academies; second, journals published by 
universities; third, journals published by provincial and municipal research 
institute.114 There are problems related with the data, especially after the June 4 
Incident, yet Rosen is quite confident that they can be used to test a hypothesis.
Some journals do publish articles analysing the situation of the Party 
secretaries in the villages. Some other journals publish survey of peasant reaction to 
the cadres. The authors normally provide a great number of statistics.
c. Books. There are two types of books about rural cadres, including secretaries: 
first, books published by party organizations; second, books published by research 
institutes. Books belonging to the first category are designed to provide a detailed 
guidance to grass-root cadres on every aspects of Party organization. These books are 
useful to know the official demands on cadres. Intended to give moral persuasion, 
some books contain a collection of stories of good Party secretaries.115
In the second category are academic books which report survey of villages and 
villagers. Some contain statistics related to cadres. These are books written by 
academicians with academic interest. For instance, a survey on the emergence of clan 
in the villages,116 or social stratification.117
112On the value o f  these surveys, see Manion, Melanie "Survey research in the study o f  contemporary 
China: learning from local samples," China Quarterly. No. 139, September 1994, pp. 741-765.
113Rosen, Stanley, "Students and the State in China: The Crisis in Ideology and Organization." State 
& Society in China, ed. Athur Lewis Rosenbaum, pp. 167-192. Boulder, Co: W estview Press, 1992, pp. 
167-192; see also Rosen, Stanley and David Chu. Survey Research in the People’s Republic o f  China 
Washington, DC: US Information Agency, 1987; "Value Change among Post-Mao Youth: The Evidence 
from Survey Data." Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People’s Republic, eds. Perry 
et al. Link. pp. 193-216. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
ll4Rosen, Stanley, "Students and the State in China," on .cit.. footnote no. 1, p. 186.
ll5For instance, a book which contains stories o f  200 good Party secretaries: Chen Yeping and Pei 
Shi, Zai danezhibu shuii de gangwei xia (Under the post o f Party branch secretaries), Shenyang: Baishan 
chubanshe, 1991.
116Wang Huning, Dangdai zhongguo cunluo iiazu wenhua (Contemporary Chinese village clan 
culture), Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1991.
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B. Observation
I conducted my observation in a village in Xiangyin County, Hunan Province where 
I spent one full month in 1993. During my stay I was accepted as an overseas 
Chinese, and I was allowed to stay in a family house. This stay gave me an ample 
opportunity to make observations on various aspects of village life. More important, 
I was able to make observations about the interaction among cadres, between cadres 
and peasants, and between Party secretaries and peasants. In addition to that, I also 
took the opportunity to talk with the party secretary of the village and the rural 
cadres.
117Hu Jilian (ed.), Zhongguo nonghu iingii xinewei vaniiu (A survey o f  peasant household economic 
behaviour in China), Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1992.
42
CHAPTER TWO 
THE MAKING OF A VILLAGE PARTY SECRETARY
"We should do a good job 
in selecting party branch secretaries," 
(Editorial Renmin ribao. 29 October 1994)
How is a village party secretary elected? What type of party secretaries are elected? 
How long are they permitted to stay in office? These are questions which are to be 
addressed before we enter into the discussion on the roles of village party secretaries. 
This is because the way village party secretaries are elected is one of the crucial 
factors which contributes significantly in shaping the way party secretaries behave. 
Party secretaries who are elected by party members only may be accountable to the 
party members, and less to the villagers. Party secretaries who are elected among 
villagers will naturally have more attachment to their own village than those who are 
not. Indeed, party secretaries who are elected from those who are ideologically 
motivated will have different work ethics from those who are not.
This chapter will be divided into three main sections. The first section will 
describe the standard procedure of election of a village party secretary; this section 
presents what is formally demanded by the central leadership. The second section is 
to present what is happening in the field. We will look into the variants as well as 
deviance from the standard procedure. The third section seeks to find the common 
pattern of the processes of electing party secretaries in villages.
I. THE STANDARD PROCEDURE OF ELECTION
A. Qualities required as candidates for party secretaries
To be elected as a party secretary, first of all, he/she should have been a party
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member for at least two years. This is the formal requirement.1 This means that one 
can become a party secretary only when he/she is twenty years of age as the minimal 
age requirement to enter the Party is eighteen.2 Besides this, there is another set of 
requirements.
The first set of qualities demanded by the central leadership to select any 
cadres, including village party secretaries, is what is widely known as decai iianbei. 
According to this standard, those who would like to take positions of cadres should 
have "morality" (de) and "talent" (cai). "Morality," here, refers to political attitude 
and thinking; and "talent" refers to work ability and professional work.3 A cadre 
should have both qualities, none of them can be missed out.
This standard was, then, complemented by another demand, namely "si hua" 
or "four process". As the central leadership, in the beginning of Reform, aimed at 
reforming the leaders of party organizations at the grass-root so that they were fitted 
to the cause of Reform, they laid down four demands: young, educated, skillful, and 
revolutionary. Thus si hua consists of rejuvenation, intellectualization, specialization, 
revolutionization.4 This programme was launched by Hu Yaobang at the occasion of 
the Twelfth Party Congress (1982)5 Thus, to become a cadre one must possess, at 
least, six qualities.
To become a party branch secretary, however, there are additional 
requirements. According to a handbook for the party branch secretary, these
lwDangzhibu shiiji de zhuyao zhize he zhengzhi yewu suzhi." (the main function and the political and 
professional quality o f a Party branch secretary) in Jiao Gengqiang and Jing Ri (eds.), Dangzhibu gongzuo 
shouce (A Manual for the work o f  a Party branch), Beijing: Zhongguo zhengzhi daxue, 1991, p. 116.
Party Charter (1982), Article 1, states: "Any Chinese worker, peasant, member o f the armed forces, 
intellectual o f  any other revolutionary who has reached the age o f  18 and who accepts the Party’s 
programme and Charter and is willing to join and work actively in one o f the Party organizations, carry 
out the Party decisions and pay membership dues regularly may apply for membership o f  the Chinese 
Communist Party."
3 "Decai iianbei" in Jing Bin (ed.), Zhongguo gongchandang da cjdjan (Grand dictionary o f the 
Communist Party o f  China), Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1991. p. 300.
4In Chinese, they are qingnianhua. zhishihua. zhuanyehua, geminghua.
5H u Yaobang, Quanmian kaichuang shehui zhuvi xiandaihua jianshe de xin jumian (Thoroughly create 
the new situation o f building socialist modernization) in NN, Shi vi lie san zhongquanhui vilai zhongyao 
wenxian xuandu (Collection o f  important documents since the third plenum o f the eleventh party congress), 
Vol. I, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987, p. 514.
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requirements include "six abilities" fliu hui): (1) ability in doing party work; (2) 
ability in giving lectures on the Party; (3) ability to manage and monitor party 
members; (4) ability to tackle problems arising within the Party; (5) ability to carry 
out the work on ideology and politics; (6) ability to mobilize the functions of mass 
organizations such as the Chinese Youth League and Women’s Federation.6 These 
are actual qualities that a leader, or more specifically, a party leader should possess.
But, a special handbook for party branch secretaries lists not less than twenty 
two qualities that party secretaries should master; they range from moral qualities 
to skill. These are: to have strong political principles, to master the Party’s line, 
general and specific principles, to master the fundamentals of Marxism, to have the 
spirit of wholehearted service to the people, to observe Party discipline, to have a 
strong Party spirit, to have a strong belief in communism, to have the spirit of self- 
sacrifice for the Party and the people, to think and act in the same way, to be modest 
and prudent, to develop the work style of the Party’s arduous struggle, to preserve 
honesty, to master Party history, to master the basic knowledge on the work of 
ideology and politics, to master natural science, to master social science, to master 
a certain degree of management science, to have a good ability of analysis, to have 
a certain degree of ability in coordinating organizations, to have a certain degree of 
ability of persuasion, to have a certain degree of ability in expressing oneself.7
So far, the qualities described are those which are required for general cadres 
or party secretaries. What are the specific requirements for village party secretaries? 
"A Handbook for Village Party Secretaries" presents all the twenty two qualities but 
they are organized into four clusters: politics, knowledge, ability, and work style.8 
One additional quality is about physical health. The reason given is: "Village party 
secretaries, being at the front line of the construction of double civilizations, must
6"Pangzhibushuii dadao ’liuhui’ de zhuyao neirong" (The main content o f  "six abilities" that a party 
branch secretary should reach), in Jiao Genqiang and Jing Ri (eds.), op .cit.. pp. 124-125. For more details, 
see General Political Department, Xin shiqi dangzhibu shuii ,linhuiT gaivao (Essentials o f  ’six abilities’ for 
party branch secretaries o f  a new era), Beijing: Changcheng chubanshe, 1990.
7
Li Kunrui, Dangzhibu shuii gongzuo shouce (Handbook for the work o f  party branch secretaries), 
Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1992, pp. 75-100.
Zhang Dianzhong, Nongcun dangzhibu shuii shouce (A handbook for village party branch 
secretaries), Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1990, pp. 28-30.
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work hard not only by using their mouths to talk but also their hands to work. They 
must often work from dawn to dusk. Their job is very heavy."9
B. Candidates for party secretaries
Where do candidates for party secretaries come from? None of the official documents 
specify that candidates for village party secretaries should come from party members 
of the party branches in their villages. However, it may have become a common 
practice that party secretaries, invariably, come from the party branches of the village 
where they are from. For instance, from Qiu Zhirong’s investigation of 735 village 
party secretaries, he found out that, in the process of searching for candidates for 
party secretaries, they used the principle "jiudi qucai" or "draw on local resources." 
As a result, 95 per cent of them are local people.10
Local people are usually peasants. Recently, there has been a growing trend 
where peasants who become party secretaries have done the military service for some 
time. Many years ago, these peasants applied to join the military service, and served 
for a number of years. Due to various reasons, they came back to their own villages. 
These retired servicemen, upon returning to their villages, are elected party 
secretaries. For instance, in the suburban districts of Jingin city (Shandong Province) 
52 per cent of the ex-servicemen assumed the job as party secretaries.11 Similar 
reports also came from Henan Province,12 Hubei Province,13 Fujian Province.14
9Ibid.. p. 30.
10Qiu Zhirong was Dongtai City Party Committee Secretary (Dongtai city is in Jiangsu Province). 
Qiu Zhirong, "Nongcun dangzhibu shuii duiwu iianshe de dongtai vangiiu (Dynamic investigation o f  the 
construction o f  the contingents o f village party secretaries) Dang shi wen hui. 1989, No. 4 , pp. 28-30. See, 
also NN. "Nongcun dangzhibu shuii houii fan ren xianxiang chu tan" (A preliminary investigation on the 
phenomenon o f  the dearth o f successors to the post village Party branch secretary) Dang iian (Beijing), 
1989, No. 6 , pp. 12 & 47.
n Renmin Ribao, 28 April 1991, p. 2.
12 , . . . .
"Zhibu shi uchu, shun shi guaniian: xinmi xuanba ganbu dao nongcun renzhi." (The party branch
is the foundation, the party secretary is the crux: Xinmi City select cadres to be sent to villages to take up
jobs) Renmin ribao. 11 March 1995, p. 3 in Zhongguo renmin daxue shubao ziliao zhongxin, 1995, No.
3, p. 139.
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The advantage of employing retired soldiers, apparently, is that they have had lengthy 
training in organization and leadership skills, qualities which are needed to take up 
the job of party secretary (see, above).
The trend of assigning retired soldiers to become party secretaries seems to 
be an official policy. Zhao Zongnai, Deputy Head of the Central Organization 
Department, in his speech delivered during National Conference of Village 
Organizations in Caixi, Shandong Province, 5-8 October, 1990, argued that the 
selection of good party secretaries is crucial to the effort of constructing Qian she) the 
party branches.15 He, then, proposed that party secretaries can be selected from 
retired soldiers. This view is echoed four years later in the wake of the campaign of 
rural party rectification in 1994, by Zeng Xianqing when he expounded his theory on 
the construction of party branches in the countryside.16
Both Mr. Zhao and Mr. Zeng actually also support the idea of recruiting 
candidates for party secretaries from the staff of village enterprises and educated 
youths who return to their villages. They even propose cadres who are already 
working at the township. This proposal is intended to overcome shortages of 
candidates for party secretaries.17
13Zhang Xinmei, "Xianshi nongcun shequ zhone de shili renwu." (Powerful persons in the 
contemporary village community), Shehuixue vu shehui diaocha. 1992, No. 3, pp. 35- 38.
14"Xuan. nei, va. kao" (Select, educate, push, and check), Xiang-zhen luntan. No. 2, 1995, p. 4.
15Zhao Zongnai "Qieshi iiaqiang vi dangzhibu wei hexin de cunji zuzhi iianshe." (Carry out the 
strengthening o f  the construction o f  village-level organizations by taking the party branch as core) 
Xiang-zhen luntan. 1990, No. 9, pp. 6- 8,
16See, the article by Zeng Xianqing "Gaige kaifang zhong de nongcun iiceng dang zuzhi iianshe. (The 
construction o f  grass-root party organization in the countryside during reform and opening up]) Dangjian 
wenhui (Shenyang), 1994, No. 3 , pp. 4-5 in Zhongguo renmin daxue shubao ziliao zhongxin. 1994, No. 
3 , pp. 156-157.
17See, also Zhang Rui, "Shilun xin shiqi xuanba cun dangzhibu shuii de biaozhun vu tuiing." (A 
discussion on the standard and avenues for selecting village party branch secretaries in the new era) Fuxun 
shehui kexue (Liao), 1989, No. 12, pp. 13-14. The author proposes five channels o f  acquiring candidates 
for party secretaries: (1) from the village itself; (2) from the township organ; (3) from village enterprises 
or the neighbouring village; (4) from the retired cadres; (5) from the non-party activists. Cf. "Raining qu 
wei xiang houiin cun dangzhibu zhuru xinxian xueye." (Kaiping District Party Committee injected fresh 
blood into backward village party branches) Nongmin ribao. 25 December 1990, p. 3. Here, party 
secretaries are elected from those who run village enterprises, but also from the retired cadres who have 
been working at state-run enterprises or state organs or research units.
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The Fourth Plenum (1994) approved all of these proposals:18
"In some villages where suitable candidates for party branch secretaries cannot 
be found immediately, we may adopt such measures as selecting outstanding 
people from party and government bodies, as well as village and town 
enterprises, to take up jobs in the villages. We should broaden our horizons 
and widen the channels through which young intellectuals and retired 
servicemen in rural areas, key members in village enterprises and outstanding 
people who leave their hometowns to do business are uncovered in a planned 
manner and trained meticulously."
C. The procedure of election
The procedure of election within the party, after the introduction of Reform (1978) 
was laid down in the document released in February 1980, titled "Some Norms 
Concerning Political Life within the party."19 One of the norms, No. 8, governs the 
election which is actually a general norm to be applied to all elections within the 
party.
According to this norm, any election should proceed through four steps. First, 
the name of candidates are to be "fermented" fvunniang) among party members or 
their representatives. Secondly, party members or their representatives will approve 
the names of the candidates. Thirdly, the candidates will introduce themselves to the 
electors. Fourthly, election is conducted through secret ballot.20
The election of a party branch secretary also follows the norms which are fully 
incorporated in what is called "Provisional regulations of the CCP on the election 
work at the grass-root organization" (1990).21 According to these "Provisional
1 8 HCCP Circular on Strengthening Rural Primary and Grass-Roots Organizations," in SWB, 2 
December 1994, FE/2168 G/5.
19The Fifth Plenum o f  the Thirteenth Party Congress, "Guanyu dang nei zhengzhi shenghuo de ruogan 
zhunze." 29 February 1980, (Some Norms Concerning the Political Life within the Party), in Jing Bin 
(ed.), Zhongguo gongchandang da cidian (Grand dictionary o f  the Communist Party o f  China), Beijing: 
Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1991. p. 908-914.
20Ibid.. p. 912.
21See Zhongguo gongchandang iiceng zuzhi xuaniu gongzuo zanxing tiaoli (Provisional regulations o f  
the CCP on the election work at the grass-root organization), in Sun Qi and Zhang Kemin (eds.) Zhongguo 
gongchandang iiceng zuzhi xuaniu gongzuo wenda (Questions and answers on election work at the grass- 
root organization o f the CCP), Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1992, pp. 116-122.
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Regulations," the election of a party branch secretary should take place after the 
election of the functionaries of the party branch committee (Art. 16).22 A party 
secretary, thus, is not elected by the party branch congress, but by the new party 
branch committee. This does not mean that the party secretary is not responsible to 
the party congress. A party secretary, as the head of the party branch committee, is 
responsible to the party branch committee and, as member of the party branch 
committee, to the party branch congress; he must write regular reports to each 
bodies.
The process of election goes as follows. A list of names of candidates is 
prepared by the outgoing party branch committee (Art. 16). The outgoing party 
secretary presents the list to the members of the committee for "fermentation." They 
will make recommendation, and then make a preliminary selection.23
The second step is to send the list of names to the township party committee 
for approval (tongvi). (Art. 16) Thirdly, after the new party committee receives a list 
of names from the township, it will start the "fermentation" again.24 This stage of 
fermentation is different from the previous one because the new committee, 
supposedly, do not know the list of names in advance. Thus, this is a stage where the 
electors come to know the candidates and assess the quality of the candidates. 
Possibly, they get involved in debates about the suitability of the candidates. Most of 
the time, they may just approve, especially the incumbent party secretaries.
Finally, the election. Only the members of the new committee elect a new 
party secretary through a secret ballot and on the basis of absolute majority. The 
number of a party branch committee is not always big. The largest number permitted
All legal references in this section refers to this "Provisional regulations."
22A party branch has two bodies: the party branch congress where all members take part, and the party
branch committee which consists o f a selected party members to act as standing committee to the party 
branch congress. On the structure o f a party branch, see Appendix C.
23Sun Qi and Zhang Kemin, op .cit.. Question No. 84, p. 41.
is seven, and the smallest is three,25 Thus, in a village with a big party branch and 
a big party branch committee, the election of party secretary is probably quite 
exciting. Otherwise, it is just an event for a small number of people in a village.
After election, the new party secretary himself must go to the township party 
committee and report himself for approval.26 If the one who is elected as party 
secretary is not on the list previously agreed by the township party committee, then 
he will have to go through the process of scrutiny before being approved.27
The township party committee and its Department of Discipline Inspection 
supervise the process of election. (Art. 30) In case there is an irregularity, according 
to its gravity, they can impose punishment ranging from criticism to disciplinary 
action. (Art. 31)
In special circumstances, where a party branch does not have a committee, all 
party members will "ferment" names of candidates, and then bring them to the 
township party committee to be scrutinized and agreed upon. (Art. 13 and 16). 
Afterward, all party members within the Party Branch Congress elect a new party 
secretary,28
D. Re-election and terms of office
The term of office of a party branch secretary, including a village party branch 
secretary, is the same as that of the party branch committee. As the term of office 
for the party branch committee is only for two years, so is that of the party secretary. 
In other words, each time there is an election of a new party branch committee (every 
two years), a new party branch secretary is also elected.29 The idea behind this 
regulation is probably linked to the status of party secretary within the party branch
25See, Appendix C. Also, "Dang zhibu sheli de vuanze" (The principle o f  establishing a Party branch), 
in Jing Bin (ed.), op .c it.. p. 347.
26Sun Qi and Zhang Kemin, op .cit.. Question No. 89, p. 43.
27Ibid.
9R
Ibid.. Question 83, p. 41.
29 "Zhibu weiyuan hui" (The Party branch committee), in Jing Bin (ed.), op .c it.. p. 348
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committee, namely the head of the party branch committee.30
A party secretary can be re-elected for many times as there is no limit to the 
number of office terms for party secretaries (also for members of the party branch 
committee). This practice may have become a long tradition. A typical case is one 
which is reported by Qiu Zhirong, Dongtai City Party Committee Secretary 
(Jiangsu Province). From his investigation of 735 village party secretaries who were 
under his jurisdiction, he found party secretaries coming from many different 
generations: 8 per cent from the time of collectivization (1958), 52 per cent from the 
time of the Cultural Revolution, and 40 per cent after the introduction of Reform in 
1978.31 A report from Maoyou Village (Yuanjiang County, Hunan Province) 
explicitly argues about the long-life tenure of the party secretary. "As long as he does 
not make mistakes,32 is not ill, then he should not stand down."33
The Fourth Plenum (1994), as a matter of fact, supports the idea of re-electing 
the incumbent party secretaries. "We should support incumbent party branch 
secretaries who have been tested in practice, who are equal to their jobs and who 
enjoy popular support."34 This latest document, undoubtedly, further strengthens the 
tradition of re-electing incumbent party secretaries.
The reelection, however, is not always automatic. A party secretary can be 
asked to leave the post or even purged before his office term is finished. This usually 
happens during rectification campaigns. For example, Kang Nengcheng reported a 
rectification of "backward" party branches and their secretaries in 1989. At that time, 
there were 732.000 party branches and 15 per cent of them in the category 
"backward." Work teams were sent to the countryside, and one of the rectification 
activities was "to meticulously elect good party secretaries," after purging the old
30lbid.
31Qiu Zhirong, on .cit..
32 "Fan cuowu." in Chinese terminology, will include acts o f corruption.
33 "Jiii fazhan nongcun ningnian rudang" (Actively recruit young peasants to join the Party) Nongmin 
ribao. 9 April, 1985, p. 3.
^"CCP Ciruclar," op .cit.. p. 5.
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II. VARIANTS AND DEVIANCE
What is presented above is the standard procedure. In this section I will explore some 
variants from the standard procedure which are officially sanctioned. This is not 
issued as a policy by the office of Central Committee of the Party but as a practice 
reported in handbooks and journals which are published with official approval. They 
are not yet incorporated in the standard procedure but will, in the future, be 
eventually recognized as standard. In the second part, I will describe the deviance 
from the standard procedure; this is not officially sanctioned but does exist in some 
parts of China.
A. The officially sanctioned variants
1. The first four of the variants are reported in the "Handbook for the Work of Party 
Branches." They are all practised in Ji County, Tianjin. 36 The first is "competitive 
variant." The candidates for party secretaries are decided by the whole party members 
and villagers. There is a session to discuss the candidates and also an opinion poll. 
Afterward, candidates are elected. Each of these candidates, then, have to make a 
speech, explaining their programmes of work, in front of party members. Party 
members will again discuss the candidates and their programmes. Election takes place 
after this discussion.
In this variant, two things are noticeable. Firstly, party secretaries are elected 
by all party members, not only by the party branch committee. Secondly, the 
candidates are to present programmes of work on the basis of which they are elected. 
This is the competitive character of this variant. A candidate with a better programme
35In Chinese, Jingxin xuan hao dangzhibu shuii. See Kang Nengcheng "Jiaqiang nongcun iiceng zuzhi 
iianshe." (Strengthen the construction o f village grass-root organizations) in Zhongguo nongye nianiian 1991 
(China Agriculture Yearbook), 1991: pp. 141-142.
36Jiao Genqiang and Jing Ri (eds.), op.cit. "Xuanhao nongcun dangzhibu shuii de si ge fangfa" (Four 
methods o f selecting village party branch secretaries), p. 558-559.
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is elected. Thus, the chance of "entering through the backdoor" is minimized.
This first variant of election, apparently, has quite a long history. The 
Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily), at least, since 1988 already reported it. The report 
says that in Xiannanxi County (Sichuan Province), 288 village party secretaries were 
elected by party members, and not appointed by the township party committees. This 
initiative, however, faced stiff opposition by party members.37
This variant was accepted beyond Tianjin and Sichuan Province. Many reports 
come from various places in China on this variant. In Zunhua Township (Zunhua 
County, Hebei Province) party secretaries were elected by all party branch 
members.38 Candidates, two to four, after delivering their speeches on administering 
the village in front of party branch congress, had to answer questions raised by the 
present party members. Afterward, election was conducted through secret ballots. 
Candidates could be someone who recommends oneself, or was recommended by the 
party, or by the masses. They, then, were approved by the party. This practice was 
carried out in 25 villages in the township.
The Party Committee of Xian yang County (Hubei Province), it is reported, 
elected 122 new party branch secretaries by using new criteria, namely to have good 
knowledge on commodity economy, business, and management.39 The process of 
election itself was to follow "competitive procedure": the candidates were presented 
to the party members and the villagers, and let them "ferment." After that, the 
candidates were to give a speech and answer questions. The election was conducted 
openly, but only by party members. A similar practice also took place in Yancheng 
City (Jiangsu Province) where 1181 villages "conducted an open and competitive
37 "Minzhu xuaniu cun zhishu shi gaohao dangzhibu banzi de guaniian." (Democratically electing 
village party secretaries is critical for the success o f  village party branches) Nongmin ribao. 20 December 
1988, p. 3.
38 "Dangyuan men shuo. *Zhei cai shi zhen minzhu’." (All party members said: ’This is real 
democracy’," Nongmin ribao. 4 April, 1989, p. 3.
39Xiong Yuanhui and Zeng Jiangsheng, "Yong shengchanli biaozhun xuanren nongcun dangzhibu 
shuii. (Using production ability as standard to select village party branch secretaries) Xuexi vu shixian 
(Wuhan), 1989, pp. 47-49.
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election of party secretaries."40
2. The second is the "sent-down variant." A cadre from the township or county is 
sent down to a backward party branch of a particular village. This cadre is, unlike 
other village cadres, "a cadre leaving production" (tuochan ganbu). meaning a cadre 
who does not engage in production such as tilling the fields. He is actually a full-time 
cadre who draws his salary from the State. As he is sent down from the higher 
authorities, then there is no question of election. The higher authorities select the 
party secretary. But the selection is not arbitrary because - it is reported - "party 
members and the masses should basically know him."
This second variant, actually, does not present an election process; election 
takes place within the confinement of the township or county office and by the people 
in the authority. The local party members and villagers are not involved. Although 
they were asked their opinions, they ultimately have to accept the sent-down cadre. 
The report says that this method is intended to correct a deteriorating situation which 
has affected a village and its party branch for a long time.
Outside Tianjin, this variant is reported in Zhucheng County (Shandong 
Province).41 According to the report, the county party committee conducted a 
rectification, and in this process "they brought in young and outstanding party 
members" to replace the old ones. They were elected from party members of 
specialized households or economic cooperative organizations (jingji lianheti). There 
were 340 of them. Another report comes from Lishu Cunty, Jilin Province which was 
written by the Deputy County Party Secretary. He reported the practice of sending 
township cadres to villages to take up jobs as party secretaries.42
This variant is used as a means to remedy party branches which are
40" Yancheng gongkai iinexuan cun dangzhibu shuii." (Yanchang openly select village party secretaries) 
Baokan wenzhai. 14 August 1995, p. 1.
41"Zhucheng nongcun tani vouxiu dangyuan danren zhibu lingdao." (A big batch o f  outstanding party 
members assume party branch leadership at Zhucheng Village) Nongmin ribao. 3 May 1985, p. 1.
42Wang Shengke, "Xuannai xiang-zheng iiguan ganbu dao cun ren dangzhibu shuii de tiaocha vu 
sikao," (Xin changcheng (Changchun)) 1993, No. 12, pp. 40-41, in Zhongguo renmin daxue shubao ziliao 
zhongxin. 1993, No. 1, pp. 146-147.
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"backward." By sending an able cadre from the township, one author argues, it is 
expected that this cadre will correct all irregularities and ameliorate the situation.43 
The central leadership accepted this practice. On 1 December 1990, a circular was 
issued jointly by the Central Committee and the Sate Council. To remedy the 
shortcomings of the backward party branches, it urged the party committees at county 
and township levels to select "some party members who are honest, fair, aggressive, 
and competent," and appoint them "to act as party branch secretaries to help those 
party branches improve their organizations."44
3. The third is the "guardian variant." This is also about a cadre who is sent by the 
township or county authorities. Unlike the second variant, this cadre is not to become 
party secretary. However, he will act as the guardian to the local party branch and 
its secretary to put the party branch and the village in better shape. As part of this 
package, it may happen that he will also assist the local party branch to select a new 
party secretary. This cadre will not stay in the village for a long time. As soon as he 
considers that the party branch can operate well, he will leave the village.
Similar to the second variant, the third variant presents an election process. 
However, the whole process of electing party secretaries is put under the "guidance" 
(zhidao) of the sent-down cadre. It is not known the extent of this guidance; it may 
range from preparing the list of names of candidates to conducting the election itself. 
Yet the idea of sending an assisting cadre is not to overhaul the party branch in 
question because it is considered not to be in a very bad state. What it needs is only 
a temporary remedial measure.
Not many reports are found on this variant. Besides Tianjin, in Zhucheng 
County (Shandong Province), it was reported, that beside sending down youthful 
cadres to take up the jobs of party secretaries in the villages, the county also asked 
outstanding party members who were currently working temporarily outside the
43Wen Xianfang, "Tongguo duozhong tuiing peibei nongcun houiin dangzhibu daitouren" (Approve 
various approaches in providing leaders to the lagging behind Party branches in the village) Dangjian 
vaniiu. 1990, No. 6, pp. 43*44.
^ " Zhonggong zhongyuang guowuvuan guanvu vi iiu iiu vi nian nongye he nongcun gongzuo de 
tongzhi." (A circular by the central committee and the state council on the 1991 work o f agriculture and 
villages), 1991, p. 1-3; also Renmin ribao. 5 December 1990, pp. 1-2.'
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village to go back to the village. This latter group (43 people), according to the 
report, was then distributed by the county to the villages to help the new leaders in 
carrying out their duty.45
4. The fourth is what the handbook itself terms: "circle round variant." The 
candidates for the village party secretary are prepared and trained by the township 
party committee. They are required to work at the township for a certain period of 
time. When election time comes, they are sent back to their own village to take part 
in the election of party secretary.
According to the handbook, this method is to overcome firstly, the shortages 
of talented candidates, and secondly, the insurmountable problems in the village 
concerned. The latter means that "the village is in a very complicated (fuza) state and 
is severely under the influence of clans." In this kind of environment, where it is 
difficult to breed good cadres, it is necessary - the book argues - that the township 
party committee takes initiatives. The term "circle round," apparently, means that the 
township party committee circumvents the difficulties: the candidates are still local 
peasants yet they are already transformed.
The fourth method basically does not alter the fundamentals of the standard 
procedure of election of party secretaries. The party branch committee still has to 
discuss the candidates and elect them. The only difference lies in the fact that the list 
of candidates are not prepared by the party branch committee.
This variant was reported also in 1991, in Changde city (Hunan Province).46 
The city party committee succeeded in training 8563 cadres, and 8000 of them were 
eligible to become party secretaries. Four years later, after undergoing varied on-job 
training in the villagers’ committee as well as in Party organization, 875 of those 
cadres were ready to take up jobs. At that time, there were 4149 party secretaries, 
and 800 of them were advanced in age.
45"Zhucheng nongcun tapi vouxiu dangyuan danren zhibu lingdao." (A big batch o f  outstanding party 
members assume party branch leadership at Zhucheng Village) Nongmin ribao. 3 May 1985, p. 1,
46"Changde shi peiyang cun dangzhishu houbei ganbu" (Changde city trained cadres to take up job 
as party village branch secretaries) Renmin ribao. 6 January, 1991, p. 3.
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5. The fifth variant is an election which involves the villagers. The first report was 
from the Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily) 1986. The election of party secretaries in 
villages in Changqing County (Shandong Province), for instance, was said to be 
conducted "through open competition." Four hundred party secretaries were elected 
through this process.47 It provided a detailed report. At the first stage, candidates 
were recommended by the party, or by the village people’s representative, or party 
member recommended oneself. Secondly, these candidates were examined by the 
township party committee. Thirdly, an enlarged party branch congress was convened 
where the people’s representative also attended. During this meeting, the candidates 
read out their programme of administering the village, and replied to questions from 
the masses and examining small groups. Fourthly, election was conducted within the 
party through secret ballots, and results were announced on the spot.
This variant was reported in Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) in 1995. 
According to this report, four hundred new party secretaries ( and more than 1000 
members of party branch committees) in villages under Zoucheng city (Shandong 
Province) were elected "by involving party members and the masses."48
B. Deviance from the standard procedure
Deviance from the standard procedure is caused by the activity of social groups in 
society. Two types of deviance are identified: the first is buying votes by the 
bourgeois class, and the second is the muddling of election by lineage groups.
1. Buying votes to win an election is reported by Yang Liping in his article published 
at the Dangiian yaniiu (Research into the construction of the party) in 1992.49 Mr 
Yang writes this article on the basis of his research conducted in Zhejiang Province
47"Changqing gongkai jingxuan nongcun dangzhibu shuii." (Changqing openly select village party 
branch secretaries) Nongmin ribao. 21 March 1989, p. 3,
48"Zoucheng nongcun dangzhibu iianshe you xin iizhi." (The construction o f village party branches 
in Zoucheng city has new mechanism) Renmin ribao. 26 May 1993, p. 4.
49Yang Liping, "Nongcun jieji bianhua he dang de iianshe." (Class changes in the countryside and the 
construction o f  the Party) in Dangjian yaniiu (Jing), 1992, No. 1, pp. 43-46.
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which has undergone rapid economic growth. First of all, he identifies the emergence 
of classes in the countryside, and analyses their impact on various aspects of village 
life. In his observation, there are five classes emerging in the countryside, 
agricultural workers (nongve laodong zhel. staffs at village enterprises (xiangzhen 
give zhigongl. village and township functionaries (xiangcun guanli zhe). private 
merchants (geti gongshang hui. and private enterprises (siving give hu).
One serious impact is that classes are competing to have control over the 
village and party organizations. Mr Yang writes: "After the village class ranks 
undergo structural changes and diversification of the economy, different strata 
increasingly demonstrate numerous differences relating to economic interest, value 
orientation, and behaviour." Using a typical Marxist analysis, he further argues: 
"Different strata are hoping to acquire their own representatives within the political 
organizations, to protect and consolidate their interests."
In Mr. Yang’s observation, interest groups in villages are competing to 
influence the process of election of the village party committee. The means they use 
is money. "There emerges the phenomenon of buying votes in order to be elected to 
the committee. Consequently, in some places it is not possible to elect cadres for the 
party committee, nor possible to satisfy the numbers. Many persons who are not 
qualified for the jobs are elected to the party committee. This influences the 
leadership of the party in the countryside." One of the consequences shows that - as 
he writes - "there are even cases where the party leadership is rejected (paichi)."50
This type of deviance is quite new, and typically found in rich and prosperous 
villages.
2. The muddling by lineage groups is reported in various media. Quoting again the 
results of an investigation of 745 party secretaries by the Research Centre of Dongtai 
City Party Committee (Jiangsu Province), it is reported that old party secretaries 
breed their successors.51 The practice is called ’dai tu shi* (bringing in one’s 
disciple) "At present, the majority of party secretaries are all examined, trained, and
5oA11 o f  the quotations from, Ibid.. p. 80.
51Research Centre o f Dongtai City Party Committee, on .cit..
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recommended by the ’old party secretary.’" These old party secretaries, then, judge 
and select their own successors according to their own standard. The researchers 
argue that it is very difficult for these people to be impartial. The researchers believe 
that when they do the selection of their successors, they will certainly be influenced 
"by blood relations and lineage consideration" because they prefer to have successors 
of the same surname ftong xing dang).
In Xiang County, Hubei Province, this phenomenon is called "Bo Le" 
system.52 It is reported that out of 620 party secretaries, about 20% of them are not 
able "to meet the demand of new era," The authors point out that one of the reasons 
is that in villages there is a practice called "Bo Le." Bo Le was a man living in Qin 
State in the Spring and Autumn Period, well-known for his outstanding ability to 
judge a horse’s worth only by looking at it. It is now used as a metaphor indicating 
a person who is able to discover, recommend and know how to choose the right 
person for the right job.
There is no objective criteria, of course, in these two election processes. The 
person who selects his own successor chooses him on the basis of his personal taste. 
There is little doubt that in this process, a party secretary is elected more on the basis 
of lineage consideration.
The muddling by lineage groups in the election of party secretaries can be 
more subtle than the above mentioned. In his investigation in Xing Village (Hubei 
Province), Zhang Xinmei finds a very sophisticated influence of lineage.53 The 
author shows that the ladder to the position of party secretary has been decided long 
before. As we know from the previous section, many retired servicemen are taking 
up jobs as party secretaries. This opportunity is apparently used by some lineages. 
Thus, a lineage will help one of his members to enter the military service. After four
52 « •Xiong Yuanhui and Zeng Jinsheng, "Yong shengchanli biaozhun xuanren nongcun dangzhibu shuii1
(Using a standard o f election to select village Party branch secretary), Xuexi vu shixian (Wuhan), No. 4, 
1989, pp. 47-49
53Zhang Xinmei "Xianshi nongcun shequ zhong de shili renwu." (Powerful persons in the 
contemporary village community) Shehuixue vu shehui diaocha. 1992, No. 3 , pp. 35- 38. Although this 
article does not mention Party secretaries directly, it indirectly refers to "xiang. cun, zhu xinezhen fuzeren" 
to which party secretaries belong.
59
or five years, he may return and with a greater chance, to becoming party secretary.
Indeed, Mr. Zhang argues that to become a powerful person (shili renwu). or 
to stay in power, one needs strong support from his lineages in many ways. Thus, 
after one is elected party secretary, to consolidate his power, he further needs the 
support of his lineage because - he writes - "power in a village is "unstable" fbu 
wending*) where a party secretary can be forced to step down if there arises a serious 
problem." To advance in his career, a party secretary must also rely on his lineage 
without which, it will not only stop his career but also may damage it with eventual 
result of relegation. The author states that "the close relationship between powerful 
persons and lineage or kin is a clear objective fact in the village community."54
This second type of deviance displays the strong influence of lineage groups 
whether it is through personal selection or democratic election. This is more probable 
in villages of one-single surname (first form) or one-dominant surname (second 
form).55
HI. PATTERN OF THE MAKING OF PARTY SECRETARIES
A. The process of election
Thus far we have seen seven types of election of village party secretaries: five are 
authorized and two are unauthorized by the central leadership. This section, 
however, will analyze the authorized types as these types of election are actually the 
authorized versions though constrained by social groups in society.
The three authorized types of election demonstrates a concentric circle; the 
farther from the circle the "more democratic." The first type, the standard one, is the 
most undemocratic where party secretaries are elected only by members of the party 
branch committees. At the second circle lies the type which involves all party 
members (Variant 1) and at the most outer circle (Variant 5) is the one which is the 
most democratic although the villagers do not yet directly elect the party secretaries. 
(See Diagram 1)
54Ibid.. p. 37.
550 n  this distinction, see Chapter Six.
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Evidently, there is a clear trend toward broadening the base of electorates. 
Party secretaries, in the standard procedure, are elected by members of the party 
branch committee only; then they are elected by all party members; eventually, they 
are elected by all party members by taking the voice of the villagers. These various 
approaches may be urgently needed in order to restore the authority of the CCP in 
the
countryside which is rapidly declining. The document of Fourth Plenum (1994) 
Diagram 1
The three types of election demonstrate in a concentric circle; the farther from the 
core the "more democratic."
The core: party secretaries elected by the party committee; second circle: party 
secretaries elected by party members; third circle (Variant I): party secretaries elected 
by involving the villagers (Variant V).
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admitted this openly when it acknowledged the fact that the branches were "loosely- 
organized or paralysed" to the extent that they were unable to solve "the prominent 
problem that has obstructed reform and development and affected our efforts to 
maintain stability."56 If party secretaries are elected by a broader electorate, it is 
expected that they will be made accountable to a larger number of constituents who, 
in turn, will support them if they do their job well.
Variants 2 and 3 are used in an emergency situation. In both cases, the 
villages in question are in a bad situation or, in CCP terminology, "a paralysed and 
semi-paralysed state" to the extent that they are not able to elect party secretaries on 
their own, not to mention democratic election. Thus, party secretaries are not elected 
but imposed by the higher organs. Or, if they are elected, the election might be under 
the influence of the "guardian cadre."
Variant 4 is also utilized to remedy a helpless situation. Yet, unlike variant 2 
and 3, it tries to retain the democratic character of the election. Although the 
candidates are given training by the higher authorities, they must go through an 
election process to become party secretaries. This variant may help to mitigate the 
resentment of villagers which may arise if either Variant 2 or 3 is used. On the one 
hand, this variant retains the right of the higher organs to change the paralysed state 
of a village party branch; but, on the other hand, the higher organs also restrain 
themselves from imposing their will arbitrarily. Variant 4 can, actually, be viewed 
as a milder variation of Variant 2 and Variant 3.
B. Candidates to become party secretaries
In terms of candidates, there is another trend which shows a trend toward "localism," 
namely that party secretaries are to be local people. As we have seen in Section I.B, 
candidates for party secretaries are always sought among local people. The retired 
servicemen which have fed the current need of party secretaires are actually also local 
peasants, although, due to their service, have left their villages for quite a long time.
Except the second variant, all the other four variants of election emphasize
56"CCP Circular," op .cit.. G/4.
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local people as party secretaries whether they are elected democratically, appointed 
by the higher authorities, or even trained by the township authorities. The standard 
procedure does not explicitly make a statement about localism, yet its silence cannot 
be interpreted as prohibiting the practice either. Variant 1 also exhibits a similar 
feature: party secretaries are elected by all party members who can be safely inferred 
to be party members of local village party branches. Variant 5, the only type of 
election which involves the whole population of a village, is certainly the one which 
gives a clear indication toward localism.
This tacit agreement, apparently, acknowledges the importance of local people 
to become leaders for themselves. Only local people know their place, and therefore, 
only local people can govern and rule better. This principle, as a matter of fact, 
cannot be better in serving the needs of the state itself as "the glue."57 The more 
the state wants to extract surplus from the countryside, the more it needs local people; 
local people link peasant society with the state which otherwise is estranged from the 
society it rules.
There have been attempts to alter this trend because localism can produce, 
among other things, the deviance as we have seen above. For instance, Li Wentong 
does not hesitate to support the idea that, in order to remedy the situation in the 
countryside, the township party committee should send township cadres to take the 
job as party secretaries in the villages.58 Researchers from the Research Centre of 
Dongtai City Party Committee (Jiangsu Province) clearly argue against the practice 
of jiudi qucai (to recruit local people) in selecting village party secretaries. In its 
place, like Mr Li Wentong, they also make a proposal that party committees at the 
township or county send good and able cadres to backward party branches or poor- 
area party branches to become party secretaries.59
57Shue, Vivienne The Reach o f the State. Sketches o f the Chinese Body Politic. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, p. 87.
58' Li Wentong, "Jiaqiang cun ii dang zuzhi iianshe de ii dian sikao." (Some reflection on the 
strengthening o f the construction o f village-level party organization) Shaoxing shizhuan xuebao, 1994, No. 
4, pp. 80-83 in Zhongguo renmin daxue shubao ziliao zhongxin. 1995, No. 2, pp. 105-108.
59Researchers from Research Centre o f  Dongtai City Party Committee "Nongcun dangzhibu shuii houii 
fan ren xianxiang chu tan" (A preliminary investigation on the phenomenon o f the dearth o f  successors to 
the post village Party branch secretary) Dang iian (Beijing), 1989, No. 6, p. 47.
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The Editor of Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily) supports this idea but only 
under a certain condition.60 This editorial speaks a lot about ’houiin dangzhibu’ or 
backward party branches which are described as "bu li. bu he. bu qin. bu lian" (no 
strength, no harmony, no hardwork, no honesty). To remedy this situation, it needs 
more than rectification; it needs new leadership or a new-party secretary. According 
to the editor, almost all backward party branches do not have ideal party secretaries 
as party members just take turns among themselves to become party secretaries 
flunliu zhizheng). The solution, therefore, is that "to them the higher party 
organization must send capable party members from outside."
These proposals, actually, do not fundamentally alter the basic trend of 
localism. Party secretaries should invariably be local people, and only under certain 
circumstances, can they be people from outside the villages. The trend of localism, 
apparently, will continue if the central leadership would like to effectively govern and 
rule the countryside. The central leadership clearly opts to abide by the old tradition. 
For example, the only comprehensive document on village party branches, the 
document on party rectification of the Fourth Plenum, 1994, is silent about this 
matter. There is no mention about altering the trend of localism. Indeed, the 
document urges "to broaden our horizons and widen the channels" 61 in recruiting 
candidates for party secretaries, yet it does not explicitly encourage the breaking up 
of localism. Perhaps, they expect that the local party committees (township and 
county) will make experiments before it becomes a nationwide policy.
Thus, we find two main patterns in the process of making a village party 
secretary: the broadening of the base of the electorate and localism. These two trends 
are thought to be beneficial by the central leadership in their efforts to restore the 
authority of village party branches.
^ " Jiaqiang iiceng zuzhi iianshe yao mingque zhidao sixiang." (Strengtening grass-root organizations 
need a clear guiding thinking) Nongmin ribao. 28 January 1991, p. 1.
61"CCP Circular," op .cit.. G/5.
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CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have tried to describe, first of all, the necessary qualities that a 
candidate for party secretary should possess: the decai iianbei in combination with si. 
hua and liu hui. These qualities plus 22 other are believed to be vitally important to 
invigorate the party branches in all the units which, in the era of Reform, have to 
carry out various different jobs at the same time. Candidates for village party branch 
secretaries still have to possess one additional quality, namely "health."
Secondly, candidates for party branch secretaries are recruited from various 
channels, but are invariably local peasants. Recently, retired servicemen have become 
the main sources of candidates for party secretaries. This group of people, having 
vast experience in the matter of organizational and other skills, is thought able to 
become party secretaries with the necessary qualities mentioned above.
Thirdly, apart from the authorized types, there are two unauthorized types of 
electing party secretaries. These are deviances which emerge as the result of the 
influence of social groups in society. The first is buying votes by the bourgeois class 
in villages, and the second is the muddling of the election by lineage groups. The 
buying votes may be typically found in rich and prosperous areas, although the same 
chance cannot be ruled out in the poorer areas. The lineage groups which have 
become more and more assertive recently, use the available opportunity to exert their 
influence in the election of party secretaries in many ways.
Fourthly, the authorized types consist of one standard procedure and five 
variants. From these six types, there are three types which are utilized for a normal 
situation, and another three for a special situation. In the latter, the higher authorities 
exert a direct intervention by sending down cadres who replace the existing party 
secretaries or by training a number of party members to be candidates for party 
secretaries. In the former, there is a clear trend towards broadening the base of the 
electorate, from one which is confined to selected members of the party branch 
committee to one which includes the villagers at large.
Finally, we also find out that although there is no official regulation, party 
secretaries are invariably local people. This is closely related to the source of 
candidates being always local, and to the method of election which is also always
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rooted locally. Party secretaries may not be local people but this is only in an 
extremely special situation such as in totally paralysed party branches.
The broadening of the base of electorate and the persistence of localism, 
evidently, form the main pattern of the making of a village party secretary after 
Reform (1978). This will certainly bring an impact on the way village party 
secretaries exercise their authority in their villages.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PARTY SECRETARY AND HIS SUPERIOR (1): 
THE ROLE OF STATE AGENT
"Without the Communist Party, 
there would have been no new China" 
(One o f  patriotic songs)
As indicated in Chapter One, there are two roles which come ''from above." This 
chapter concerns with one of the two roles which originates from a village party 
secretary’s relationship with his superior, a hierarchical relationship which is rooted 
in the very nature of his being the secretary of a party branch of the Chinese 
Communist Party. That is the role as state agent.
This chapter will be divided into two major sections. The first section will 
discuss the role of state agent. The second section will deal with explaining the origin 
of the role by looking into the agenda of the state. I will demonstrate that this role 
is part of the state’s attempt to raise the enthusiasm of the peasants to produce more 
which, in turn, leads to the adoption of the strategy of nominal encapsulation.
I. THE ROLE OF STATE AGENT
A. The definition of the role of state agent
The state is understood as - following Michael Mann - centralized institution.1 As 
such, the state monopolizes the power to formulate policies for its population through 
various means, democratic or non-democratic. This is what Mann calls 
"infrastructural power" namely "the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil 
society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm."2 In 
this perspective, the Party and the government are taken as one entity as they are
^ a n n ,  Michael "The Autonomous Power o f the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," in John
A. Hall (ed.), States in History. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 112.
2Ibid.. p. 113.
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closely interlocked with each other.3
The term "state agent," therefore, means people who work for the state to 
implement the state’s policies. An agent is a person who is assigned to a specific task 
as part of a big operation, and must complete it with perfection. The person 
him/herself does not have his/her own plan separate from the grand design. He/she 
simply has to carry out a task. In our case, a village party secretary must listen and 
obey the instructions from the higher authorities (township or county).4
B. The objective
The main job of a state agent is to implement a set of objectives set by the state. 
What is the content of the objective for the Chinese countryside? Generally speaking, 
they are objectives which have something to do with agriculture and village society. 
Since the introduction of Reform (1978), the central leadership has issued a vast 
amount of policies on "village work" fnongcun gongzuol. At the beginning of every 
year, in the first week of January, there is always a national conference in Beijing to 
evaluate the situation of agriculture of the previous year and set a plan for the coming 
year. The decision produced during this conference usually becomes a decision on 
village work.
Village work, in the beginning of Reform, simply meant programs to increase 
agricultural production. But in 1984, village work had a broader meaning. The 
Central Committee decided that "village work" should include "overall development"
3Lieberthal writes: "Thus, at each level o f  the political system in China - the Center (Beijing), the 
province, the prefecture, the city, the county and the locale (township or commune) - there is a full array 
o f party and state organs, with the party in addition having committees, branches, and cells embedded 
within the state organs. In principle, the party is to make policy and state is to administer it, but as w e shall 
see, reality has not been that neat." See Lieberthal, Kenneth Governing China. London: W .W . Norton & 
C o., 1995. p. 77.
4Cf. The definition o f  "agent" by the "Oxford English Dictionary": (1) He who operates in a particular 
direction, who produces an effect; (2) One who does the actual work o f  anything as distinguished from the 
instigator or employer; hence, one who acts for another, a deputy, steward, factor, substitute, 
representative, or em issary.(The Compact Edition o f  Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971, p. 178.
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of the village.5 "It should not be concerned only about increasing production, but 
also about guiding the peasants to learn book-keeping, and to pay attention to 
efficiency. It should not only be anxious about production, but also exchange, 
distribution, consumption, and other things. It should not only be about agriculture, 
but also about developing all aspects of citizens’ economy as well as culture, 
education, technology, health, physical training, etc."6
Village work goes hand in hand with another subject, namely "ideology and 
politics" or sixiang zhengzhi. "As policies for the countryside become broader, 
commodity economy becomes more developed, it is even more necessary that the 
Party strengthens the work on ideology and politics. "7 What does this mean in the 
countryside? It was, for the first time, presented in the famous "Document No. 1" (1 
January 1982).8 The document maintains an assumption that "peasants inescapably 
preserve the old custom and thinking which they inherit from the old society," and 
considers it as a "paralysed and weakened situation." Yet, it only gives an abstract 
statement without specification of the content of "the education of ideology and 
politics."
The following year, 1983, a document titled "Strengthen the work on 
ideology and politics in the countryside" elaborated further this point.9 The "old 
thinking" is defined as feudalism, capitalism, anti-socialism, and other criminal 
activities, and these are to be eradicated from the peasants’ mind. The project of 
education in ideology and politics means: "step by step elevate the political and 
ideological consciousness of the peasants, and make them strive to become socialist
5Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu vi iiu ba si nian nongcun gongzuo de tongzhi (Central Committee o f  
the CCP on the announcement o f 1984 village program) Zhongguo nongve nianiian, 1984 (China agriculture 
yearbook), Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1984, pp. 1-4.
6Ibid.. p. 4.
7Ibid.
8 "Quan guo nongcun gongzuo huivi iivao" (The summary o f the national conference on village works), 
in Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongvao wenxian xuanbian (Selection o f  important documents 
on agriculture and villages in the new era), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992, p. 130.
9This is also known as "Document No. 2" See, Jiaqiang nongcun sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo 
(Strengthen the work on ideology and politics in the countryside), Zhongguo nongve nianiian. 1983 (China 
agriculture yearbook), Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1983, pp. 5-7.
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peasants who possess idealism, virtue, culture, discipline, love for the motherland, 
love for socialism, love for the Party, and love for the collective.1,10 But it is warned 
that the final goal is not to "demand every peasant to become a communist."11
For the first time, in the same Document No. 2, the central leadership 
introduced the slogan "building material and spiritual civilization" for the village 
(wuzhi wenming and iingshen wenming). "Therefore, it is imperative that, according 
to the strategic plan of the Twelfth Party Congress, while building the high level of 
material civilization, one must also build a high level socialist of spiritual 
civilization."12 The building of spiritual civilization is, apparently, part of the 
"education in ideology and politics." After going through the "education in ideology 
and politics," peasants are expected to gain "spiritual civilization."
From then on, it becomes the slogan in the countryside: "building material and 
spiritual civilization." In concrete terms, to build "material spiritualization" means 
that village party secretaries must be able to increase the production of grain and 
other agricultural products. In addition to that, they should manage the infrastructure 
for the production such as irrigation, distribution of agricultural inputs, transportation 
of agricultural products, etc. To build "spiritual civilization" means that they must 
eradicate the old practices among peasants such as belief in gods, clans, gambling, 
etc. 13 Three additional tasks not included in the celebrated slogan are birth control, 
land management and tax collection. Probably, these policies are, in the eyes of the 
central leadership, to be accepted without special slogans and to be implemented 
without question. However, peasants’ failure in these three areas are interpreted as 
weaknesses in the "ideology and politics." Cadres, then, must go and conduct "the
10Ibid.. p. 6.
^ Dangqian nongcun sixiang zhengzhi xuanchuan iiaovu tivao (A summary o f educating and 
disseminating ideology and politics in the contemporary countryside), Zhongguo nongye nianiian. 1983 
(China agriculture yearbook), Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1983, p. 13.
12Ibid.
13For further discussion on "spiritual civilization," see Barry, Peter "Building Up a Spiritual 
Civilization," Tripod. No. 91, 1996, pp. 21-27.
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education of ideology and politics" to the peasants.14
Thus, the objective set by the central leadership for a village party secretary 
consists of two goals at the same time: "village work" which concentrates on 
agricultural production and "ideology and politics" which focuses on peasant thinking. 
Along with these are an additional three tasks of birth control, tax collection and land 
management.
C. The practice of the role of the state agent
The objective set by the central leadership is actually one which the whole party 
branch should achieve. The Party Charter (1982), Art. 32, stipulates that party 
branches, in general, should first, disseminate policies, and secondly, carry out "the 
education of ideology and politics." While these tasks are valid for all party branches 
in the whole of China, in 1990, a document, entitled "Minutes of summary national 
conference on the building of village level organizations," designed a special place 
for a party branch in a village. 15 In this document, it is stated that the party branch 
should become the "core" fhexin). In the countryside there are a number of 
organizations with particular goals, but the party branch lies in the core. It reads: 
"The village party branch is the leadership core of all organizations and works."16
Thus, it is the party branch which actually is mandated to achieve the objective 
of village work, and is responsible for its completion. The party secretary, as part of 
the party branch, naturally, must also achieve the objective. The party secretary 
cannot act less than that which is mandated to the party branch. This is clear from the
l4Questions N o. 69 , 72 , 78 o f a handbook on handling "education o f  ideology and politics." See, Xu 
Shaochen (ed.), Nongcun sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo 100 ge zeme ban? (One hundred how-to in carrying 
out the work on ideology and politics in the villages), Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1990.
15"Quan guo cunii zuzhi iianshe gongzuo zuotanhui iivao" (Key notes o f  national conference on the 
building o f village level organizations), in Shi san da vilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian. Vol. II (Selected 
important documents since the Thirteenth Party Congress, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991, pp. 1332- 
1345.
16Ibid.. p. 1335. The idea o f  party branch as leadership cores is repeated in the Fourth Plenum o f the 
Fourteenth Congress 1994. See: "Dali iiaaiang nongcun vi dangzuzhi wei hexin de iiceng zuzhi iianshe" 
(Vigorously strengthen the constructions o f  the grass-root organizations by taking party organization as 
core," in Renmin ribao. 25 November 1994, p. 1; "CCP Circular on Strengthening Rural Primary and 
Grass-roots Organizations," in SWB, FE/2168 G/4-9, 2 December 1994.
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fact that he is to a make report to the party branch committee once every month and 
to the whole party branch once every three months.17
A party secretary, however, is not just doing secretarial work for the party 
branch. Although he is elected by the party branch committee, he is in equal position 
to it. He is to convene the party branch committee and the party branch congress, 
he is even to prepare the agenda of the meetings. He is a leader for both the party 
branch and the party branch committee. As one handbook describes it, he is "the 
leader and the organiser of the daily operation of the Party branch."18 It is quite 
fitting, therefore, if, in CCP’s terminology, a party secretary is designated as "zhuvao 
fuzeren" or important person who holds the responsibility. He must shoulder the 
responsibility of both successes and failures of the work of the party branch.
Party secretaries, indeed, are considered by the central leadership to occupy 
a central position within party branches. For instance, in 1990, Song Ping, arguing 
for building party branches in the countryside, says that "to be able to increase the 
construction of party branches in the countryside, the crucial thing is to find a good 
squad, especially to select honest and active party members to become party 
secretaries."19 Song Ping believes that the fate of a party branch is closely related 
with the quality of its party secretary, A good party secretary guarantees the 
completion of works assigned to the party branch.
A party secretary is designated various titles. Using prose, the handbook 
graphically describes the role of the party secretary in the village as a wild goose 
(yan) which leads the other geese. The prose goes as follows:
If wild geese have no leader, it would be impossible for them to fly for a long 
distance. If there is one leading wild goose, the flock of geese will be able to
17See "Dane zhibu shuii" (The Party branch secretary), in Jing Bin (ed.), Zhongguo gongchandang 
da cidian (Grand dictionary o f  the Communist Party o f  China), Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo 
chubanshe, 1991, p. 349.
18 *Jiao Gengqiang and Jing Ri, Dangzhibu gongzuo shouce (A Manual for the work o f  a Party branch), 
Beijing: Zhongguo zhengzhi daxue, 1991, s.v ."Dangzhibu shuii de zhuvao zhize he zhengzhi vewu suzhi." 
(the main function and the political and professional quality o f  a Party branch secretary), p. 115.
19Song Ping, "Jiaqiang nongcun gongzuo. shenhua nongcun gaige" (Strengthen the work in the 
countryside, and deepen reform in the countryside) in Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao 
wenxian xuanbian. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992, p. 620.
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fly far and high, from north to south, heading in a direction.20
Thus, says the proverb qun van gaofei tou van "(if the flock of wild geese want to 
fly high, then a leading wild goose should lead them). Taking the image from military 
circles, village party secretaries are also described as "battle station" (zhandou 
gangwei). These images are to convey the idea of the centrality of the position of the 
party secretary in the party branch. Although the mandate is given to the whole party 
branch, it is its party secretary which is essential to the success of the implementation 
of the mandate.
How should the party secretary deal with various organizations in the village? 
A handbook for village party secretaries explains that a village party branch secretary 
"should always maintain a close relationship with the responsible persons in the Party 
Branch Committee, the Villagers’ Committee, and mass organizations, to exchange 
experience, to complement each other, and give support to their work."21 Following 
this instruction, the party secretary normally organises meetings with the 
head/chairman of each organization existing in the village: chairman of the villagers’ 
committee, head of the People’s Militia, chairwoman of the Women’s Federation, the 
branch secretary of the Youth League. So, altogether, he must often meet with about 
six to seven people. There is no fixed time table for this kind of meeting, however.
This forum, apparently, only serves as a forum of communication. Here, the 
cadres share their experiences or exchange views; no decision is taken. This is 
probably also a forum to coordinate various activities in a village. The party 
secretary, although he may not make decision, can make various suggestions to each 
of the participants.
At what forum, then, are problems arising in the village discussed? There are 
two fora for discussing problems, namely the Party branch committee and the 
villagers’ committee. As a standing committee of the party branch, the party branch 
committee must convene, at least, once a month , and discuss all sorts of problems,
20Chi Mian, Zenvang dang hao nongcun dangzhibu shuii (How to become a good village party 
secretary), Revised edition, Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1987, p. 1.
21See, "Cun dangzhibu shuii zhize" (Responsibility o f  a village party secretary), in Zhang Dianzhong, 
Nongcun dangzhibu shuii shouce (A handbook for a village party secretary), Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 
1990, p. 23-24.
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and respond to these problems. Two departments of the party branch committee are 
generally in existence, the department of organization and the department of 
propaganda. The department of organization mainly deals with problems related to 
the well-being of the party branch such as membership fees, recruitment, education 
of the members, etc.22 The department of propaganda tackles almost all problems 
in the village because this department is responsible for disseminating the Party’s 
policies.23 It is in the latter that the party secretary may make decisions to tackle 
problems regarding policy implementation in the village.
The second forum, the villagers’ committee, also discusses problems arising 
in the village.24 According to Art. 2 and 4 of "The Law of Villagers’ Committee," 
it is the job of the villagers’ committee to manage both social and economic affairs. 
In Art. 2, it stipulates that the villagers’ committee is to handle "the public affairs and 
utilities of the village, mediating disputes among villagers, assisting in maintaining 
public order;" in Art. 4 it is "to support and organise villagers in promoting 
production, supply and marketing, credit, consumption" and in addition to that, "to 
coordinate and provide services to production in the village."25 The villagers’ 
committee, therefore, tackles a wide range of problems. The chairman of the 
villagers’ committee, assisted by his staff, solves all sorts of problems which arise 
everyday.26
The Fourth Plenum (1994) gives further details:27
"Matters of importance in the village, including economic and social
development plans, public services and other hot issues of interest to all
9 9
See, Appendix C
23Ibid.
24See, Appendix A
25The translation is from "The Organic Law Governing Village Committees o f  the People’s Republic 
o f China (Trial)," in FBIS-CHI, 27 November 1987, p. 21.
26This daily activity is made possible by the fact that the chairman and vice-chairman o f the villagers 
committee are permitted not to work in the field, and receive salaries. See, The Law o f  the Villagers’ 
Committee, Art. 8.
27See, "CCP Circular" SWB FE/2168 G/6-7
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villagers, should be submitted, in accordance with relevant laws and 
regulations, to the meeting of villagers’ representatives or the village congress 
for discussion and a decision in accordance with the principle of democratic 
centralism."
"All matters relating to the interests of all villagers, especially when it comes 
to finances, assigning housing sites, names of women who have been approved 
to have a child that year and how revenues from fines are used, should be 
published in a notice at regular intervals so that people can exercise 
supervision."
The party secretary must be present at the meeting of the party branch 
committee because he is formally the head of it. Here, he can do more than make 
suggestions; he make decisions on problems which - according to the party branch 
committee - violate the Party’s line, principles, and policy. To what extent is the 
party secretary involved in the affairs of villagers’ committee? In principle, the party 
secretary is not permitted to get involved in the villagers’ committee because it is, 
according to Art. 2, an autonomous organization.28 However, a document released 
in 1990 opens the possibility of the intervention by the party secretary: as part of the 
party branch, he is also supposed to "exercise leadership," and, indeed, "investigate 
and supervise." 29 Under this arrangement, the party secretary may be present at 
meetings of the villagers’ committee, and may intervene in decisions.
The document released in the following year, 1991, opens the possibility wider 
when it allows cadres concurrently to take posts at the party branch, the villagers’ 
committee, or economic organization.30 Indirectly, this document also allows the
28Art. 2: "Villagers’ committees are the mass organizations for the autonomy o f villagers at the grass­
roots level by way o f self-management, self-education, and self-service." in Ibid.
29 "The villagers’ committee is under the leadership o f  the party" and that "the party branch shall 
conduct investigation and supervision over cadres and party members working in the autonomous 
organization o f  villagers’ committee." See, "Quan guo cunii zuzhi iianshe gongzuo zuotanhui iivao" 
(Minutes o f  summary o f  national conference on the building o f  village level organizations), in Shi san da 
yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian. Vol. II (Selected important documents since the Thirteenth Party 
Congress, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991, pp. 1337-1338.
30"Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu iin vi bu iiaqiang nongye he nongcun gongzuo de iueding." (The 
decision by the Central Committee and the State Council on the strengthening o f  agriculture and village 
works), 29 November 1991, in Shi san da yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian. Vol. Ill (Selected important 
documents since the Thirteenth Party Congress, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991, pp. 1778. This decision 
is reaffirmed by the Fourth Plenum o f  the Fourteenth Party Congress 1994; see "CCP Circular" in SWB 
FE/2168 G/6.
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party secretary to take up the job as chairman of villagers’ committee. If this is the 
case, then the party secretary can wholly intervene in the affairs of the villagers’ 
committee.
The relationship between the party secretary and the chairman of the villagers’ 
committee is very complicated. On the one hand, the party secretary must exercise 
"leadership" over him; on the other hand, he must also acknowledge the fact that a 
villagers’ committee is an autonomous body. The first is crucial to the authority of 
the Party in the countryside, whereas the second is critical to the enthusiasm of the 
peasants to produce more. Tensions and conflicts between the two most senior leaders 
in a village are surely unavoidable.
The party secretary probably has to spend most of his time with the villagers’ 
committee as the problems tackled by the villagers’ committee are central to the 
village and vital to his future career. The activities of a village party secretary, 
however, are more than that.31 First of all, he must take care of the Women’s 
Federation. This organization is crucial in the work of birth control in the village. 
Although the scope of the work of the Women’s Federation is broader than handling 
birth control, it has become, eventually, the only place to handle the birth-control 
program. Given the strenuous campaigns by the leadership, the party secretary cannot 
but pay serious attention to this particular organization if the birth-control program 
is to succeed. The woman who is in charge of this organization is normally under 
heavy pressure from the villagers; the party secretary’s job is to give encouragement 
and help her to find better solutions. Often there are times, when the Women’s 
Federation gives up, and the party secretary himself must face the angry villagers.
Secondly, the party secretary also has to take care of the Youth League in his 
village. The Party Charter (1982) still considers the Chinese Youth League as feeder 
to the Party,32 and asks the party organization to pay close attention to it.33 The
31On various political organizations in a village, see, Appendix A.
32In the Party Charter (1982) it is stated that Youth League is "a school where large numbers o f young 
people will learn about communism through practice," and in addition to that, "it is the Party’s assistant 
and reserve force." (Art. 49)
33
Party committees at all levels must strengthen their leadership over the Communist Youth League 
organizations." (Art. 50)
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position of the party branch is quite clear: leadership. Thus, the party secretary can 
sometimes take part in the meeting of the Youth League. Thirdly, the party
secretary is to exercise leadership over the People’s Militia.34 The function of this 
organization is increasingly unclear as wars, especially people’s war, become a very 
remote possibility. Its existence in the village is justified simply by long-time 
tradition. The leadership that the party secretary should exercise is quite direct: he 
is to be the "company political instructor" (lian zhidao vuanT35 To these two 
organizations, the party secretary, perhaps, pays a minimal attention as they have a 
very insignificant impact on the village.
The activities of the party secretary with the Party are not the least of all. As 
mentioned above, his job is to regularly convene the party branch committee and the 
party branch congress. In addition to that, he must also take care of the rank-and-file. 
The handbook for village party secretaries, for instance, states that the party secretary 
should "understand and grasp what the Party members think, do, and learn."36 At 
present, this job becomes very complicated as there are more and more party 
members who leave the village to find job, or more and more party members from 
other villages coming to the village to work.37 Each group has to be handled 
separately and with special attention. The party secretary may not be directly involved 
in this work, and may ask the head of the department of organization to handle the 
matter. Yet he still is expected to give instructions on special cases. Is a party 
secretary always to get involved in the details of all problems in his village? The 
central leadership, clearly, does not explicitly ask village party secretaries to do so; 
what is asked is to become "leadership core" flingdao hexinl. As such, a party 
secretary, theoretically, is not to interfere or intervene in the internal affairs of other 
organizations. This role of leadership core seems to be about monitoring. The
^O n this organization, see Han Huaizhi (ed.), Dangdai zhongguo minbin (Contemporary Chinese 
People’s M ilitia), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1989.
35Zhang Dianzhong, op .cit.. p. 98.
36Ibid.t p. 23; c f  "Dang zhibu shuii'’ (The Party branch secretary), in Jing Bin, op .cit.. p. 349
37A good discussion on this topic, see Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Politics o f Disillusionment, the Chinese 
Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping. 1978-1989. Armonk, NY: M .E. Sharpe, 1991, pp. 234-236.
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handbook for village party secretaries says that one of the tasks of a village party 
secretary is "to investigate the situation as well as the problems in the implementation 
of the plan and decisions of the work of the party branch." After the investigation, 
he is supposed to make a report to the party branch committee, to the party branch 
congress, and to the higher authorities (shangji dang zuzhi)38
Thus, a village party secretary is not expected to intervene directly in the 
works of the organizations in his village; his job is to make investigation and write 
a report. In some places, this is interpreted as the party secretary being "to do the 
overall" (zhua quanmian).39 The whole idea is to put the party secretary more as 
primus inter pares (one among equals) than a commander in chief. Each organization 
in the village works on their own, without daily instruction from the party secretary, 
to achieve the target.
However, the central leadership also clearly wants him to become "zhongyao 
fuzeren. " He should be held responsible for the success or failure in completing the 
state’s objective for the countryside. If a village is successful, it is to praise the party 
secretary; if a village fails, the party secretary is to blame. This is the axiom of the 
central leadership.40 The party secretary is to become the only motor for all sorts 
of activities in the village, or to be the leading goose. In other words, he is expected 
to be the leader of his village.
Thus, the central leadership wants village party secretaries to be both primus 
inter pares and motor. These roles are not easy to perform: a certain degree of 
passivity required by being a primus inter pares is contrary to the nature of being a 
motor. One of the solutions is to use the method of "the education of ideology and 
politics" (sixiang zhengzhi iiaovul. This method is to be used in combination with the
38Zhang Dianzhong, op .cit.. p. 23.
39This is the formulation from Caixi County, Shandong Province, see Fang Yan and Bao Yong Hui 
"Cunmin zi zhi: iicene minzhu zhengzhi de zuzhi he zhidu iianshe." (The political autonomy o f villagers: 
the construction o f  a system and a political organization which is democratic at the grass- root) Neibu 
wengao, 1992, No. 7, pp. 16-19.
40This has always been the argument to have a good party secretary as a guarantee for a good village; 
see "Gaibian mianmao guaniian zai banzi" (In order to change the situation, the critical thing is the leaders) 
Nongmin ribao. 10 March 1987, p. 3; also "Village Scene," China News Analysis. No. 1524, 15 December 
1994, p. 8.
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available means, namely the party members. For this purpose, the central leadership 
encourages a new approach called "nongcun dangvuan lianxi hu" or "village party 
members linking up with households."41 A party member, according to his/her 
choice, links up with one or more households, and maintains constant contact with 
them. In this interaction, he/she will disseminate the Party’s policies, especially new 
policies. Furthermore, he/she will also help them in many other areas such as 
production, how to use new technology, to provide market information, etc.
The central leadership takes Liuzhuang Village (Qiliying Township, Xinxiang 
County, Henan Province) as a village which perfectly represents this ideal. The story 
about this village is published as the headline in Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily).42 
The name of its party secretary is Shi Laihe who has been elected as the national 
worker’s model, a member of the standing committee of the People’s Congress, and 
as possessing the true qualities of protector of ordinary people. The party branch 
committee, according to the reporter, puts the work on ideology and politics as its top 
priority. It has 14 members, seven of whom are assigned to the matter of ideology 
and politics.
In the whole of the party branch there were 72 party members, each of them 
linked to 2 or 3 households for which they were held responsible for ideology and 
politics. The reporter argues, that "in this way, the party branch can timely know and 
grasp the pulse of the thinking of the peasants." To these party members, the party 
branch demanded that they transmit "the Party’s line, general and specific lines" to 
the households. They were also asked "to lead the peasants toward prosperity, teach 
them the system of the law, help them to obey the law." But they must "listen to 
opinion and demands of the masses." A report about the situation of the households 
should be made regularly.43
41Zhang Diangzhong, op .cit.. p. 165.
42"Liuzhuang cun dangzhibu jiaqiang xin xingshi xia de sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo" (Works on 
ideology and politics as newly implemented by Liuzhuang village Party branch) Nongmin ribao. 22  
November, 1985, p. 1.
43For other experiments in other places in China, see for example, "Shiying xin xingshi. zuohao 
nongcun dangzhibu gongzuo" (Adapt to the new situation, do well the work o f  village party branch). 
Zhongguo nongmin bao. 18 June 1981, p. 1; Wang Shudong."Nongcun dangzhibu de xin shixian"(The new 
practice o f  village party branches) Zhibu iianshe. 1986, No. 2, pp. 12-13; "You le kunnan zhao dangvuan"
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This particular approach does not place the party secretary in the position of 
interfering in othher organizations. He can continue to become primus inter pares. 
Yet he has something to do in regard to policy implementation in his village. He can 
be active in this area as he is in full command of the party members.
This new role which I call "state agent" combines both the position as primus 
inter pares and "motor". The party secretary shall look into the completion of the 
state’s objective in the village but without constraining other organizations and the 
peasants. The Fourth Plenum (1994) aptly outlines this idea.
First, the idea of the party branch as core is stressed. "We should regard the 
construction of rural grass-root organizations as a systems project and make 
coordinated efforts to build up village-level organizations with party branches as the 
core." Being the core, it does not mean that party branches and the secretaries can 
dominate their villages. Therefore, the text goes on to write: "At the same time, we 
should pay attention to building an operation system aimed at providing better 
services and to building a work system based on democratic management." Indeed, 
the drafter warns everybody that "building in these areas is an inter-related entity; 
therefore, it should be carried out in all areas, not just in one of them." Or, in other 
words, the party branches should become core but by abiding to what is called 
"democratic management.1,44
The latter is mentioned again in relation to the discussion on "strengthening 
autonomous villagers’ organizations, collective economic organizations and mass 
organizations." The document reads: "We should extensively launch activities aimed 
at establishing relevant institutions in accordance with the law, administering villages 
within the framework of those institutions and exercising democratic management to 
inspire peasants’ initiative for becoming masters of their own affairs."45 A strong
(If you have difficulties, go and look for party members) Nongmin ribao. 13 M ay, 1986, p. 3; Run 
Qingwen "Nongcun dangzhibu de huodong fangshi" (The pattern o f activities o f  a village party branch) 
Dangzhibu iianshe (Shanxi), 1987, No. 1, p. 27; "Ruhe fahui dangvuan xianfeng mofan zuoyong? 
Dangvuan lianxihu zhidu shi youxiao fangshi" (How to make party members play the role o f  vanguard 
model? The system o f  party members linking up with households is the best model) Nongmin ribao. 26 
December, 1989, p. 3.
^"CCP Circular" in SWB, FE/2168 G/6-7.
45Ibid. G/6
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warning is given: "We must not allow one or a few individuals to monopolise 
decision-making powers."46
The pressure put on the shoulder of the party secretary is not made lighter. 
The central leadership demands accountability from the party secretary with regard 
to the completion of the state’s objective. If anything goes wrong in a village, the 
state is quick to blame its party secretary. Indeed the state, considers him as its agent, 
regardless of his formal title.
The Editorial of Nongmin Ribao (Peasants’ Daily) makes this clear.47 "As 
soon as a party grass-root organization is found in a paralysed situation, people must 
be sent immediately to help them, to carry out rectification, and do not let it drift for 
a long." This job is to be carried out by the county party committee.
LI. THE CENTRAL LEADERSHIP AND PARTY BRANCHES IN THE 
COUNTRYSIDE
Why is it that village party branch secretaries are to adopt the role of the state agent? 
The answer to this question cannot be separated from the strategy of "nominal 
encapsulation" adopted by the central leadership. The strategy of nominal 
encapsulation allows organizations in a village to have relative autonomy; the party 
branch and its secretary basically retreat from the day-to-day control and intervention. 
The consequence is that the party branch secretaries have to find a new role, the role 
of the state agent.
A. The concern of the central leadership
The first and foremost concern of the central leadership, at the beginning of Reform 
as well as at present, is to increase the agricultural production. At the early period 
of Reform, the daunting task was how to revitalise peasants’ enthusiasm to produce
46Ibid. 0 /6 -7 .
47"Kaichuang nongcun dang de iiceng zuzhi iianshe gongzuo de xin iumian." (Make a breakthrough 
in the work o f  constructing the village party grass-root organization) Nongmin ribao. 4 December 1985,
p. 1.
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more. At that time, it was widely acknowledged that the biggest stumbling block was 
the commune system itself. The Editor of China Peasants’ Daily, for instance, argues 
that during the Commune Period, "it was frequently easy for the leaders to use 
administrative command to direct production, and this influenced the material interests 
of the villagers, hurt their enthusiasm to produce, and. brought no benefit to the 
healthy development of the collective economy."48
Along with the introduction of the new economic system for the peasants (the 
household contract responsibility system), in early 1980s, the central leadership 
gradually dismantled the three-tier political structure in the countryside, the commune 
system. These measures had, inevitably, direct impact on the operation of the party 
grass-root organizations in that the party has to share authority with other 
organizations in a village. At the township (formerly commune), under the 
arrangement of zheng she fenkai. the party committee has to sit side by side with the 
township government. At the village (formerly brigade) the party branch has to sit 
side by side as well with the villagers’ committee. Indeed, the presence of village 
enterprises and other private household businesses in villages make the idea of party 
committees or party branches which command everything further untenable.
After this storm of changes, there is one question left: what should be the 
proper role for the party branches in villages? More specifically, what is the proper 
role for a village party secretary? If he is only one of many chairmen/chairwomen, 
it would undermine the leadership of the Party. If he continues to play the role of 
commander, it would jeopardise the new household contract responsibility system. 
Thus, the central leadership had a dilemma: to salvage the economy or the Party’s 
leadership.
B. Party branches as "leadership core" in villages
One solution which was apparent in the beginning of Reform (1980) was to separate 
the Party from the government under the program of "dang zheng fenkai." This was
48"Huifu xiang zhengquan, shixing zhengshe fenshe." (Restore the political power o f  the township, 
and implement the separation o f  commune and government) Zhongguo nongmin bao. 18 January, 1983, 
p. 3.
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actually not an exclusive program for party branches in the countryside; the Party 
from the central down to the party branches nationwide, urban as well as rural, have 
to be separated from the government. Deng Xiaoping in 1980 wrote that the Party had 
dominated the government so much that it created a situation called "vi dan^ dai 
zheng” (to use the Party as a substitute the government) and accordingly, 
"bureaucratism".49 Deng personally supported the idea of reforming the political 
structure in China, and indirectly, the strategy of separation of the Party from the 
government.
This does not mean that Deng would want to dismantle the Party. He clearly 
affirmed in 1979 that China should uphold "the Four Cardinal Principles" (si xiang 
jiben vuanze). one of which is to accept the leadership of the CCP.50 The program 
of separation of the Party from government was intended - in Zhao Ziyang’s words - 
to restore the leadership of the Party. If the Party gets too involved in administrative 
and economic affairs, there will be not enough attention for Party affairs, he 
argued.51 The strategy of separation of the Party from the government was formally 
adopted by the Thirteenth Party Congress, in 1987.52
Within the framework of the separation of the Party from government, the 
leadership of the Party over the State is defined as "mainly in political, political,
49 "Bureaucratism", according to Deng, is: "standing high above the masses, abusing power, divorcing 
oneself from reality and the masses; spending a lot o f  time and effort to put up an impressive front; 
indulging in empty talk; sticking to a rigid way o f  thinking; being hidebound by convention; overstaffing 
administrative organs; being dilatory, inefficient, and irresponsible; failing to keep one’s word; circulating 
documents endlessly without solving problems; shifting responsibility to others; and even assuming the airs 
o f a mandarin, reprimanding other people at every turn, vindictively attacking others, suppressing 
democracy, deceiving superiors and subordinates, being arbitrary and despotic, practising favouritism, 
offering bribes, participating in corrupt practices in violation o f  the law." Deng Xiaoping, "Dang he euoiia 
lingdao zhidu de gaige" (On the reform o f  the system o f  Party and state leadership), 18 August 1980, in 
Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works o f Deng Xiaoping), 1975-1982, Hubei: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, 
p. 287.
50"Jianche si xiang iiben vuanze" (Uphold the four cardinal principles) in Deng Xiaoping, Ibid. pp. 
144-170.
5lZhao Ziyang, "Guanyu dang-zheng fenkai" (On the separation o f  the Party from the government), 
14 October 1987, in Shi er da yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Selected important documents since the 
twelfth party congress), Vol. IE, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988, p. 1469.
52Zhao Ziyang’s report to the Thirteenth Party Congress, Yanzhe you zhongguo tese de shehuizhuvi 
dalu qianiin (March along the road o f  socialism with Chinese characteristics), in Shi san da vilai zhongyao 
wenxian xianbian (Collection o f important documents since the thirteenth party congress), Vol. I, Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1991, pp. 4-61.
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ideological, and organizational leadership."53 In other spheres, such as concrete 
economic measures, legal relations and day-to-day affairs, Party leadership is to be 
exercised through the governmental institutions and regularised procedures according 
to the State Constitution and the specific laws and regulations based on it.54 In other 
words, the Party abandons its previous claim of absolute control, and limits itself 
from intervening in state organs.
In the countryside, the program of separation of the Party from the 
government was carried out hand in hand with the dissolution of the communes. In 
place of communes, township governments were established and separated from the 
township Party Committee.55 The separation of the Party from the government at the 
village level (formerly, production brigade), however, was not perfectly applicable 
because there was no governmental division at village-level. Villagers’ committees 
which emerged in the villages in the middle 1980s, according to the law, are not 
designated as state administrative organs, and must elect their own chairmen.56
The strategy of separating the Party from the government had unintended 
consequences: party branches in the countryside were in a state of confusion.57 The
53Party Charter (1982); further elaboration, see Hu Yaobang, "Ouanmian kaichuang shehuizhuvi 
xiandaihua iianshe de xin iumian" (Entirely create new situation o f the construction socialist modernization), 
in Shi vi iie shan zhongquanhui yilai zhongyao wenxian xuandu (Selected readings o f important documents 
since the Third Plenum), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987, p. 514.
54Further discussion on these issues, see Harro von Senger, "Recent Developments in the Relations 
between State Norms and Party Norms in the People’s Republic o f China," in Stuart Schram (ed.) The 
Scope o f State Power in China. London: SOAS. 1985, pp. 171-207.
55"ZhonggonE zhongyang euowuvuan guanvu shixing zhene-she fenkai iianli xiang zhengfu de 
tongzhi" (An announcement by the Central Committee and the State Council on the implementation o f the 
separation o f the government from the commune and establishment o f  township government), 20 October 
1983, in Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Selected important documents 
on agriculture and village works in the new era), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992, pp. 220- 
222 .
56The State Constitution (1982), Art. I l l ;  The Organic Law Governing the Villagers’ Committees 
(1987), Art. 2 and 8.
5 7
Cunii zuzhi iianshe wenti tantao" (A discussion on the problem o f  the construction o f  village level 
organizations) Nongmin ribao. 30 December 1987, p. 4. Citing an investigation at "a certain county," it 
is reported that out o f 114 villages, 60 per cent o f  them do not have a clear division o f  labour between the 
party branches and the villagers’ committees, and 24 per cent suffered severe conflicts. See, also Burns, 
John P. "Local Cadre Accommodation to the ’Responsibility System’ in Rural China" Pacific Affairs. 
Winter 1986-86, Vol 58 , no 4, pp. 607-625.
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concept of the leadership in ideology and politics was probably too difficult for the 
peasants to understand. Many village cadres were confused. Apparently, the party 
branch secretaries found themselves in an awkward situation. They felt that they were 
supposed to lead but did not know exactly what to do. The central leadership was 
quick to acknowledge "the paralysed and semi-paralysed situation."58 D u r i n g  
this first stage (1980-1990), the role of the party secretaries was unclear (leadership 
in ideology and politics).59 This was the stage when many party secretaries played 
almost no role in villages. The decline of grain production in 1985 through to 1988 
might have forced the central leadership to rethink the role of the party branch 
secretaries. After assessing the situation of the poor performance of agriculture, the 
Central Committee in 1988 went on to admit that "at present, one part of village-level 
grass-root organizations is paralysed." There are many reasons, but one of them is 
the fact that "leadership is not strong enough."60
The second stage started in 1990 with the abandonment of the strategy of 
separation of the Party from the government,61 and adoption of a new strategy of 
the party branch as "leadership core" or lingdao hexin. Song Ping, member of the 
Standing Committee of the Politburo and in charge of organization, was the main 
proponent of this concept. He emphasised the importance of the party branch in the 
countryside. In one of his reports (on Anhui Province), he wrote: "If villages would
58 "Ouan guo nongcun gongzuo huivi iivao" (The summary o f the national conference on village 
works), December 1981, p. 131; and "Zhonggong zhongyang. guowuvuan guanvu vi iiu ba liu nian 
nongcun gongzuo de bushu" (The central committee and the state council on the strategy for the village 
work in 1986), 1 January 1986, p. 383; both in Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian 
xuanbian (Selection o f  important documents on agriculture and villages in the new era), Beijing: Zhongyang 
wenxian chubanshe, 1992.
59This certainly was one o f  the reasons for tension, even conflict, with the villagers’ committee which 
were becoming more and more assertive in demanding their autonomy.
60"Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuvuan guanvu duotiu ming nian nongve fengshou de iueding" (The 
decision by the central committee and the state council on seizing agriculture harvest o f  next year), 25 
November 1988, in Xin shiqi nongve he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Selection o f  
important documents on agriculture and villages in the new era), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 
1992, p. 529.
61Indeed, this program was shelved after the June Fourth Incident in 1989; Willy Wo-lap Lam argues: 
"The CCP insisted after June 4, 1989, that political reform had not stopped. However, the party’s definition 
o f  the ’reform o f  the political structure’ was changed to exclude separation o f  party and government and 
participation by non-party or non-mainstream politicians and intellectuals," Willy Wo-lap Lam, China, After 
Deng Xiaoping. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, p. 241.
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deepen reform, would develop economy, the crucial point would be to have good 
party branches, and to have good party secretaries."62 Secondly, Song addressed 
the fundamental question: What should the party branch do? This topic was discussed 
in the National Conference on the Construction of Village-level Organization, in 
Beijing, August 1990.63 At this occasion, Song Ping, for the first time, launched 
his idea of party branches to be "leadership core" fiingdao hexin) in their villages. 
In his view, a village is a "small society" (xiao shehuil in which there are a number 
of organizations and many works, A party branch would play leadership-core role 
within this situation. He does not explain further why the party branch, and not the 
villagers’ committee, should adopt the role. He only states: "Only the party branch 
can become leadership core." No definition of "leadership core" is given, 
however. Song Ping did not make any reference to the program of separating the 
Party from the government. Song Ping’s idea of the leadership of the Party is not 
something similar to the period of commune, yet neither it is anything like a 
"paralysed situation," The concept of "core leadership" is in between those two 
extremes.
This concept is, on one hand, still rooted in the idea of Party leadership 
contained in the Party Charter (1982) which is also the foundation of the concept of 
the separation of the Party from the govenrment. The Party must respect the 
autonomy of the government and other mass organizations. Thus, the party branch 
and its secretary must not directly intervene in the villagers’ committee, in other mass 
organizations, and especially in village enterprises. Party secretaries are not to 
monopolise power or abuse their power,64 but to be primus inter pares.
62"Song Pine zai Anhui kaocha shi zhichu: vao qieshi iiaqiang nongcun iiceng dang zhuzhi iianshe" 
(During his investigation in Anhui, Song Ping points out: we must carry out the construction o f  village 
grass-root party organizations) Nongmin ribao. 27 October 1989, p. 1.
63Song Ping "Zai quan guo cun ii zuhzi iianshe gongzuo zuotanhui shang de iianghua (zhaivao). n (A 
speech at the occasion o f national conference on the construction o f  village-level organization (summary)) 
Xiang-zhen luntan. 1990, No. 9 , pp. 3-4.
^ri'his phenomenon was identified by the central leadership, see "Zhonggong zhongyang zhengdang 
gongzuo lingdao weiyuanhui guanvu nongcun zhengdang gonzuo bushu de tongzhi" (Announcement by the 
leading committee o f  the central committee on the work o f rural party rectification on the deployment o f 
the work o f  rural party rectification, in Xin shiqi,op.cit.. p. 366-368.
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The concept, on the other hand, is also dictated by the need for strong 
leadership which can make sure that village works are completed according to the 
state’s demand, and prevents chaos in the countryside. Faithful to the Leninist 
heritage, the central leadership believes that this strong leadership can only be 
provided by theCCP as the vanguard party. In 1980 Deng wrote: "The modernization 
program in China needs our Party."65 Deng’s insistence that the CCP should stay 
as vanguard party for modernization is indeed unambiguous. In the same article he 
says: "Essentially, without the leadership of the Party, there will be no modem
China. [...] Without the leadership of the Party, there will be no correct political 
line." 66
So, the party secretary as the embodiment of the Party is to become leader and 
to be responsible for the completion of the village works. The new concept is an 
attempt by the Party theorists to rescue what is good from Lenin’s concept of the 
vanguard party and what is required for conducting market-oriented reform in the 
countryside. Although the leadership of Post-Tian’anmen repudiated Zhao’s idea of 
the separation of the Party from the government, they retained its fundamental tenet 
of limiting the power of the Party.
The concept of "leadership core" was put to the test three years later, in
1993. During that year China saw the worst riots in villages in several provinces 
since the Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949.67 Then, the following year,
1994, China was hit by severe cotton crisis.68 These riots and cotton crisis, perhaps, 
were part of the reasons which prompted the central leadership to carry out another
65Deng Xiaoping, "Muqian de xingshi he renwu" (The current situation and task), 1980, in Deng 
Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works o f  Deng Xiaoping) 1975-1982, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, p. 
237.
66Ibid.. pp. 230-231.
67"The Social Unrest in the Countryside," China News Analysis. No. 1492, 1 September 1993; 
"Sichuan renshou da-za-qiang shiiian xiangqing" (The details o f  smashing-looting case in Renshou, Sichuan) 
Wenhui bao. 13 June 1993, p. 2; "Jinnian yilai guanvu nongcun wenti de ii iian da shi" (Several big 
incidents related to village problem since beginning this year) Ming bao. 26 July 1993, p. 8. This last 
article presents a table describing several incidents around China: Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, 
Jiangxi, Henan, Guizhou, Guangxi for various different reasons.
68"Muqian mianhua zhiliang wenti yanzhong" (At present, cotton problem is very serious), Renmin 
ribao. 22 May 1994, p. 2; "Cotton in crisis," China News Analysis. No, 1506, 15 March 1994.
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rural rectification campaign beginning in late 1994;69 it was supposed to last two to 
three years. Numerous party secretaries fell from power during this campaign.
It was the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth Congress in autumn 1994 was 
decided upon the decision of the campaign and was also the first plenum which 
exclusively and comprehensively addressed the role of party branches in the 
countryside. Here, in order to allay doubts and hesitation, the central leadership 
reaffirmed the concept of the party branch as "leadership core" proposed by Song 
Ping (who was no longer a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo after 
the Fourteenth Party Congress, 1992). Evidently, it also accepts the role of the party 
secretary as leaders’ core, or which I call "state agent" who should act as primus 
inter pares and yet shoulder the responsibility for the implementation of the state’s 
policies.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have described what the central leadership wants the village party 
branch secretaries to do in their village, and argued that they have to play the role of 
state agent. This is a role which requires the party secretary to bring into completion 
a set of objectives on village works, by positing himself as primus inter pares among 
other figures from other organizations. Of course, the party secretary has to provide 
leadership, but this is to be carried out in cooperation and consultation. In CCP’s 
terminology, he is to play the role of the "leadership core."
The role of the state agent is distinct from that during the period shortly before 
the Reform (1978) or the period of Cultural Revolution. During that period of time, 
village party secretaries played the role of "commander in ch ie f who gave 
commands, reasonable or unreasonable, to the villagers. This role was quite 
compatible with the nature of the commune system which was actually a type of 
regimentation. Party secretaries, not surprisingly, were nicknamed "tu huangdi" or 
"local emperors."
The role of the state agent was formulated in 1990 by Song Ping, then
69The first was between 1986-1987 (rectification to root out the "remnants o f  Cultural Revolution"), 
the second was between 1991-1992 (the campaign o f  "socialist education").
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member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP. Partly as a reaction 
to the decline of agricultural production, and partly as an attempt to correct the 
strategy of "separation of the Party from the government," the role was designed both 
to reaffirm the centrality of the role of the party branches and their secretaries in the 
countryside, and to retain what had been stated in first stage where the party branches 
were assigned to perform leadership in ideology and politics. As I have shown, the 
formulation process of the role went through two stages; the first stage (1980-1990), 
the stage of the separation of the Party from the government, and the second stage 
(1990-) the stage of the party branch as leadership core.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PARTY SECRETARY AND HIS SUPERIOR (2): 
THE ROLE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL AGENT
To become rich is glorious.
(Deng Xiaoping)
In the last chapter, I have described the role that the central leadership has designed 
for village party secretaries, namely as state agent. This chapter will describe another 
role, the entrepreneurial agent, which the central leadership wants the village party 
secretaries to play.
I will argue that this role is the result of the central leadership’s effort to bring 
prosperity in the countryside through the acceleration of economic growth. The 
standard terminology used by the CCP to describe this situation is xiaokang. In the 
role of the state agent, the central leadership also exerts strong pressure on village 
party branches to achieve this objective. The current regime, which is legitimised 
through its success in economic terms, cannot afford to be lax on this front.
This chapter will be divided into two major sections. The first section will deal 
with the practice of the role as demanded by the central leadership. The following 
seeks to explain the rationale behind this role. Why does the central leadership want 
party secretaries to perform this particular role?
I. THE ROLE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL AGENT
A. The objectives
The objectives that village party secretary must have as entrepreneurial agent1 is 
closely connected to the state’s effort in accelerating economic growth. Economic 
growth in the countryside, in the beginning of Reform, was clearly formulated in late 
1978 when the Central Committee issued the document titled "Decision on Some
JI am using the concept o f  agent as defined in the Chapter Three.
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Problems in Accelerating the Development of Agriculture. "2 This decision basically 
stressed the comprehensive development of agriculture, industry and commerce. 
Unlike policies of the previous period, it recognised that rural policy should have a 
wider perspective than its previous concentration on crop farming.3
Coupled with a policy issued in March 1984 on village enterprises, the central 
leadership gives further encouragement to economic development in the countryside.4 
This document officially accepts village enterprises as the focus of rural development, 
and - as we shall see - party secretaries must be involved in it. By designing these 
policies, obviously, the central leadership aimed at achieving "agricultural 
modernization" which was proclaimed as one of the Four Modernizations.
Thus, from 1978 the main objective for village party secretaries to achieve 
was about developing the economy of their villages. The central leadership did not 
give a specific target. This strategy of rural development was then superseded in 1991 
by the policy of xiaokang or "comfortable life."5
2
Zhongguo gongchandang di shivi iie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huivi baogao (Report o f 
the third plenum o f the eleventh congress o f the central committee o f  the CCP), 22 December 1978, in NN, 
Nongye iitihua zhongyao wenjian huibian. 1958-1981 (Collection o f important documents on agricultural 
collectivization, 1958-1981), Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1982, pp. 967.
3"We surely must with correct attitude and in an integrated way implement the policy which 
"simultaneously elevates agriculture, forestry, husbandry, fishery, and sideline production" and "by taking 
grain as the key link, develop the overall according to the local condition and according to an appropriate 
centralization."Ibid. p. 990.
4"Zhonggong zhongyang. guowuyuan zhuanfa nongmuyuyebu he budangzu ’guanvu kaichuang shedui 
give xin iumian de baggac* de tongzhi" (Circular from the Central Committee and State Council to transmit 
the report by the Ministry o f  Agriculture, Husbandry, and Fishery and by the Party Group o f the Ministry 
on Creating a New Situation in Commune and Brigade-run enterprises)," 1 March 1984, in Zhongguo 
nongcun faaui 1984 (China Rural Laws 1984), Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1986, pp. 343-356.
5The discussion on xiaokang had been going one for several years before the decision for the 
countryside in 1991. It was mentioned by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, and adopted by the Twelfth and 
Thirteenth Party Congress in 1982 and 1987. The Seventh Plenum o f the Thirteenth Congress (1991), when 
designing the Eighth Plan, defined xiaokang as follows: "The lives o f  the people should proceed from 
subsistence level to comfortable level, then life materials should be abundant, the structure o f  spending 
should be more rational, the living quarters should clearly improve, cultural life should be richer, the 
standard o f health should continue to improve, and social service should continually be better." See, Deng 
Xiaoping, "Shixian sige xiandaihua de hongwei mubiao genben zhengce" (The glorious and basic policy 
o f carrying out the four modernizations), in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guoshi tongiian (General lesson 
on the history o f  the PRC), Vol. IV, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993, p. 114; Hu Yaobang’s report to 
the Twelfth Party Congress, Quanmian kaichuang shehui zhuvi xiandaihua iianshe de xin iumian 
(Thoroughly create the new situation o f building socialist modernization), op .cit.. p. 477; Zhao Ziyang’s 
report to the Thirteenth Party Congress, Yanzhe you zhongguo tese de shehuizhuvi dalu qianjin (March 
along the road o f  socialism with Chinese characteristics), in NN, Shi san da yilai zhongyao wenxian
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At the end of 1991, the Central Committee of the CCP issued a document, 
titled: "The Decision of the Central Committee on Further Accelerating Agriculture 
and Village Work." For the first time, it was decided that peasants, not only the 
urbanites, should embark on "comfortable level" or xiaokang by the year 2000. It 
states: "The overall target: in developing the foundation of village economy, is to 
make peasant life relinquish subsistence level and reach a comfortable level."6
The target of xiaokang for the countryside, since then, occupied speeches by 
central leaders. For example, PM Li Peng at the Conference on Exchanging 
Experiences of Villages Rushing toward Xiaokang. 12 April 1993, was quoted as 
saying: "Without comfortable life for 900 million peasants, it is impossible to talk 
about comfortable life for the whole nation."7 The Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth 
Party Congress (1994), a plenum on rural Party rectification, reiterated this target. 
"We should consistently regard economic construction as the central task; set our aim 
on enabling the masses to achieve xiaokang and on building new socialist rural 
areas."8
Xiaokang is more than the rise of GNP; it is about quality of life. Therefore, 
the objectives of xiaokang includes a wide range of indicators, such as consumption 
of meat, brick house, television, electricity, education, etc. In order to avoid
xianbian (Collection o f  important documents since the thirteenth party congress), Vol. I, Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1991, p. 16; Zhonggong zhongyang guanvu zhiding guomin jingji he shehui fazhan shi man 
guihua he ’ba w u’ jihua de jianvi (A proposal by the central committee on the formulation o f  ten-year plan 
o f social development and ’eighth five-year’ plan), 30 December 1990, in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
guoshi tongjian (General lesson on the history o f  the PRC), Vol. IV, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993, 
p. 970.
6Zhonggong zhongyang guanvu iin vi bu iiaqiang nongye he nongcun gongzuo de iueding (Central 
Committee’s Decision on Further Strengthening Agriculture and Village Program), 29 November 1991, in 
Shisan da vilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (A selection o f important documents since the thirteenth party 
congress), vol. Ill, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993, p. 1760.
The conference was attended by more than 100 county leaders which annual per capita income are 
more than 100 yuan. "Meivou jiu yi nongmin de xiaokang. jiu tanbushang quan guo de xiaokang" (Without 
a comfortable life for 900 million peasants, it is impossible to talk about a comfortable life for the whole 
nation) Renmin ribao. 13 April 1993, p. 1. Arguing in similar vein, see interview with Liu Jiang, the 
Minister o f  Agriculture, in Ji Bin and Zhao Lianqing, "Zhongguo shixian xiaokang de guaniian zai 
nongcun" (The crucial point for China in achieving comfortable life lies in the countryside) Liaowang. 19 
April 1993, pp. 4-5.
8"CCP Circular on Strengthening Rural Primary and Grass-roots Organizations," in Summary o f  
World Broadcast (thereafter: SWB], 2 December 1994, FE/2168 G/4.
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arbitrariness, the target of xiaokang is usually determined by every province. In 
Hunan Province, for instance, Xiaokang was defined as "six items and 12 
indicators":9
1. Income
a. annual net average income: 1200 yuan (taking the price of 1990 as 
standard)
2. Material life indicator
b. "enge’er" index: under 50%
c. annual consumption of meat: over 30 jin
d. brick houses: more than 80%
3. Spiritual and cultural life
e. spread of television: more than 70%
f. spending on service: more than 15% of consumption
4. Quality of population
g. the rate of population growth: below ten per one thousand.
h. average education: eight years
5. Life environment
i. the spread of toilet: more than 90%
j. the spread of electricity: more than 95% 
k. area reached by road: more than 95%
6. Security
1. the number of criminals: less than 5 per ten thousand persons.
B. The practice of the entrepreneurial agent
The role of the party branches in the economy is never put in doubt since the
9I could not obtain the complete document, but it is mentioned in an article by Yang Yaohui, "Hunan 
nongcun bene xiaokang vaniiu" (A research on Hunan villages to achieve comfortable life), in Xiao Haohui 
(ed.), Hunan: nongye, nongcun. nonemin wenti vaniiu (Hunan: a research on problems concerning 
agriculture, village, and peasant), Beijing: Zhongguo shangye chubanshe, 1993, p. 37-40. This decision 
is also reported in Hunan nianiian 1993 (Hunan Yearbook 1993), Changsha: Renmin chubanshe, 1993, 
p. 76.
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beginning of Reform. One book titled "How to Become a Good Village Party 
Secretary," demands that village party secretaries in the new era should be able to do 
economic works.
"In the old time, if one would evaluate a village party secretary, one should 
see whether or not he spent his time in the field, whether or not his face is 
black due to sun-bum, whether or not his hands are marked with thick 
calluses, whether or not his clothes are patched, whether or not he often pays 
a visit to the poor and the needy. In the present time, if one would evaluate 
a village party secretary, the most important thing is to see whether or not he 
has courage and vision to bring prosperity, whether or not he can crack his 
brain, produce ideas, to lead us on the path of prosperity."10
This passage is crucial to many party secretaries. If the old-time party secretaries 
were people who shared the fortune of their fellow villagers, being poor with the 
poor, it is no longer the case now. If during Maoist period, a party secretary should 
become the model of a selfless communist who untiringly serves the masses,11 after 
Reform, the party secretaries are just to do the reverse. They should provide a strong 
leadership in leading peasants toward prosperity.
This was perfectly echoed in an editorial in Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily) 
of 10 March 1987. This editorial argues that the success of many villages in changing 
their situation lies in good leadership by party secretaries. "If you want to change 
poor appearance, you have to construct a good village grass-root party branch 
leader’s squad. If peasants want to get rid of their poverty and reach prosperity, 
they need capital, skill, and various other services. Thus, more than ever they need 
the party branch to animate all aspects of enthusiasm." 12
In one of his reports (on Anhui Province), in 1989, Song Ping gave the 
clearest statement on the importance of the party branch in the countryside in 
economy. He says: "If villages would deepen reform, would develop economy, the
10Chi Mian, Zenvang dang hao nongcun dangzhibu shuii (How to become a good village party 
secretary), Revised edition, Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1987, p. 13.
^This is well documented by Chen, A .S ., see "The Ideal Local Party Secretary and the ’M odel1 
Man," China Quarterly. No. 17, 1964, pp. 229-240.
12 . . . . . .
"Gaibian mianmao guaniian zai banzi" (In order to change the appearance, the critical thing is the
leaders) Nongmin ribao. 10 March 1987, p. 3.
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crucial point is to have good party branches, and to have good party secretaries."13 
Party secretaries, in Song Ping’s view, are the key to success for villages in 
developing their economy.
Handbooks for village party secretaries never fail to include advice on 
developing economy. One piece of the advice that the "Handbook for a Village Party 
Secretary" (1990) gives is about village enterprises. They are important because, it 
says, they "can help to diversify the economy of the villagers into agriculture, 
sideline production, industry, and commerce." Furthermore, village enterprises can 
"raise the income of the villagers and alleviate their burden."14 Diversifying the 
economy is important not only because it can raise income but also "make full use 
of labour, the means of production, land and other natural resources," the author 
says.15
The handbook, furthermore, gives special advice on sideline production. It is 
basically non-agricultural activity which consists of transport, gathering, processing, 
handicraft, and "other subsidiary production which do not belong to agriculture." To 
develop sideline production, it argues, is "to carry out a rational division of labour 
and make full use of skilful craftsman." In the end, sideline production, the author 
says, can raise income and satisfy the various needs of the people.16 Apparently, the 
author of the handbook would like to convince village party secretaries that sideline 
production is as equally important as industry and commerce.
In terms of resources, village party secretaries are advised to use local 
resources, i.e. resources which are existing in their own villages. This principle was
13"Song Ping zai Anhui kaocha shi zhichu: yao qieshi iiaqiang nongcun iiceng dang zhuzhi iianshe" 
(During his investigation in Anhui, Song Ping points out: w e must carry out the construction o f  village 
grass-root party organizations) Nongmin ribao, 27 October 1989, p. 1. One o f  the five goals o f  the Fourth 
Plenum (1994) specifically emphasizes the crucial position o f  village party secretary again: "We should 
build good leading bodies, paying particular attention to appointing good secretaries who can unify and lead 
the people in firmly implementing the party’s line, principles, and policies. See, "CCP Circular," op .cit.. 
p. G/4.
14Zhang Dianzhong, Nongcun dangzhibu shuii shouce (A handbook for a village party secretary), 
Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1990, p. 118.
15Ibid., p. 131.
16Ibid., 130.
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declared at the beginning of Reform when the household responsibility system just 
started. Advising on how to develop various type of responsibility systems, the 
National Conference on Agriculture Work (December 1981) says: "In formulating 
plans for developing agriculture, forestry, husbandry, sideline production, fishery, 
industry and commerce, production teams must work out measures which suit local 
conditions."17 Production teams cannot operate beyond the limit of its local 
resources. In 1991, the Central Committee reiterated this principle when it said: "One 
must use the local resources in developing production, initiating collective enterprises, 
and raising the income of unified management economy."18 The Fourth Plenum 
(1994) which produced the most comprehensive document on village work stressed 
this principle. Indeed, this principle is also applicable to poor areas.19
A study made by the World Bank confirms the practice; it shows that village 
enterprises "typically enjoy close ties to specific rural communities, with the supply 
of both capital and labour overwhelmingly local in origin."20 If state-owned 
enterprises acquired their loans from a national credit plan, loans for rural firms were 
mostly generated from incremental rural deposits.21 There is no free labour market 
in the countryside. Between 89.7 per cent and 94.0 per cent of workers in the rural 
enterprise come from the same township.22 The report seems to suggest that there 
is administrative intervention when it cites a case in Wuxi County (Jiangsu Province)
17"Quail euo nongcun gongzuo huivi iivao" (The summary o f the national conference on village 
works), December 1981, in Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Selection 
o f important documents on agriculture and villages in the new era), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian 
chubanshe, 1992, p. 120.
18"Guowuyuan guanvu iiaqiang nongye sehhuihua fuwu tixi iianshe de tongzhi" (State Council’s 
circular on strengthening the construction o f  agriculture social service system), 28 October, 1991, in Ibid. 
p. 767.
19"CCP Circular," SWB op.cit.. p. 5. "Economically-underdeveloped villages should be self-reliant, 
should work diligently, tap their potentials and step up mutually-beneficial cooperation with develop areas 
to quicken the pace o f  casting o ff poverty and achieving prosperity."
20Ody, Anthony J. Rural Enterprise Development in China. 1986-1990. World Bank Discussion 
Papers, No. 162, Washington DC: The World Bank, 1992, xi.
21Ibid, p. 11.
22Ibid., p. 12.
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where labour is allocated to community enterprises by the township authorities.23
So far, it has been made clear that village party secretaries are assigned by the
central leadership to develop the economy of their village by using local resources.
The next question is: How should the village party secretaries carry out this job? If
village party secretaries are asked to develop the economy of their village, do they
themselves have to get involved in economic activities? Should they start the
enterprise and run it as well? None of the official documents, however, explicitly
advice party secretaries to engage in commercial enterprises. There are, however,
some authoritative documents which can be freely interpreted to implicate that notion.
The often quoted saying of Deng Xiaoping is one of them; it reads:24
"In economic policy, I am of the opinion that it should be allowed that a small 
number of areas, enterprises, workers, peasants, through their effort and 
diligence, get more money, and live better. If a group of people live better,
then they will produce a powerful example, influencing their neighbours,
animating people from other areas and units to learn from them."
This quotation is widely used to justify anybody who becomes rich in China. There
is nothing wrong in becoming rich as long as it is "through their effort and
diligence." This principle is applicable to all Chinese people, including party
members. A handbook for village cadres, "Questions and Answers on Village
Work,"25 starts with a question: "If a CCP member takes the lead in becoming rich 
through hard work, can it be said that he/she abuses power for him/herself? The 
answer of the handbook is ’no.’ The quotation of Deng Xiaoping above is used here. 
This document, implicitly, can accept the fact that rural party cadres (including party 
secretaries) are engaged in business and, possibly, become rich. Party secretaries are 
actually those who are targeted by the author. To foster his argument, the author cites
23m l
24Deng Xiaoping, "Jiefang sixiang. shishi diushi. tuaniie vizhi xiang qian kan" (Emancipateyour mind, 
seek truth from facts, unite to march onward), in Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected works o f Deng  
Xiaoping), 1975-1982, Hubei: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, p. 143.
25N N , Nongcun gongzuo wenda (Questions and answers on the work in the countryside), Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1985, Question No. 155. This book is commissioned under the auspices o f  several other 
government institutions, such as the Policy Research Office o f the Secretary o f  the Central Committee 
Village Policies, Research Centre on the Development o f the Countryside in China, Policy Research Office 
o f the Ministry o f Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery, etc.
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an example of a party secretary in a village in Shanxi Province who, through his 
initiative, brought economic development to his village.
Party secretaries, therefore, are implicated in Deng’s quotation and other 
official documents that, when they develop the economy of their village, they should 
lead their fellow villagers by engaging themselves in the enterprises: take initiative, 
look for the needed resources, and manage the business. The reason for the vagueness 
of the official statement is probably attributed to the fact that it is impossible to write 
a direct and clear document on the subject since becoming an entrepreneur 
contravenes the basic credo of Marxism.26
The central leadership circumvents this by adopting non-official channels. This 
may partly explain the rise of publication of confessions, biographies, and adventure 
stories of village party secretaries who have been successful in leading their fellow 
villagers by engaging themselves in various enterprises. This genre of literature, 
apparently, functions as effectively as unofficial statement about policies which cannot 
be published due to ideological constraint.
A confession of a model party secretary is illustrative here. Shi Laihe was a 
successful party secretary from Liuzhuang Village, Henan Province. In his article, 
titled "How to become a good village party branch secretary" and published in 
Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) 22 December 1990, he gave an equivocal exhortation 
to his fellow party secretaries.27 He wrote: "At present we are carrying out socialist 
commodity economy. If you don’t have any ability, then you’re finished. As a party 
secretary, one should not only be able to do the work on ideology and politics, but 
also to do the work on economy, organization, solving disputes, birth control." He 
further argued that village leaders, especially the party secretary, should maintain a 
high degree of credibility. "If he does not bring prosperity to the masses, fails to
26This is actually a problem o f legitimation. Communist regimes, invariably, struggle to acquire 
legitimation from the population as "the masses" they control continually fall on "motivation crises." This 
argument is developed in Ding, X .L. The Decline o f  Communism in China, Legitimacy Crisis. 1977-1989. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 19.
27Shi Laihe. "Zenyang dang hao nongcun dangzhibu shuii?" (How is it to become a good village Party 
branch secretary?), Renmin ribao. 22 October, 1990. He has been awarded the medal o f "national model" 
four times, and had reportedly met in person national dignitaries such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu 
Shaoqi, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, etc. All o f  these attributes might have given special weight 
to Shi’s authority in writing this article.
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fulfil his duty, and commits corruption, then no one will listen to him. If he convenes 
a meeting, no one will come to attend."
Another example is a confession by Li Yuzong, party secretary of Hechengli 
Village (Longjing City, Jilin Province).28 He was elected as "national model of 
worker" (quan guo laodong mo fan). He write as follows: "If you do your job well, 
they will obey you and follow you. If not, then no one will listen to you. It can be 
said that obedience comes from whether or not you have created material benefit and 
profit for the masses and the masses can see it. The best benefit is one which 
everybody can enjoy. The only way to obtain this kind of benefit is to develop the 
economy of the collective of the village, namely village enterprises."
In these two pieces of articles, the good party secretaries developed their 
village and led their fellow villagers "toward prosperity" (dailing zhi fuL by starting 
profitable enterprises. Any party secretary is asked to emulate them. One special 
book which has collected, from newspapers across China, more than 100 stories of 
successful village party secretaries serve the same purpose.29 As the title of the book 
suggests "Under the post of the party secretaries," the central leadership, apparently, 
purposefully intends to make it as part of the propaganda, that village party 
secretaries, as the models suggest, work hard to set up varied enterprises in all types 
of variations. Some of those model party secretaries are presented in Table 1 below.
The central leadership, evidently, uses this genre to give unofficial approval 
to village party secretaries to play the role of entrepreneurial agent. This policy is 
even more emphasised by the persistent use of the reward method. As evident from 
the stories about the model party secretaries, those who excel in promoting economic 
growth in their villages are rewarded with acknowledgment by the state. In fact, it 
has become an annual event for the state to give awards to villages and their party 
secretaries for their achievement during the past year. For instance, in 1990, the 
journal Xiang-zhen give announced one hundred most successful villages in China in
28"Zen yang dang nongcun dangzhibu shuii" (How to become a village party branch secretary) 
Nongmin ribao. 28 June 1991, p. 3.
29
See, Li Yicong, Zai dangzhibu shujj de gangwei shane (Under the post o f the party secretaries), 
Shenyang: Baishan chubanshe, 1991. Stories in this book are collected from nation wide newspapers.
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Table 1
Party secretaries and the enterprises they set up
Name o f  
party secretary
Village Enterprise
1. Xie Mengcang Xin Village 
Chang’an County, 
Shanxi Province
Acetylene factory
2. Liu Qinzhang Nanjie hedian village, 
Yongnian County, Hebei 
Province
Paper factory,
Ferroalloy facto- ry, Wooden 
furni-ture factory.
3. Zhang Xiumei Jiankang Village 
Tianmen city, 
Hubei Province
Weaver factory
4. Ma Lihai Liujia Village 
Ningyang County, 
Shandong Province
Shoe factory
5. Yang Zhiguo Xiashitang Vill, 
Yibin County, 
Sichuan Province
Wine factory
6. Yu Tianruan Xishuangdan Vill. 
Xian County, 
Hebei Province.
Orchard,
Candied fruit factory, Aquatics
7. Zhang Weiji Nanling Village 
Bao’an County, 
Guangdong Prov.
Silk flower fac- tory, Feed 
processing plant
8. Zheng Meiyun Zhulinhu Village 
Huanggang Dist., 
Hubei Province
Brick and tile factory
9. Li Zhongyang Ludun Village 
Jin County, 
Liaoning Province
Vegetable shed
10. Yue Xianjie Jinqiao Village 
Yushan County, 
Jiangxi Province
Feed processing 
plant; Tomato yard
11. Chang Yuchun Bachakou Village 
Shan County, 
Shandong Province
Asbestos factory
12. Zhu Haishui Henggang Village 
Guixi County, 
Jiangxi Province
Bamboo goods factory
Sources: Li Yicong, Zai dangzhibu shuii de eanewei shang (Under the post o f the party secretaries), 
Shenyang: Baishan chubanshe, 1991: (1) pp. 81-84; (2) pp. 115-117; (3) pp. 129-132; (4) pp. 239-240; (5) 
pp. 338-340; (6) pp. 364-368; (7) pp. 413-415; (8) pp. 479-480; (9) pp. 490-492; (10) pp. 517-520; (11) 
pp. 605-607; (12) pp. 631-634.
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developing village enterprises.30 These villages and their party secretaries are usually 
awarded with banners and nationwide press coverage. In this way, party secretaries 
who do not do well are put under heavy pressure.
The role of the entrepreneurial agent, as is clear from the explanation above, 
is actually about setting up village enterprises. More village enterprises mean an 
increase in economic growth in villages. When the central leadership adopted the 
policy of xiaokang for the countryside, it by no means altered the trend. In fact, the 
position of village enterprises become even more significant: more village enterprises 
lead to the increase in economic growth, and economic growth leads to xiaokang. The 
drafter of the Fourth Plenum (1994) document may also have this logic in mind when 
he writes: "In strengthening party branches, we should focus on building leading 
bodies and selecting good party branch secretaries so that they will become strong 
collectives capable of leading peasants towards xiaokang."31 Thus, since 1991, 
village party secretaries are demanded by the central leadership to develop the 
economy of their villages by setting up village enterprises to the degree that the 
villages will reach the level of xiaokang.
The demand is quite absolute. The central leadership explicitly states that 
party secretaries who do not do well in developing the economy of their village 
toward xiaokang are to be "strengthened." The Fourth Plenum (1994), the plenum 
which approved the rectification campaign of party branches in the countryside, said: 
"The building of leading bodies of average villages should be strengthened, their 
economic development should be speeded up and greater efforts should be made to 
build a spiritual civilization in these villages to attain the objective of enabling their 
residents to live a more comfortable life (xiaokangl.32 In this statement, "average 
villages" are those which are left behind in their attempt to reach xiaokang. and for 
this reason, their "leading bodies" (i.e. party secretaries) have to be "strengthened"
30  *•"Zhongguo xiang-zhen give 'shi da bai qiane’" (One hundred powerful town-village enterprises in 
China) in Xiang-zhen give. No. 12, 1991, pp. 4-5.
31 "CCP Circular", ibid.. p. 5.
32IbuL
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(which may range from being sent to party school to purging).33
II. THE CENTRAL LEADERSHIP AND PARTY BRANCHES IN THE 
COUNTRYSIDE
Why is it that the central leadership ask party secretaries to become its agents to 
promote a comfortable life for villages in China? This role also cannot be separated 
from the strategy of nominal encapsulation adopted at the beginning of Reform. 
Similar to politics, in economy the central leadership first of all liberated controls 
over the use of land and labour and returned them to peasant households. The price 
increases for agricultural products purchased by the government actually injected a 
large amount of funds into the countryside, which, in turn, were vital for 
reinvestment. Thus, at the same time, there was surplus labour and new sources of 
capital. As peasants were now free to use their labour and funds to specialise in 
production, they were quick to divert resources to non-agricultural activities. This 
liberalisation of labour and capital partly explains the boom in enterprises in the 
countryside,34
Under these new circumstances, the central leadership was forced to define a 
new role to be assigned to party secretaries. This section is to examine the process 
whereby the central leadership came to the decision of assigning the role to village 
party branch secretaries. The first part describes the hesitation on the part of the 
central leadership as reflected in the debates on whether or not party secretaries 
should play the role; the following part is concerned with the process leading towards 
the formulation of the policy for party secretaries as entrepreneurial agents.
A. Debates on party secretaries who take a lead in becoming rich
The debates exploded in early 1985. They were serialised for two months in
33The central leadership takes a lenient attitude toward party branches in poor areas.
^For a fuller account on agricultural policy, see Ash, Robert "The Evolution o f Agricultural Policy," 
in China Quarterly. No. 116, December 1988, pp. 529-555; Findlay, Christopher et al., Policy Reform, 
Economic Growth, and China’s Agriculture. Paris: OECD, 1993.
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Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily) under the heading "Is it permissible for a village 
party secretary to take a lead in achieving prosperity?" and had drawn participants 
from all over China. The editor wrote that since the opening of the forum, it had 
attracted not less than 800 letters from across China,35 The key term debated was 
about "to take a lead toward prosperity" f daitou zhifu): "to take a lead" means that 
party branch secretaries in the villages are permitted to start and run an enterprise.
One letter with the pen-name Nongyou (the friend of peasants) from Shaanxi 
Province expressed an anxiety: "I just heard this story. There was a party secretary 
who bought a "Jiefang" car and then transported goods of the village by becoming a 
driver himself. For half of the month he did not live at home. When there was 
problem in the township, he was not there; when village cadres faced problems, they 
could not find him; when villagers had problems, they could not find him either." 
The anonymous writer basically argued that business had taken too much of his time, 
and consequently, the attention, of party secretaries for village and party affairs. Mr. 
Rong Zhaolu from Shandong Province defended the right of party secretaries to 
engage themselves in business activities. But, they should avoid using their power to 
run the business. He mentioned a series of examples of corrupt practices by party 
secretaries. "If they become rich in this way, it is really inadvisable. We sincerely 
advise that these kinds of party secretaries should repent as soon as possible (gaman 
gengzhang).36 He actually praised party secretaries who set up in business as 
specialised households (zhuanvue hu).
In the following week, a letter by Wang Baodong from Hebei Province 
attacked again corrupt practices by party secretaries. For example, some party 
secretaries, under the pretext of contract, monopolised the sideline production of the 
whole village. "This is not taking a lead in achieving prosperity, but making oneself 
prosperous." Still in the same edition, another letter by Yao Dazheng from Shanxi 
Province, opened up with a statement: "One thing is sure that village party secretaries
35"Nongcun dangzhibu shuii gai bu gai daitou zhifu?" (Is it permissible that a village party secretary 
take a lead in achieving prosperity?) Nongmin ribao. 4 June 1985, p. 3.
36 "Nongcun dangzhibu shuii gai bu gai daitou zhifu?" (Is it permissible for a village party secretary 
to take a lead in achieving prosperity?), Nongmin ribao. 26 April 1985, p. 3. See: "Gongzuo ving shis 
di vi wei de" (The work should be on the first priority), and Rong Zhaolu, "Wenti zai yu zhen vang zhifu" 
(The problem is how to become rich).
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should take a lead in achieving prosperity." The qualification that the writer made 
was similar to the previous two letters. Party secretaries must do so in an ethical 
way. "He should not do so in crooked ways (waimen xiedao)."37
Two days later, the editor wrote an introductory comment, saying that the 
leadership of party secretaries was necessary. It was necessary, first, in the time when 
the villagers did not dare to become rich, and secondly, when the villagers already 
had the courage to become rich. In both situations, party secretaries should play the 
role of leadership towards prosperity. However, underlining the opinions of the 
previous letters, the editor warned against the abuse of power by party secretaries.38 
Examples of party secretaries (from Hebei and Liaoning) who led their fellow 
villagers towards prosperity but in an honest way were given. They both mobilised 
local resources through a cooperative effort of the whole village.
The edition of 21 May 1985 presented the counter views. A letter from 
Fangshan County (Beijing) vigorously argued against the role of party secretaries in 
leading towards prosperity. The writer, Mr. Liu Lin, came up with three reasons. 
First of all, he said that what party secretaries should do was not to take a lead in 
achieving prosperity but "to help the masses to prosper;" secondly, it was impossible 
to do two things at the same time (business and village work) as energy was limited; 
thirdly, there was the danger of abusing power, leading consequently, to irregularities 
(bu zheng zhi feng). It is the last point that most worried writers. The writer 
proposed that party secretaries either do the village work or do business; they must 
choose.39
Mr. Liu’s view was shared by Mr. Shen Qingguo from Jiangsu Province. He 
wrote: "If he is busy with his own family for the whole day, how many factories can
37 "Nongcun dangzhibu shuii gai bu gai daitou zhifu?" (Is it permissible for a village party secretary 
to take a lead in achieving prosperity?) Nongmin ribao. 3 May 1985, p. 3. See: Wang Baodong, "Zhi wei 
ge ren zhifu, fii de you gui" (To enrich only oneself, is to become rich in a shameful way), Yao Dazheng, 
"Daitou zhifu. vao zou zhenglu" (To lead towards prosperity means to walk the correct path).
38 "Nongcun dangzhibu shuii gai bu gai daitou zhifu?" (Is it permissible for a village party secretary 
to take a lead in achieving prosperity?), Nongmin ribao. 7 May 1985.
39 Yang Lin, "Buvi tichang dangzhishu daitou zhifu" (Party secretaries should not take a lead in 
achieving prosperity) in "Nongcun dangzhibu shuii gai bu gai daitou zhifu?" (Is it permissible for a village 
party secretary to take a lead in achieving prosperity?) Nongmin ribao. 21 May 1985, p. 3.
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his village have?" From his observation of prosperous villages in Jiangnan, he found 
the fact was that those villages that became rich had little to do with party secretaries. 
"It should not be that the families of party secretaries become rich First and then 
lead." Instead, it was because, he argued, the party secretaries "propagated and 
implemented policies from the Party." Mr Shen simply did not believe that party 
secretaries should take a lead in achieving prosperity.40
In a more specific way, Mr. Kong Lingming from Hebei Province pointed out 
that the reason why party secretaries were not being allowed to take a lead in 
achieving prosperity was that because as yet there was no law regulating them. "If 
in a very short time there is no regulation, I ’m afraid there will be no end of trouble 
for the future." Equipped with so much power, party secretaries would easily use it 
for their private interests, not for the interest of their villages. So he did not agree 
with the new role for party secretaries; for him, apparently, the danger that party 
secretaries would abuse their power and become corrupt was too real.41
Apparently, in response to these views, the editor of Nongmin ribao argued 
in the following week that one should treat "party secretaries like ordinary citizens" 
(vi ban bai xing). If ordinary citizens are allowed to follow the principle "one section 
of the people to become rich first," this principle should then be applicable to party 
secretaries as well. Party secretaries, therefore, are to be allowed to become rich.42
The next question is about "all and at the same time become rich" (gongtong 
fuyu),43 a question which is rooted in the very nature of the CCP. But, 
interestingly, this question was shifted into a question of timing. Or, as a letter 
written by Mr. Ye Mao, from Inner Mongolia summarised it: Should party secretaries 
become rich "before, after, or at the same time"?44 Mr. Ye argued that this question 
should be solved on the ground; party secretaries should look to their next door
40"Si tongzhi de kanfa" (The opinions o f  four comrades), Ibid.
41Ibid.
42"Nongcun dangzhibu shuii gai bu gai daitou zhifu?" (Is it permissible for a village party secretary 
to take a lead in achieving prosperity?) Nongmin ribao. 4 June 1985, p. 3.
43The term ’gontong fuyu* is used here, which literally means ’all and at the same time become rich.’
^ " Duo xianexiang zuolin voushe" (Look out to your next neighbours), Ibid.
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neighbours (xiang zuoling voushe) if they wanted to become rich. This same 
argument was put forward by Mr. Lin Guohua from Beijing. They should "work out 
measures which were suited to local conditions and local people fving di ving ren 
zhivri.1145 For both Mr. Ye and Mr. Lin, party secretaries were persons who should 
place the people as their top priority, even by sacrificing their own private interests. 
"If party secretaries suffer losses, they really deserve it," wrote Mr. Lin.
In other words, becoming rich is not a matter of morality or legality, but of 
common sense. The editor also agreed with this point. Of course, party secretaries 
should be allowed to become rich but they should also consider their status as 
members of CCP. The editor said: "Thus, party secretaries should not mix with the 
ordinary rich families. If they are already rich, they should consider how to lead the 
masses towards prosperity."
So far, we have seen that the debates have proceeded on three levels. On the 
level of ideology, the debates suggest that there is nothing wrong for a party secretary 
to become rich. One letter written by Wang Shihong, Deputy Head of Tanghu 
Township (Jiangxi Province), in fact, warned of the danger of "leftist eye" in 
evaluating what the party secretaries were doing.46 Party secretaries who become 
rich do not violate any ideological tenet. On the legal level, there was also no 
obstacle, although one letter had already raised this problem. Party secretaries were 
allowed to become rich despite the absence of legal arrangements.
The problem lies at the level of society. All letters raised objections to party 
sectaries taking a lead in achieving prosperity simply because it hurt society’s sense 
of justice. Villagers knew too well how party secretaries, holding power in their 
hand, were enabled to take over village enterprises for themselves and their families. 
Villagers, not being connected to them, were marginalised. By taking a lead in 
prosperity, in the peasants’ view, party secretaries were actually granted a double 
privilege: power and wealth. Thus, many writers rejected the idea of party secretaries 
taking a lead in prosperity simply because they did not want to see this accumulation
45"Ye tan xian fu. houfu, gongtongfu" (Speaking about before, after, or at the same time become rich)
Ibid.
46Wang Shihong, "Zhengque kandai dangzhibu shun zhi fu" (Correctly treat party secretaries who 
become rich), Ibid.
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of wealth and power falling into one hand. Mr. Wang angrily wrote: "Their wealth 
is tremendous, and their power enormous. They do become ’head’ but do not 
’lead.’"47
This problem is not easy to solve. There are two suggestions: firstly, that 
party secretaries should look to their neighbours (by Mr. Ye Mao); secondly, that 
party secretaries should take a lead if they live in poor areas, and not do so if they 
live in prosperous areas (by Mr. Li Guohua). The last forum of the debates 
(Nongmin ribao. 18 June 1985) apparently took up these two views. The editor wrote 
"At present, there are party members who overly stress becoming rich first, and 
forget prosperity for all. We are in the opinion that if the masses have doubts as to 
the Party’s policies, party cadres should not take a lead in achieving prosperity. If the 
masses can understand the Party’s policies, and have courage to achieve prosperity, 
then the focus of the works of party cadres should be laid on how to lead the masses 
towards prosperity for all."48
B„ Towards the formulation of the role
The year of 1985 was indeed a pivotal year. It was not surprising that the debates 
occurred in that year. This was partly because in the previous year (March 1984) the 
central leadership took a decisive action by officially accepting village enterprises as 
the focus of rural development.49 Naturally, villagers were questioning the role of 
party secretaries, especially when party secretaries themselves became directly 
involved in the starting and running of the enterprises. As mentioned above, three
47Here, Mr Wang plays with words which cannot be imitated in English. The debates were about 
daitou zhi fu. the two words dai and tou combined are translated "to take a lead" but they literally mean 
"to lead at the head." His criticism is that party secretaries only do the second word, tou (head) Wang 
Baodong, op.cit,
48"Nongcun dangzhibu shuii gai bu aai daitou zhifu?" (Is it permissible that a village party secretary 
take a lead in achieving prosperity?) Nongmin ribao. 18 June 1985, p. 3.
49 "Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan zhuanfa nonEmuvuvebu he budangzu *guanyu kaichuang shedui 
give xin iumian de baogao* de tongzhi" (Circular from the Central Committee and State Council to transmit 
the report by the Ministry o f  Agriculture, Husbandry, and Fishery and by the Party Group o f  the Ministry 
on Creating a New Situation in Commune and Brigade-run enterprises)," 1 March 1984, in Zhongguo 
nongcun faqui 1984 (China Rural Laws 1984), Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1986, pp. 343-356.
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related questions emerged: ideology, law, and social, and they created a crisis of
confidence of the peasants in the party secretaries.
The debates, apparently, were to tackle this crisis. The result - as we have
seen - was quite unsuccessful since they were unable to come up with a clear
definition of the role of party secretaries. The ideology issue was sidetracked by
condemning it as "leftist" and the law issue was shelved as unimportant. Party
secretaries were, then, given liberty as to whether or not to take a lead in prosperity;
and this was to be completely at their discretion.
Thus, during this first stage (1978-1991), party secretaries were practically left
alone in developing the economy in the village; there was no specific demand to
develop the economy within the framework of xiaokang. The national media
frequently reported excesses where party secretaries single-mindedly develop the
economy, either that of their own villages or that of their own families. A typical
case is the report of an investigation conducted in villages in Beijing suburb.50 The
findings showed four major weaknesses displayed by the village party secretaries.
Below is a quotation from the conclusion of the article which may give more flavour:
"Firstly, the foundation of their thinking is not solid enough. [...] In the 
process of prosperity, these people do not care about the collective, do not 
care about other people, they only work hard to enrich their families. Some 
of them even have a strong individualism. Secondly, they all lack the 
knowledge about the Party and experience in politics. These cadres are mostly 
young cadres, about 40 years of age, many of them enter the Party in the 
process of prosperity. [...] Especially after they assume the job as Party 
secretaries, they concentrate only on production. In some villages, Party’s 
activities practically stop. Some Party secretaries have two jobs at the same 
time, many of them assume positions in construction projects. They often go 
out from their villages, and have little attention to develop Party activity in 
their villages. [...] Thirdly, they do not have enough knowledge on major 
policies. The higher authorities prohibit them frdm doing it, but they think 
they could go ahead and scoop money, even in an adaptive way. [...] 
Fourthly, the village leadership does not display a collective leadership. Many 
Party secretaries simply act alone, there is no collective leadership."
50Department o f Organization o f  the Beijing Municipality Party Committee, "Beiiingshi iiaoqu ba ge 
xian zhifu nongmin zhong de dangyuan. danren cun dangzhibu shuii de qingkuang diaocha" (An 
investigation o f  Party members and village Party branch secretaries o f eight counties belonging to Beijing 
suburb), Dangjian (Beijing), 1988, No. 10, pp. 38-39. For similar report, see, for example, Yu Yunhui 
et al. Xin shiqi dang de iiceng zhuzhi iianshe (The construction o f Party grass-root level organization in 
the new period), Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1991, p. 21.
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In the meantime, the central leadership was grappling to define a new 
ideological foundation for the new phenomenon of rich peasants in the countryside. 
It seems that the ideological problem was more pressing at this particular time. On 
16 May 1987, Nongmin ribao published an article defending against allegation that 
the household responsibility system and the commodity economy in the countryside 
had led to retrogression. The author strongly argued that there was nothing wrong in 
that because the main criterion forjudging progress or regression was "whether or 
not it is advantageous to the promotion of the development of productive forces."51 
The author said that revolution in China was different from what Marx and Engels 
envisaged. "In an economically and culturally backward country, after the victory in 
the proletarian revolution is won, if productive forces do not develop, the people’s 
gradually increasing material and cultural needs can hardly be satisfied, nor can the 
strong points of the socialist system be shown."52
In November 1987 Zhao Ziyang delivered his famous speech on "the primary 
stage of socialism." Zhao said: "If one thinks that we can jump over the primary 
stage of socialism without passing through a massive development of production 
forces, this is a fantasy about the development of revolution, and the source of 
’leftist’ mistakes."53 Zhao and his associates wanted to end the debates on the 
ideology question, and accordingly, pushed forward with his agenda of reform on 
market liberalisation both in the cities and the countryside. Zhao said: "At the 
primary stage, [...] with an eye for prosperity for all, we encourage one group of 
people to become rich first through honest labour and lawful business."54
Zhao’s speech contributed significantly to two areas. Firstly, it helped to 
mitigate the criticism levelled against rich entrepreneurial party secretaries. If at the
"Whether or not it is beneficial to the emancipation o f social productive forces is the main hall mark 
for judging it is progressive or retrogressive," Nongmin ribao. 16 May 1987, p. 1 in FBIS-CHI, 27 May 
1987, K12-13.
52Ibid.
53
Zhao Ziyang’s report to the Thirteenth Party Congress, Yanzhe you zhongguo tese de shehuizhuvi 
dalu qianiin (March along the road o f  socialism with Chinese characteristics), in Shi san da vilai zhongyao 
wenxian xianbian (Collection o f  important documents since the thirteenth party congress), Vol. I, Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1991, p. 10.
^ ibid., p. 14.
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primary stage of socialism a group of people is allowed to become rich first, then 
party secretaries as "ordinary citizens" - as indicated in the debates above - should 
be allowed to do so. Thus, there should be no ideological problem for village party 
secretaries to take a lead in becoming rich as long as they do so "through honest 
labour and legal business."
As important as the issue of the role of party secretaries, secondly, Zhao’s 
speech also gave ideological foundation for the existence and survival of village 
enterprises in China.55 Being at the primary stage of socialism, China can still afford 
to have enterprises in the countryside which generate rich peasants (in the popular 
Chinese terminology: vi wan yuan hu or the 10,000-yuan households). This certainly 
gave new confidence to party secretaries to continue their role in the economy. It 
must be noted that the fate of village enterprises are inherently linked to the debate 
on the role of party secretaries. If village enterprises had been banned because of 
their capitalist nature, then party secretaries would have lost their economic role in 
the villages.
As the ideological obstacle to the existence of village enterprises and the party 
secretaries who run them had been overcome, in the late 1980s the central leadership 
shifted their attention to find a proper place for village enterprises within the policy 
of rural development. The sustained development of village enterprises, most 
probably, encouraged the central leadership to formulate the policy for rural 
development within the framework of xiaokang: villages also should stride towards 
xiaokang.
The earliest pronouncement of xiaokang for the countryside was made by Du 
Runsheng, the head of the Agricultural Policy Research Department of the General 
Secretariat of the Central Committee. In March 1987 this department issued a 
document which stated two main policy aims for rural areas: (1) the per capita grain
55The debates on village enterprises, in fact, did not end here. Those who disagree with the emergence 
o f capitalists in the countryside take every opportunity to undermine village enterprises. In order to defend 
the survival o f village enterprises, in 13 January 1990, the "China Township and Village Enterprise 
Association" was established with Bo Yibo as head and He Kang, the Minister o f  Agriculture, deputy head. 
("Bo Yibo and He Kang appointed to new rural enterprises body," 13 January 1990, in SWB, FE/0663 
B2/6-7). Three months later, Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily) published an article on the ten advantages 
o f village enterprises, just to allay doubt on village enterprises ("Zhengque pingjia xiang-zhen give de 
zuoyong" (Correctly evaluate the role o f village enterprises), Nongmin ribao. 15 March 1990, p. 1)
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consumption in 2000 must be 400 kg per annum; and (2) the average rural incomes 
must approach urban incomes in year 2000.56 Du seemed to believe that villages had 
the potential to achieve the target simply because of the existence of village 
enterprises. Thus, there is a direct link between the potential of village enterprises 
and xiaokang.
The decision of incorporating the countryside in xiaokang scheme - as we have 
seen in section A - was announced by the Central Committee at the occasion of the 
Eighth Plenum of the Thirteenth Party Congress, 29 November 1991.57 At this 
stage, the central leadership seemed to have come to a firm conclusion that the 
countryside, having such a potential for growth, was not to be looked down upon.58 
Village enterprises, albeit their having capitalist colour, are legitimate activities within 
the framework of xiaokang which is characteristically linked to socialism at the 
primary stage. Bo Yibo’s speech on the occasion of the inauguration of "China Town 
and Village Enterprises Association" on 13 January 1990, argued along this line: 
"The 1990s will be the most important and crucial period for China’s economic 
development. In order to double our output value and become well-off, we need only 
maintain a 6 per cent growth rate. However, it will be impossible to attain this goal 
if we fail to develop town and village enterprises."59
The confirmation of xiaokang 1991 for the countryside, in turn, helped to 
shape the policy on the role of party secretaries as entrepreneurial agents for 
xiaokang. Party secretaries are not only to play a leading role in economy, but more 
importantly, to do it with xiaokang as a target for the whole village. From 1991 
onwards we are entering the second stage in which party secretaries are to play the
56Nongmin ribao. 3 March 1987.
57Zhonggong zhongyang guanvu iin vi bu iiaqiang nongye he nongcun gongzuo de iueding (Central 
Committee’s Decision on Further Strengthening Agriculture and Village Program), 29 November 1991, in 
Shisan da vilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (A selection o f  important documents since the thirteenth party 
congress), vol. HI, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993, p. 1760.
58Kelliher emphasizes this point in his explanation o f conflict between the state and peasants where 
the state clearly takes side with the rich peasants; see Kelliher, Daniel "Privatisation and politics in rural 
China," in Gordon White (ed.), The Chinese State in the Era o f Economic Reform, London: Macmillan, 
1991, pp. 318-341.
59"Bo Yibo and He Kang appointed to new rural enterprises body," in SWB, FE/0663 B2/6.
I l l
role of entrepreneurial agents towards xiaokang. In this way, all economic activities 
of party secretaries which were considered ideologically deviant and separated from 
the national scheme, find their legitimate place.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have described what the central leadership wants the village party 
branch secretaries to do in their villages, namely the role of economic growth. This 
is a role which requires party secretaries to bring into completion the plan for 
achieving a comfortable life or xiaokang. This objective is set in a series of 
quantitative targets to be completed by the year 2000.
Village party secretaries are allowed to start and run enterprises but should do 
so by mobilizing local resources. Handbooks for village party secretaries give them 
plenty of advice, and models are used to encourage those party secretaries in starting. 
The central leadership justifies this policy by relying on the quotation of Deng 
Xiaoping.
There are two stages of development of the role of party secretaries in 
economy. In the first stage (1978-1991) party secretaries acted as entrepreneurial 
agents in a literal sense. The central leadership did not demand more than growth. In 
the second stage which started in 1991, party secretaries were asked not only to 
develop the economy of their villages but also to do so with a target towards 
xiaokang. Now, the central leadership demands more than growth. The shift is partly 
prompted by an apparent potential of village enterprises to achieve the target, and 
partly by the definitive solution to the ideological question related to the nature of 
village enterprise itself and also to that of party secretaries who become rich.
In general, this role can be said to be part of the concept of the party branch 
secretaries as core (Chapter III); but, specifically, it gives additional responsibility 
to party secretaries. Party secretaries are not considered, only as playing a political 
role but also an economic role. This is certainly something which goes beyond the 
shift from "revolutionary cadres to party technocrats" as Hong Yung Lee has
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suggested.60 This additional role demonstrates that party secretaries in the 
countryside are not only technocrats but also "econocrats."
^H ong Young Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. Berkeley, 
CA: University o f California, 1991,
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PARTY SECRETARY AND HIS FELLOW VILLAGERS (1): 
TH E ROLE OF MORAL MIDDLEMAN
"The Heaven is high, and the Emperor is far"
(Chinese proverb)
In the preceding chapters, I have described and explained the two roles that originate 
"from above" or from party secretaries’ with their superiors. This chapter will 
describe and explain one role which emerges from the interaction between a village 
party secretary and his fellow villagers, namely the role of "moral middleman." This 
role, I will argue, is the result of villagers’ demands based on their "moral 
discourse":1 he should protect their fellow villagers who are protecting their village 
from the intervention of the state.2 As a village party secretary is always a local 
peasant (see Chapter Two), and therefore part of the village community, he is put 
under the moral obligation to cooperate with his fellow villagers to confront the state. 
This assertion is to be understood in the light of village community as "moral 
community" where "moral discourse" is inevitable. 3
^ h is  term originates from Richard Madsen, Morality and Power in a Chinese V illage. Berkeley, CA: 
University o f  California, 1984. I follow his argument on moral discourse which shapes the conduct o f  
village leaders in China. In general, discourse theory analyses the way systems o f  meaning or ’discourse1 
shape the way people understand their roles in society and influence their political activities. For a further 
discussion on discourse, see David Howarth, "Discourse Theory," in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds,), 
Theory and Methods in Political Science. London: Macmillan, 1995, pp. 115-133.
^The state is defined as all institutions which are differentiated from the rest o f  its society as to create 
identifiable public and private spheres; see Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O ’Leary, Theories o f the State. 
The Politics o f  Liberal Dem ocracy. London: Macmillan, 1987, p. 2.
"Moral discourse" is intimately linked with village as "moral community." As Bailey understands it, 
in a "moral community" the interaction o f its members is characterized by continuous judgment o f  right 
and wrong. Beyond the community such judgements do not apply: to cheat an outsider is neither right or 
wrong: it is merely expedient or inexpedient. It is difficult to draw the boundary o f a particular moral 
community. Thus Bailey gives an example "For the villagers whom I knew the moral community comprises 
their own family, the members o f  their own caste in the same village, their fellow villagers (markedly 
graded according to their distance from ego in the caste system), their kinsmen in other villages and their 
caste fellows in other villages, and getting near to the limit, people o f  other castes in those same villages. 
Then, after a gap, come people who are villagers like oneself, with the same style o f  life and speaking the 
same dialect, but with whom, as yet, no connexion can be traced: if  they desire to be admitted to the moral
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This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section deals with the 
role of a moral middleman. It will describe how a village party secretary plays this 
role. The following section will look into the dynamics within a village which 
generates this role.
I. PARTY SECRETARY AS MORAL MIDDLEMAN 
A, The definition of "moral middleman"
The phenomenon of middleman has been explored by scholars such as Gluckman in 
his article on the African headman.4 Since then, a number of scholars have taken part 
in that enterprise, such as Fallers, Mitchell, and Fortes. While they introduced the 
label of "intercalary," Wolf developed the concept of political and cultural middleman 
in his discussion on Mexico.5 Geertz proposed the concept of cultural middleman or 
"broker."6
Among the differences of the concept of middleman, Swartz singles out three 
patterns of middleman: (1) one who interrelates with two different political cultures, 
(2) one who interrelates with two communities, or (3) one who interrelates with two 
groups. 7 He is "the man who interrelates and articulates the needs, aspirations, 
resources, and traditions of his local village or tribe to the corresponding demands, 
supplies, resources, and jural order of the province and the nation."8 Bailey
community, the villagers use elaborate and rigorous techniques to test their cultural credentials." See, 
Bailey, F.G. "The Peasant View o f  the Bad Life," in Teodor Shanin (ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971, p. 302-303.
4Gluckman, M . "The village headman in British Central Africa," in Africa. XIX (2), April 1949, pp. 
89-106.
5Eric W olf, "Aspects o f  group relations o f  group relations in a complex society: Mexico," in 
American Anthropologist, no. 58, pp. 1015-78.
6Clifford Geertz, "The changing role o f  the cultural broker: the Javanese kijaji," Comparative Studies 
in History and Society, no. 2 , 1960, pp. 228-249.
n
Swartz, Marc J. "Part HI. The political middleman," Marc J. Swartz, ed. Local-Level Politics. Social 
and Cultural Perspectives London: University o f  London, 1968, pp. 199-204,
8Ibid.. p. 199-200.
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specifically argues that the task of a middleman is "to bridge a gap in 
communications between the larger and the smaller structure. "9
A middleman can be a schoolteacher,10 a missionary,11 a policeman,12 a 
village chief,13 a religious leader,14 etc. But, regardless of his official occupation, 
a middleman must be able to please both sides to whom he serves. He is not to 
defend the interest of both sides, nor sacrifice either one. This situation leads Swartz 
to characterise him as "Janus-faced". "He must play distinct versions of the local 
leader to the local community as against the higher politicos, and equally distinct 
versions of the national party or government worker to both of these audiences or 
publics."15
There are two types of middleman: a go-between and a broker. The difference 
between the two lies in the manner in which the task of intermediary is performed. 
"Where messages or instructions are handled faithfully, we recognise the role of go- 
between, but where they are manipulated and ’processed’, we recognised the role of 
broker."16
In this chapter, I chose the term "moral middleman" to describe the role that 
a village party secretary performs in the period after Reform 1978. A middleman is - 
in Bailey’s words - to bridge the communication of two sturctures, the state and the
9F.G. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils. Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1970,
10Harald Eidheim, "The Lappish movement: an innovative political process," in Marc J. Swartz (ed.), 
op .cit., pp. 205-216.
^Georg Henriksen, "The transactional basis o f  influence: white men among Naskapi Indians," in 
Robert Paine (ed.), Patrons and Brokers in the East Artie. Newfoundland: Memorial University o f  
Newfoundland, 1971, pp. 22-33.
12Milton Freeman, "Tolerance and Rejection o f Patron Roles in an Eskimo Settlement," in Robert 
Paine (ed.), ib id .. pp. 34-54.
13Swartz, Marc J. "Process in Administrative and Political Action," in Marc J. Swartz, ed. 
Local-Level Politics. Social and Cultural Perspectives London: University o f London, 1968, pp. 227-243.
14Clifford Geertz, loc.cit.
15Marc J. Swartz, "Part III The Political Middleman," loc .c it.. p. 203.
1<SRobert Paine, "Introduction," in Robert Paine (ed.), Patrons and Brokers in the East Artie. 
Newfoundland: Memorial University o f Newfoundland, 1971, p. 6.
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village. He receives messages from the state and transmits it to his fellow villagers, 
and vice versa. In this exercise, he must be able to please both sides. A moral 
middleman, however, is a middleman who interrelates his village as moral community 
and take an accommodative position when they react against the state’s policies. 
Thus, he does not possess the perfect characterization of a middleman or borker, 
namely "Janus face" as Swartz suggests. Another distinctive feature of a moral 
middleman is that he plays the role because of the moral obligation, expressed in 
moral discourses, and not because of pressure from political pressure groups as 
normally happens in the cities.
The role "moral middleman" is defined as a role to mediate between the state 
and his village as moral community by which the person, under the moral obligation, 
takes an accomodative position or protects the peasants who conduct resistance against 
undesirable state policies which he himself must implement. Peasants, according to 
Scott, have various different strategies to counter the state policies such as foot- 
dragging, false compliance, flight, feigned ignorance, sabotage, theft, and, not least, 
cultural resistance.17 A moral middleman will accommodate any of the strategy 
adopted by peasants and find ways and means to conceal it; in our case, these are 
strategies of foot-dragging and feigned ignorance.
B. The practice of moral middlemanship
The first important job that a village party secretary as middleman must do is to 
regularly have contact with his superiors both in the township and in the county. This 
is conducted through various meetings in both places. After the meetings he will go 
back to his village, and convene a series of meetings again with village cadres. These 
cadres, in turn, will communicate the message to the villagers. Sometimes, the party
17Scott, James Weapons o f the Weak. Everyday Forms o f Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985, p. 36. This is only part o f  everyday forms o f  peasants’ resistance. In Scott’s 
conceptualization, everyday forms o f resistance is "informal, often covert, and concerned largely with 
immediate, de facto gains." (p. 33) It may take various forms. Peasants sometimes resort to sporadic 
physical action (p. 249), at another time boycott (p. 251), but most o f  the time, "routine resistance." (p. 
255) However, never do the peasants take "collective resistance" (p. 242). In this way, the resistance o f  
the poor peasants is "usually inconclusive." "The perpetrators move under cover o f  darkness or anonymity, 
melting back into the ’civilian* population for protective cover." (Ibid.)
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secretary himself will go to villagers and transmit policies from the central leadership. 
For instance, in the early period of Reform, the party secretary of Qili brigade 
(Jiangsu Province) admitted that he had to attend numerous meetings. From 
November 1978 to October 1979, for example, he attended meetings at the county for 
35 days, meetings at the commune for 62 days, local activities for 12,5 days, do 
inspection for 5,5 days, open various meetings at the brigade for 168 days. In one 
year, he had to spend 283.5 days at meetings.18 In 1993, another village Party 
secretary admitted that he had to attend not less than 100 days of meetings in a 
year.
Transmitting policies, however, is only half of the job of a middleman. After 
transmitting the policies, he will implement them in his village with the help of all 
cadres. Implementation is followed by the delivery of the output of the 
implementation to the higher authorities. This activity, apparently, takes place on a 
regular basis. One report says that the activities of village cadres in the whole year 
can be summarised as follows: "chuntian zai shu." "xiatian ge du." "qiutian ru ku. ” 
It means: in the spring they plant trees, in the summer they conduct birth control, and 
in autumn they collect taxes and grain.20 Summer and autumn are the seasons of 
hard work for cadres as during those seasons they have to deliver the results of the 
implementation of the unpopular policies.
Delivering the results of the implementation is the most critical phase for a 
middleman because the delivery of results highly depends on the willingness of the 
villagers. As he is a middleman mainly involved in policy implementation, the 
situation is more uncertain as some policies are welcome by peasants and some are 
not. The delivery of results is easier or much easier for popular policies; and it is true 
with the reverse.
IS "Hui duo cheng zai. ganbu nan dang" (Numerous meetings mean disaster, it’s very difficult to be
a cadre) Zhongguo nonemin bao. 20 April, 1980, p. 3.
19"Cun ganbu de fudan ye gai iianQing" (The burden o f village cadres should also be alleviated), 
Renmin ribao. 5 July, 1993, p. 2.
20 See, "Xiang cun ganbu de jingli ving fang zai nali?" (Where should township and village cadres 
put their energy?) Nongmin ribao. 17 June, 1987, p. 2.
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These unpopular policies are exactly the area where the middleman must adjust 
himself to the demands of his fellow villagers. What are those policies which are not 
popular among peasants? One seminar held in Liyuan Township (Pingdu County, 
Shandong Province) in 1989 reports that there are three areas of policies which 
peasants reject: liang or grain (obligation to sell grain at fixed price), qian or money 
(taxes) and ming or life (birth control).21 Another investigation in Shaping Township 
(Yizhang County, Hunan Province) in 1990 reveals peasants’ attitude toward policies 
from the central leadership. "Many peasants do not want to carry out birth control, 
do not want to fulfil their duty to deliver the contracted grain, do not want to sell 
grain to the state," 22
Peasants’ rejection of policies on birth control, taxes, and grain is not a local 
issue. These problems were addressed in a conference in Qinzhou City (Guangxi 
Province) in 1990 which was attended by delegates from 11 provinces.23 The 
delegates tried to find the solution for these problems. In an apparent response to 
actual problems, a handbook for village party branches does not fail to warn village 
cadres nationwide the difficulty of implementing policies of birth control and tax-grain 
collection (zhenggou tiliu).24
Confronted by the persistent resistance by their fellow villagers, village party 
secretaries are left with little choice but to accommodate their demands. Let us first 
take the birth control issue. An article written in Nongmin ribao by two authors from 
Jiangsu Province reveals this.25From their investigation in Subeimo Township 
(Yancheng County, Jiangsu Province), they found since 1982 the township has
21 "Cun ganbu nandang ma?" (Is it difficult to become a village cadre?) Nongmin ribao. 18 July 1989,
p. 3
22 "Xian zhuang vu vuanvin" (The current situation and its reason) Nongmin ribao. 17 July 1990, p. 
3. Shaping Township has 15 party branches and 366 party members.
23Tang Jiahou, "Huigu guoqu. sikao weilai" (Looking back the past, reflect the future), Nongmin 
ribao. 6 March 1990, p. 3.
24Zhang Gengqiang and Jing Ri, (eds.), Dangzhibu gongzuo shouce (Handbook for a party branch 
work), Beijing: Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chubanshe, 1991, pp. 112-113.
25 "Nongcun chaosheng xianxiang vanzhong iidai iieiue" (Violation o f  birth control in the countryside 
is serous, it needs urgent solution) Nongmin ribao. 4 January 1991, p. 4.
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exceeded the quota by 1300, or about 55.5%. In one village, there are 601 inhabitants 
but one sixth of them are ’hei hu kou. ’ The authors argue that there are a number of 
reasons to explain this. One of them is that village cadres simply do not implement 
the birth- control policy strictly. "They do not strictly implement the penalty system, 
the economic penalty is not uniform. ... As a result, this system becomes weakened 
by those cadres. Many households which have to be penalised for having violated 
birth control are not penalised, those which have to be fined are not fined or fined 
very little." In addition to that, there is also a practice called "yi qian dai za" (avoid 
operation by paying a sum of money). This policy which is originally designed to 
help unhealthy couples, is diverted by village cadres who do not want to get involved 
in difficulties.
Cheng Dongliao and Qi Tongxian in their article published in journal Renkou 
Yaniiu (Population Research), in 1990, point out that on the basis of their research 
in Henan Province, peasants do indeed reject the policy of birth control but they also 
find that cadres are not willing (bu yuan) to implement it. "They just do what is 
possible, but they do not want to put pressure on peasants."26
Here, we see party secretaries who try to protect peasants who resist the 
state’s policy on birth control by adopdng the strategy of "feigned ignorance." Party 
secretaries know too well that peasants know the policy of birth control because they 
never fail to propagate the policy. Yet when peasants ignore the policy, the party 
secretaries also know that peasants just pretend to ignore it. Instead of exerting 
pressure over peasants (their fellow villagers), party secretaries accept the feigned 
ignorance. They protect this action by devising ways to conceal it such as black card 
registration or payment of money.
Moving to the area of grain delivery, we also find a similar situation. There 
are two types of grain to be delivered by peasants, one is the contracted grain and 
another is grain as tax. Both types of grain are collected by village cadres who go 
from house to house. Party secretaries indeed have to supervise these activities. 
However, as collecting grain is always met with resistance by peasants, party
26Cheng Dongliao and Qi Tongxian, "Henan sheng nongcun iihua shenevu eongzuo de xiankuang yu 
duice (The current situation and respond to the work o f  village birth control in Henan Province) Renkou 
vaniiu. 1990; No. 4: pp. 58-60.
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secretaries find it very difficult to push hard. Already in 1988, Party secretary Wang 
Xiaocheng from Yanfang Village (Wuwei City, Gansu Province) has complained: "In 
the past, when the harvest time came, the party secretary didn’t have to go to single 
house. Grain would be delivered row by row (pai cheng chang dui). But, now, the 
party secretary must go from door to door to rouse them. Peasants, however, are not 
willing to deliver." Indeed, the reporter who interviewed cadres from the Wuwei City 
down to the villages found a unanimous voice that the most difficult task is to collect 
grain."27 The best way to do it is just to accommodate the wish of the villagers; 
they delay the delivery of grain, and just wait until the villagers are ready to do it. 
A typical case is reported from Shaping Township (Yizhang County, Hunan 
Province), when in 1990 the whole township still owed 125 tons of grain of the 
previous year to the state. 28
There are no national statistics, however, which report the delay of grain 
delivery. Yet the unanimous admission that grain collection is difficult indicates that 
delay (or even failure) of collecting grain has happened in most parts of China. The 
clearest admission is found in the document from the National Seminar on the 
Construction of Village-Level Organizations (10 August 1990) which indirectly refers 
to this problem. Explaining the four targets for the construction of village 
organizations, the document says that one of them is "to fulfil the task assigned by 
the Party and the government on time." (emphasis added) It further adds: "This fourth 
point is the most basic demand."29 Although making no specific reference to grain, 
it is safe to say that grain delivery is one of the tasks that village cadres cannot fulfil 
on time.
The details of the problem of tax collection did not emerge until early 1990s 
when the central leadership vigorously addressed the problem of "peasant burden"
27"Nonemin vue lai vue bu tinghua le ma?" (Do peasants become less and less obedient) Jingji ribao. 
22 December 1988.
28 "Xian zhuang vu yuanvin" (The current situation and its reason) Nongmin ribao. 17 July 1990, p.
3.
29"Quan guo cun ii zuhzi iianshe gongzuo zuotanhui jiyao" (Summary o f  minutes o f national seminar 
on the construction o f village-level organizations) in Xin shiqi nongye he nongcun gongzuo zhongvao 
wenxian xuanbian. Beijing: Zhongyang chubanshe, 1992, p. 645.
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(nongmin fudan). The central leadership, trying to explain the importance of tax for 
the state, distinguishes two types of taxes, the reasonable (hell) and the non- 
reasonable fbu heli). The editor of Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), for instance, at 
pains, tries to explain what "reasonable taxes" are.30 It argues that those taxes must 
be paid by peasants, whereas the "arbitrary taxes" can be ignored.
Despite all this effort, peasants think that any tax is unacceptable. For them, 
there is no distinction between "reasonable taxes" and "arbitrary taxes." Party 
secretaries are put in a very difficult position; they have to wait until the villagers 
are ready to pay. A similar strategy of foot-dragging is adopted here. Quoting the 
example from Shaping Township (Hunan Province) again, it is reported that this 
township in 1989 was unable to deliver 49 thousands yuan of agricultural taxes, or 
27.2% of the obligation.31
An identical case is reported in Zhengtong Township (Changning County, 
Hunan Province). The committee party secretary Shi Guolin, revealed his anxiety. He 
became party secretary in December 1985, but during this short period (about 18 
months) he faced insurmountable difficulties of dealing with peasants, especially in 
collecting taxes. For instance, out of 20 thousands yuan of taxes to be paid by 
peasants to the township, only 10 thousands yuan were collected. The whole 
township was allocated 170 thousands yuan of government bonds, but only after one 
and a half months later did the money start to come in. The township had to collect 
5658 yuan of taxes for special agricultural products. It happened that peasants 
refused to pay, and the money had to be obtained from the collective fund. In 
villages, there was not even a collective fund, and the party secretaries had to pay
30Editor "Shenme shi heli fudan? Sheame shi luan tanpaj?." (What is reasonable burden? What is 
arbitrary fee?) Nongmin ribao. 26 January 1991, p. 1. This editorial distinguishes three types o f  taxes: to 
the State, to the collective, and to the township which are to be considered as "reasonable burden." Taxes 
to the State: agricultural taxes (nongye shui). village special production tax (nongcun techan shui), tax on 
slaughtering animals (tuzai shui). Those are engaged in commerce, have to pay product tax (chanpin shui), 
business tax (vinve shui). and income tax (suode shuD. Tax delivered to the collective are used for 
accumulation fund (goniiiin). public welfare fund (gongyiiinl. and costs o f  administration (guanlifei) from 
which cadres draw their salary. Tax delivered to the township is used to finance schools managed by both 
village and township, birth control, provision for servicemen’s families, provision for households o f  old 
persons with no child or infirm to enjoy five guarantees (wubaohu). and training for the people’s militia.
31 "Xian zhuang yu vuanvin" (The current situation and its reason) Nongmin ribao. 17 July 1990, p .3.
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from their own pockets.32
As in the case of grain collection, there are also no national statistics on the 
delay or failure of tax collection. Therefore, as in grain collection, we can only rely 
on the statement contained in the document from the National Seminar on the 
Construction of Village-Level Organizations (10 August 1990): village cadres should 
fulfil the task assigned by the Party and the government on time. It has developed 
so far that it has become a grave concern for the delegates to the seminar in Beijing
and that a special instruction has to be included.
Apparently, in both cases (grain delivery and tax collection) peasants adopt the 
identical strategy, i.e. the foot-dragging strategy. While resenting the state’s policies, 
they choose not to deliver grain and pay taxes on time. Instead, they delay and delay 
which eventually leads to debt. In the face of this situation, party secretaries, similar 
to when they deal with birth control, protect their fellow villagers. They just wait 
until peasants are willing to pay.
The role of the moral middleman that a village party secretary performs does 
not imply that he could totally protect the interest of his fellow villagers. Peasants 
eventually must deliver the grain, they must eventually pay taxes. At one point, 
peasants agree to pay, and party secretaries stop protecting them. This is simply
because the township and/or the county authorities can check the delivery grain and
taxes easily. They check the account book, and send people to the villages to demand 
the grain or taxes.
Birth-control violation is relatively easy to protect. As reported in our case 
above, a party secretary can just turn a blind eye with the consequence that many 
children in his village have "hei hukou" or black registration cards. When he has to 
report to the township, he just makes up fake statistics.33 As birth control
32"Yi wei xiang dangwei shuii de kunao" (The anxiety o f  a township party committee secretary) 
Nongmin ribao. 15 April 1987, p. 1.
33 *Indeed, it is now widely admitted that statistics on birth control in China are not accurate as there 
are many births unregistered or unrecorded. See, Ling Zhijun, "Wei shenme hai vao fukua?" (Why should 
be boastful?) Renmin ribao. 11 April 1994, p. 2. According to this article, there is a widespread practice 
o f cheating statistic figures. One city mayor is reported to say that statistics reported to the higher authority 
are inflated up to 30%. This includes statistics o f  birth control. Then people start talking about "fukuafeng" 
(boasting style). According to the author, this practice is prompted by reward- punishment system to control 
cadres: good cadres receive an award (subsequently, promotion) and bad cadres punishment.
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supervision needs on-the-spot visit, and as the township or the county authorities very 
seldom go down to villages, party secretaries can continue to play the role of the 
moral middleman.
The pattern seems to be that the more difficult a policy, the more sophisticated 
will be the method of protection adopted by a village party secretary. Thus, protection 
from birth control needs more sophistication: from black registration card to paying 
a sum of money. Whereas protecting his fellow villagers from delivering grain and 
tax just needs a delaying tactic. Sophisticated method, however, does not mean that 
the risk of being purged by the higher authority is higher. Grain delivery and tax 
collection can be delayed but not for a very long time because it will be discovered 
immediately by the township authority. Violation in birth control, on the contrary, is 
hardly detected by the township authority unless they make an on-the-spot 
investigation. The latter is something which rarely happens.
Party secretaries can normally safely play the role of moral middleman. The 
township as well as county authorities can do very little to stop it or just do nothing. 
For example, Chen Bin, from the department of agriculture of Nantong City Party 
Committee (Jiangsu Province) talks about the ’broken string’ between villages and 
townships as well as counties. In his opinion," although counties and the townships 
have worked very hard, and have made various activities, they are ’held up’ (qiake) 
at the villages, numerous works generally stop at counties and townships." 34 To 
complicate the matter, township authorities know very little about what is happening 
in the villages under their jurisdiction. This is admitted openly by the Party 
Committee Secretary of Liulihe Township (Fangshan District, Beijing City). He heard 
only words of praise. Although he is fully aware that such words do not mean 
anything, he makes no effort to pursue further.35
Dongtai City Party Committee Secretary (Dongtai City, Jiangsu Province), Qiu 
Zhirong, in 1989, made an investigation of 735 village party secretaries who are
^" Nongcun cunii zhuzhi ii dai iiaqiang" (Village level organization urgently need to be fortified) 
Nongmin ribao. 25 August 1987, p. 3.
35"Liulihe xiang dangwei he cun ganbu duihua" (A dialogue between Liulihe Township Party 
Committee and village cadres) Nongmin ribao. 1 December 1987, p. 3.
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under his jurisdiction.36 Mr. Qiu observes that party secretaries are "plagued with 
fears of implementing certain policies: birth control, tax collection, and funeral 
ceremony." They are afraid to implement policies in those areas. In his opinion, this 
problem is rooted in institutional weakness, which means that there is not enough 
control from his superiors both at county and township level; they do not act when 
they have to. He overheard a village party secretary saying: "The Party committee 
is only keen to develop ’ten-thousand yuan families’37 but is afraid to handle the 
backward party branches."
This does not mean, however, that party secretaries do not make any effort 
to persuade their fellow villagers to abide by birth-control rules (as well as grain and 
tax delivery). They work hard for this and are quite persistent. A survey in six 
villages under Hengyang City (Hunan Province) reveals38 that birth control and 
disputes among villagers consume most of cadres’ time: 44.7% for birth control, and 
16.8% for handling disputes. Three other sensitive areas in which cadres also must 
spend a lot of time: collecting grain (12%), collecting taxes (10.5%), agriculture 
(10.3%). In these areas, cadres must use various techniques of persuasion which 
otherwise they will face serious challenge from the peasants.
The role of moral middleman is not easy. He must know exactly the balance 
between tightening and relaxing his grip. He must push when the peasants are willing 
to be pushed, but must relax when they are not willing. Naturally, to play this role 
needs a lot of time; a village party secretary cannot work in a hurry. He must be 
patient and wait. In the case of birth control, sometimes he must give up the idea of 
seeing a good result. In other words, the role of moral middleman is a role which 
need a lot of experience. A newly installed party secretary might make mistakes in 
pushing too hard.
36"Nongcun dangzhibu shuii duiwu jianshe de dongtai vaniiu" (Dynamic investigation o f  the 
construction o f the contingents o f  village party secretaries) Dang shi wen hui. 1989, No. 4 , pp. 28-30.
37"Ten thousand yuan family" or wan yuan hu is a term to describe peasant families who manage to 
become rich, so rich that they earn ten thousand yuan a month.
38 "’Chun feng* wei he nandu ’yu men guan’" (Why does the ’spring wind’ cannot pass through the 
’gate o f  heaven’) Nongmin ribao. 13 January, 1987, p. 3.
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II. PRESSURE FROM VILLAGE COMMUNITY
Why does a village party secretary adopt the role of moral middleman? Why does 
this role emerge during the period after Reform? This role comes from nothing but 
the nature of the village community itself. After the introduction of Reform in 1978, 
the state, in its dealing with villages, reverses the previous policy of "radical 
encapsulation;" in its place, it conducts "nominal encapsulation." This new strategy 
basically means that the state retreats from its day-to-day intervention in the lives of 
peasants and allows peasants to manage their own lives. Peasants, as a consequence, 
are no longer under strict and tight control of village cadres. In this way, village 
communities in the whole of China recapture their original nature again. This section 
seeks to explain the origin of the role of moral middleman by attributing it to the 
basic nature of the village community.
A. A village as community
The basic nature of a village is one of community. Anthropologists have long 
recognised this when, for instance, Redfield defines the village community as a "little 
community."39 Here the idea of "smallness" is particularly stressed. Members of a 
village are no strangers to each other, talk with each other, and work together. 
Though the boundary of the community is sometimes determined by a river or a road, 
it is determined more by villagers’ consciousness.40 The sense of community of the 
village, in this way, is laid on more solid ground.
This sense of community was prevented from developing during the period 
before Reform in 1978. Chinese peasants were identified by administrative division, 
by their membership to a commune or to a production team. Although the production 
brigade (which is coextensive with a village boundary) was recognised as a division
39Redfield, Robert "The Little Community" in Redfield, Robert The Community and Peasant Society 
and Culture Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1960, p. 4.
40 Scott, writing about a village in Malaysia, says that although "villagers are not quite sure where 
Sedaka ends," "the moral existence o f the village is recognized in discourse." Scott, op .cit.. p. 87.
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between commune and team, it is not so significant.41 From morning to night the 
team head organised their lives, whereas at the commune their records were kept.42 
The dissolution of communes (the three-tier structure) and subsequently, the 
revolutionary committee, paves the way for the emergence of the village as a 
community. A village is recognised as a single unit (termed "xingzheng cun"') with 
a party branch looking after it. This is further strengthened by the establishment of 
villagers’ committees fcunmin weiyuanhuil in the villages43 which are designed to 
be autonomous mass organizations.44
Since Reform in 1978 peasants take their village community as their 
touchstone again;45 peasants start to think in terms of their village, not their 
production team or commune. Village community is important again. The aspiration 
of both villagers and their leader is grounded on the community. The story of Party 
secretary Tang Fangbi from Qiaoziping Village (Yuanling County, Hunan Province) 
is illustrative here. One morning, when he was standing on a hill he was suddenly 
enlightened: "I must lead my fellow villagers to rebuild my village."46 This 
translation does not convey the emotive meaning of the original Chinese sentence. 
There are two special words which express the party secretary’s feeling for his
41This is also Helen Siu’s observation o f  a village in Guangdong Province. "Villages might have 
retained their physical boundaries, but the social meaning o f their existence was being changed from within 
by the Maoist paradigm." See Siu, Helen, Agents and Victims in South China, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989, p. 6.
42For a good description o f  activities around production team and commune, see Leeming, Frank Rural 
China Today. Essex, England: Longman, 1985, pp. 34-37.
43English translation o f this law, see FBIS-CHI, 27 November 1987, pp. 21-23,
^Indeed, the basic contention o f those who disagreed with the idea o f  villagers’s committee is that it 
will endanger the authority o f  the township. "If they are organizations o f  self-management, who should be 
responsible for guaranteeing state interests in the countryside? .. Some deputies even said that if  the 
peasants have more and more self-management power, they may refuse to accept the instructions o f the 
township governments, and the tasks o f  grain purchase and conscription will not be easily fulfilled." Bao 
Xin, "Letter from Beijing. Concerning the Villagers’ Committee Organization Law," in Liaowang 
(Overseas edition), 20 April 1987, No. 16, p. I, in FBIS-CHI, 24 April 1987, K - l l .
45The idea o f  "Peasant community as a touchstone" is from Gavin Smith, "Reflections on the Social 
Relations o f Simple Commodity Production," Journal o f  Peasant Studies. XIII (1), 1985, p. 101.
46"Hun xi cong ren xin" (His spirit always stays in people’s heart) Nongmin ribao. 10 March 1987,
p. 3.
127
village: ’xiangqin’ and ’chongjian iiavuan. ’ The term ’xiangqin’ is used here instead 
of other impersonal words (e.g. tongzhi. comrade); it means that Party secretary Fang 
must take the whole village as the home of his own relatives. The word ’iiavuan’ 
consists of two words ’j]a’ meaning home, and ' yuan’ meaning an area of land for 
growing plants.47 For peasants these two words can easily spark intense feeling ; 
it is more meaningful than the word ’state’ (guojig). And to rebuild one’s village is 
every peasants’ responsibility.
It is apparent that, after the Reform of 1978, a village regained its original 
nature, namely little community. The direct implication of this is that villages in 
China generate a moral discourse characteristic to a moral community. The following 
section describes the moral discourse which shapes the behaviour of village party 
secretaries.
B. Moral discourse in a village
As the village becomes guxiang and fellow villagers xiangqin again, peasants demand 
that their leader (in our case the party secretary) also thinks and acts accordingly. He 
should, first of all, show more compassion to his own fellow villagers, than to other 
villages or even township. In Chinese, this means a village party secretary must show 
tiexin or guanxin. both words contain the character xin or heart. He must attach 
(tie) or connect (guan) his heart to those of the villagers.
An investigation of more than 5000 party members and peasants in three 
townships under Yichang County (Hubei Province) in 1992 shows this. Peasants were 
asked: What type of party secretary do you welcome? One of six peasants’ views of 
an ideal party secretary was a party secretary "who cares for (guanxin) peasants, who
47C.K. Yang writes that there are four words which are so dear to peasants: tian. yuan, lu. mo or 
field, garden, house and grave. They are classical expression to signify ’homeland’ or the roots o f life. 
"These were the primary elements in which the deep and continuous roots o f  the community life o f  
Nanching were anchored. With these elements the community became a place where people were born, 
struggled for sustenance, and died, leaving behind descendants to carry on the recurring cycle. And the 
village became kuhsiang. ’the old home-tand’ with which the traditional Chinese identified the material 
interest and sentimental attachment o f his entire existence." Yang, C.K "A Chinese Village in Early 
Communist Transition" in CK Yang, Chinese Communist Society: the Family and the Village. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1959, p. 10,
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attaches his heart (tiexin) to that of the masses."48 Another investigation, in the same 
year, was conducted in Yichang County (Hubei Province) of about ten thousands 
party members and peasants. There six qualities were demanded, one of them 
stressesing the moral quality again. Peasants welcome a party secretary who pastes 
his heart to theirs (tiexin shuii'). "The masses believe that the standing (weixm) of a 
cadre critically depends on whether or not he has good thinking, one who places his 
heart at the masses and the collective. "49
The term tiexin or guanxin actually are part of a larger discourse on an ideal 
official, namely fumuguan or "father-mother official". Like a father and a mother, 
so should an official treat the people. A rhyme on this ideal official describes its 
meaning:
Care about the plight of the people 
Love the people as one loves oneself 
Observe and learn by experience the feeling 
of the people.50
The father-mother official is, therefore, the type of official that villagers expect and 
hope to have. He is to be a benevolent official who does not abuse power or commit 
corruption. All of his power and position is dedicated to promote the happiness of the 
people. As a father and mother know how to make their children happy, so does a 
father-mother official. Indeed, he must have compassion for his people. If necessary, 
he may even have to sacrifice himself for the sake of his people. A father-mother
48"Nongmin huanying shenmevang de dangzhibu shuii" (What kind o f Party branch secretaries do the 
peasants welcome?) Nongmin ribao. 20 March 1992, p. 3.
49"Shenme yang de cunzhishu zui shou huanying" (What kind o f  party branch secretaries are welcome) 
Nongmin ribao. 8 February 1992, p. 5.
50This rhyme is dictated to me by a peasant woman in Shejia Village (Xiangyin County, Hunan 
Province) where I conducted my field research.
Guanxin renminjiku
Aihu renmin xiang aihu ziji yiyang
Ticha minqing
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official must love and care for the people ftitie renmirO.51
The fact that the discourse on the father-mother official is still aiive among 
Chinese peasants cannot be doubted. Each time an official performs a morally 
virtuous act, he will be designated as father-mother official. For instance, the reporter 
of Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily) describes Party secretary Wang Jiaozhong 
(Shimen County, Hunan Province) as a "father-mother official" simply because he 
helped a beggar from another village, Yuguan Village.52 In 1990, Ma Weilong, 
Township Party Committee Secretary of Huibu Township (Zhejiang Province), wrote 
an article in the journal Xiang-zhen luntan (Discussion Forum for Township) in which 
he made an appeal to village cadres that they play the role of father-mother 
official.53 The first sentence opened with a statement: "Village cadres are often 
called by the masses ’father-mother official.’" Obviously, Mr. Ma takes it for granted 
that the idea of a ’father-mother official’ exists in peasants’ consciousness already.54
For peasants in China today, when talking about the father-mother official, 
cannot fail to mention the name of Jiao Yulu, Party Secretary of Lankao County,
5lThe discourse on fiimu guan can be traced back to the period o f  early Song Dynasty (960-1279). 
Fumu guan is an official who acts like a father (fu) and a mother (mu), or like one’s parents. Obviously, 
the idea o f fumu guan is deeply rooted in traditional Chinese concept o f  a good ruler. By saying that a ruler 
should rule like a father and a mother, Chinese people perceives the domain o f  a ruler as a family (ha). 
The people is children, and the ruler is father-mother. This "family" can be a village, a township, a county, 
even the whole country. Emperors o f  China, indeed, used to perceive the country as "iia tianxia" or 
"family country." See, Ci Hal. A reduced format, Shanghai: Cishu chubanshe, 1989, p. 1152.
52 "Shuii vu qieai" (Party secretary and a beggar) Nongmin ribao. 26 July, 1988, p. 3.
53M a W eilong, "Ruhe dang hao renmin ounzhong de ’fumuguan’" (How to become a good 
’father-mother official’ to the people) Xiang-zhen luntan. 1990, No. 9, p. 28.
^ h e  concept o f  ’father-mother official’, according to him, can be broken up into three components: 
think about the masses, rely on the masses, and make things happen for the masses. In thinking about the 
masses, a cadre should get rid o f  the bureaucratism attitude. Instead, he/she must often meet the masses 
so as to understand what they are thinking. "He must become the intimate friend o f  the masses, help the 
masses in spelling out doubt and difficulty, and be with the masses through thick and thin." "Relying on 
the masses" means that cadres, in solving problems, should trust the masses, consult them, and together 
with the masses solve the problem. Finally, in making things happen for the masses cadres should "make 
the Party’s policies become the masses’ own behaviour" and "on the basis o f  local condition, set the 
regulations and link up economic development with the interest o f the masses."
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Henan Province.55 He died thirty years ago yet his name is still in the mind of 
millions of peasants. Indeed, for an outsider, what he did was just extraordinary, not 
extremely heroic like that of Lei Feng.56 However, to peasants, he is the 
contemporary living example of the father-mother official who cares for their lives. 
He, naturally, becomes the example which any village leader should imitate.57
C. Compassion and protection
Peasants, living in a moral community, only demand compassion (guanxin and tiexin) 
from their leader. They know that they cannot escape from the obligation imposed 
by the state.58 Peasants even think that it is part of their fate to accept the burdens 
from the state. The question is what type of compassion do the peasants prefer?
Apparently, all party secretaries know that one thing they should not do is to 
hurt or offend peasants’ feeling. The word "to hurt" or dezui is a very strong word, 
the key word in the moral discourse of a good leader. Any village cadre, including
55 He was born in 1922 in Shandong Province, but served in various leadership position in many 
different places in Shandong Province and Henan Province. He served as party secretary in Lankao County 
for two years, 1962-1964. He died in May 14, 1964, in a hospital in Zhengzhou (the capital o f  Henan 
Province) because o f  illness. At that time, he was only forty two years o f  age. During this short period, 
he had done innumerable virtuous and illustrious deeds See, Lai Chaoguo, Zhongguo nongcun da xieyi 
(Vivid picture o f  villages in China), Changsha: Wenyi chubanshe, 1993, pp. 158-187.
56It is said, for example, when he came to Lankao in 1962, the whole county was suffering a long and 
harsh famine which caused the death o f tens o f  thousands o f  people. The following day, Party secretary 
Jiao was reported as going to the villages and visiting the peasants. He took with him all his staff to go to 
the villages, braving rains and storms, crossing mountains, hills and rivers. Reportedly, he visited more 
than 120 villages (production brigade), and walked more than 5000 li. Along with the peasants, he planted 
trees, repaired ditches and canals in order to overcome "three disasters", namely drought, flood, and 
famine.
57See, for example, "’Paotong shuii (Party secretary o f  paotong tree) Zhongguo nongmin bao. 18 
June 1981, p. 3; NN, Jiao Yulu jingsheng vongcun (The spirit o f  Jiao Yulu lives on) Xiang-zhen luntan. 
1990, No. 5 , pp. 25-26; "Ta xiang jiao yulu neivang" (H e’s just like Jiao Yulu) Nongmin ribao. 29 May 
1992, p. 3; "Zhengxin shi vi wei renmi qunzhong banshi" (Wholeheartedly work for the masses o f  the 
people) in Li Yicong, Zai dangzhibu shuii de gangwei shang (Under the post o f  the party secretaries), 
Shenyang: Baishan chubanshe, 1991, pp. 156-158; "Dian ling waniia deng" (To light bright lamps for ten 
thousands families) in Ibid. pp. 364-368.
58 Anthony Giddens writes: "Peasants cannot threaten to ’withdraw their labour’, not just because they 
lack the organizational means to do so, but because they could not then survive, since they produce their 
own means o f  subsistence." Giddens, Anthony The Nation-State and V iolence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1985, p. 65.
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the party secretary, must not hurt peasants’ feelings. Hurting people’s feelings is not 
the right thing for a compassionate father-mother official to do. Compassion is to be 
demonstrated in not doing anything offensive or dezui and this, in turn, is to be 
expressed in leniency in implementing difficult policies.
Peasants take it as a serious offence if a party secretary hurts their feelings and 
they will take action if the party secretary does it. Dezui. in the context of our 
discussion, means pushing hard to implement birth control, to demand grain, and to 
collect taxes. The editorial introduction of an article in Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ 
Daily) explicitly points out the fact that offending (dezui) fellow villagers is 
something that village cadres should avoid. Peasants feel extremely offended by 
cadres who are known to do "san vao" namely "vao qianu (money to pay tiliu), "vao 
liang" (grain for the state), "vao ming" (birth control).59 Indeed, village cadres, 
including party secretaries, are afraid of offending their fellow villagers.60
If the party secretaries insist on doing san vao. then their fellow villagers will 
take action. Reports in newspapers as well as journals abound with offended peasants 
retaliating against party secretaries who implemented policies without leniency. One 
party secretary Tang, on going home after promoting birth control, found all his pigs 
had died due to poisoning, and three days later, all his chicken suffered a similar fate. 
Or, Party secretary Yang, because he stuck to the written contract, found his fish had 
died in the field on the following day. Party secretary Liu and his family escaped 
death by sheer luck when he found just seconds before eating, that the rice had been 
poisoned.61
It must be noted that peasants, after the introduction of Reform, are becoming
59 "Daii baofu cun ganbu xianxiang pouxi" (The phenomenon o f attacking to retaliate against village 
cadres is on the increase) Nongmin ribao. 18 December 1989, p. 4.
60"Xuexi dang de zuzhi zhidu wenda" (Study the question-answer on the organization system o f  the 
Party) Zhongguo nongmin bao. 28 October 1982,
61 "Daii baofu cun ganbu xianxiang pouxi" (The phenomenon o f retaliating against village cadres is 
on the increase) Nongmin ribao. 18 December 1989, p. 4. Retaliation can also take place after a cadre steps 
down. A report from three villages in Linfen District (Shanxi Province) reveals that peasants who could 
not stand being offended by their party secretaries took revenge against them after they were no longer in 
the post. One cadre says: "We are now cadres. If while on the throne we offend people, then it would be 
very difficult to conduct ourselves in society after we step down." Guo Shijun, "Lu zao baofu yuanvin an 
zai?" (What is the reason o f repeated retaliation) Xiang-zhen luntan. 1991, No. 1, p. 35.
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more and more assertive. As cadres no longer control their day-to-day activities, 
especially that of production, peasants are freer to express their voice. For instance, 
writing in the Party journal, Oiushi. in 1991, the Deputy Party Secretary of Shaanxi 
Provincial Party Committee, Mo Lingsheng, lamented the fact that party branches 
were losing their role and peasants going their own way. He often heard peasants 
saying: "After the contract is given to the household, we no longer need the party 
branch. Everybody goes to make money, everybody goes their own way." 62 
Peasants even dare to question a policy from the state which is, according to them, 
strange. Peasants are reported to have said: "Why does the government ask us to do 
something which we don’t like to do?" "We have made a production contract. 
Whether we harvest much or harvest little, it’s our responsibility. Why should the 
government reward or punish us?"63 This assertiveness, to a certain degree, has 
taken many village cadres by surprise. "Now peasants are no longer obedient!"64
Retaliation against village cadres or party secretaries, however, happens only 
in the extreme cases, namely if peasants are extremely offended by the actions of 
cadres. Peasants, according to Scott, can stand any oppression under subsistence 
situation.65 The statistics on retaliation against party secretaries, released by the 
Public Security Bureau, is not significantly large. Renmin gong’an (People’s Security 
News), the official newspaper from the Public Security Bureau, in 1991, indicates 
that, according to an investigation conducted in Jiande County, Zhejiang Province, 
from 1988-1990, 49 cases out of 120 cases are those of revenge against party 
secretaries. Furthermore, the majority of revenge actions (55.83%) are directed to 
cadres’ property such as harvest in the field or trees planted in their private plots.
62M ou  Lingsheng, "Gonggu nongcun shehuizhuvi zhendi de vi xiang zhongda zhanlue cuoshi" 
(Important strategy and measures o f  consolidating the position o f socialism in the countryside) Oiushi. 
1991, No. 24, pp. 30-48,
63"Lai zi nongcun zhong bu rong huibi de huati" (A subject o f conversation which com es from villages 
and which cannot be easily avoided) Nongmin ribao. 24 January 1989, p. 3.
^ " Nongmin vue lai vue bu tinghua le ma?" (Do peasants become less and less obedient) Jingii ribao. 
22 December 1988.
65Scott’s thesis is that peasants do not go for revolution as long as their need o f  subsistence is not 
disturbed. Hardships have become part o f their life, including oppression by landlords. Scott, James The 
Moral Economy o f  thr Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1976.
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Peasants do not attack the party secretaries physically. 66
Peasants only demand that their leader show some compassion. They find it 
difficult to understand why member of their village should hurt his fellow villagers 
in the interest of the state. In peasants’ reasoning, village leader should care more 
of his village (his gmdang) than the state. Indeed, the leader should take sides with 
them in opposition to the state. After all, "the Heaven is high and the Emperor is too 
far away, "67
The higher authorities who know little about this can just give orders to the 
party secretaries to implement policies. In fact, if something does not go well 
according to plan, they are quick to find fault either in cadres or in peasants. Village 
cadres are reported to have complained: "Township cadres come down to do some 
work, then go home. As to village cadres, we live every day with them ."68 A party 
secretary lives in a community, not in an anonymous unit or danwei. "A village is a 
place of one’s folks, everybody can make mistakes. If we live every day together, 
why should I bother? If you unmask his defects, and he says that you are wrong, then 
we will feel sorry for each other. Everybody feels sorry. This will eventually 
influence our mutual relationships." This statement comes from a village cadre who 
disagrees with measures of checking financial village accounts.69
The crux of the matter is how a village party secretary can reconcile (in 
Madsen’s words) conflicting moral discourses.70 In our case, there is the moral 
imperative from the Central Committee of the CCP; at the same time there is the
^ " Nongcun baofu iiceng ganbu aniian de tedian. vuanvin ii duice" (The characteristics, reason and 
policy to cases o f  revenge against cadres in the countryside) Renmin gong’an bao. 2 May 1991, p. 3. 
Similar result from a survey o f  two counties in Hebei Province, see Zheng Jian, "Nongcun iiceng ganbu 
zao baofu de wenti zhide zhongshi" (The problem o f  grass-root cadres in the countryside suffering from 
revenge needs a special attention) Xiang-zhen luntan, 1991, No. 1, p. 34.
6701d Chinese proverb: tian gao. huangdi yuan.
68"’Jiu pin guan1 you si da nan" ( ’Officials o f  nine products’ facing big problems) Nongmin ribao. 26 
April 1985, p. 3.
69"Nongcun iiceng ganbu dui qingli cauwu you ’qi pa’" (In checking up financial affairs, village 
grass-root cadres have ’eight fears’) Nongmin ribao. 20 April 1992, p. 3.
70In his book, Madsen distinguishes, during the Maoist period, three moral discourses, Confucian, 
Liuist and Maoist, but each has its own paradigm which is irreconcilable to each other. Madsen, op.cit.
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moral imperative from the village community. Every village party secretary is 
confronted by two moral discourses: to become "a good party secretary" and to 
become a father-mother official who show compassion to one’s fellow villagers. 
Madsen is quite right in pointing out that, in a moral community, there is no easy 
way to reconcile the existing moral discourses.71 A village leader must chose which 
path he would like to follow.
The role of the moral middleman is one path which is chosen by numerous 
village party secretaries in China today, something which was impossible to do during 
the radical Mao’s period. First of all, he will listen to the appeals made by the central 
leadership, then he will see the actual situation of his village. What is the reaction of 
his villagers with regard to birth control, grain delivery, tax collection? It is good if 
they can be carried out faithfully and quickly. Otherwise, he must wait patiently, like 
the father-mother official who is more eager to protect than to punish his people.72
CONCLUSION
The role of the moral middleman that a village party secretary in contemporary China 
is playing consists of two elements: middlemanship and protection. He mediates in 
the state and his village by transmitting policies from the state and delivering the 
policy’s results (in our case, grain, taxes, and birth control) to the state. At the same 
time, he accommodates to his fellow villagers who resist undesirable policies (birth 
control, grain delivery, and tax collection). This second element does not mean that 
a village party secretary can deliver complete protection; "protection" here only 
means protecting peasants who are carrying out foot-dragging and feigned ignorance.
Thus, party secretaries continue to go to the township and the county to 
receive policies, but at the same time, they implement them according to their own
71Ibid. p. 257. Here, Madsen proposes a synthesis o f  moral discourses which - in my view - is 
impossible to do.
72 Some party secretaries prefer not to do anything. One report says that many problems are sent by 
party secretaries to the higher authorities simply to avoid hurting peasants’ feeling. "Because o f fear of 
hurting people, o f  entering into troubles Cm a fan), they send the problems to the higher level authorities." 
See, "Xuexi dang de zuzhi zhidu wenda" (Study the question- answer on the organization system o f  the 
Party) Zhongguo nongmin bao. 28 October 1982.
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discretion. The party secretary himself decides when and how the policies are 
implemented. For instance, he will try to be as kind as possible with the 
implementation of birth-control policy, and find every possible means to circumvent 
the policy; he will avoid pushing (cm) peasants to deliver grain or to collect taxes at 
a certain time limit.
In this way, he does not hurt the feelings of his fellow villagers, and 
accordingly, fulfil their expectation of having a fumuguan or father-mother official 
who shows compassion to them. The fact that a village is a moral community plays 
a crucial factor here. As a member of a moral community (who was born and grew 
up there) a village party secretary cannot ignore the pressure generated by the 
community. He is under moral obligation to care for all fellow members of the same 
community.73
Here, we are witnessing peasants who are carrying out resistance against the 
state and a village party secretary who is squeezed in between the two. The party 
secretary clearly takes side with the peasants.
73Madsen, on .cit.. p. 1-2.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE PARTY SECRETARY AND HIS FELLOW VILLAGERS (2): 
THE ROLE OF LINEAGE PATRON
If one becomes an official, 
even fowls and dogs are elevated.
(Chinese proverb)
Like the previous chapter, the focus of this chapter is the interaction between a 
village party secretary and his fellow villagers, but unlike in Chapter Three, this 
chapter will concentrate on the role of lineage patron. I will explain that this is the 
role that a village party secretary should play in his relations with his lineage. As the 
State,1 in its dealing with villages, adopts the strategy of nominal encapsulation, 
lineages in the countryside reinvent the old discourses. A village party secretary, 
being the number one man in the village, is put under moral obligation by members 
of his lineage to provide special favour.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will describe what 
a village party secretary does as lineage patron: how he operates, and to what extent. 
The following section will discuss the internal dynamics of a lineage which generate 
such a role.
I. PARTY SECRETARY AS LINEAGE PATRON
A. The definition of "patron"
The term "patron" is invariably defined in connection with another term, "client." 
But, in itself, the word "patron" is rooted in the Latin word "pater" which means
lrThe state is defined as all institutions which are differentiated from the rest o f  its society as to create 
identifiable public and private spheres; see Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’Leary, Theories o f  the State. 
The Politics o f Liberal Dem ocracy. London: Macmillan, 1987, p. 2.
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"father." A patron is one who acts like a father, while the client his child. In this 
sense, patron-client relationship is a highly unbalanced relationship. A patron is 
usually a person equipped with greater access to power, wealth and status whereas 
the client is without power, not wealthy, and not respected. Both the patron and the 
clients are bound by a principle of reciprocity albeit in an unbalanced relation.
In our case, the term "patron" is to be understood differently. Someone 
playing the patron role is simply one who distributes favour and benefit generously. 
The dimension of reciprocity is very minimal. It is not so much that the clients are 
negligent as the patron himself is obliged not to expect any returns. A village party 
secretary, therefore, plays the patron role because he must express his renqing2 It 
is, then, to be understood not in terms of sheer take-and-give calculation.
This is not to suggest that members of a lineage totally ignore the importance 
of giving a return. My argument is that the reciprocal dimension which is present in 
a normal patron-client relationship is a defining feature in the relationship between 
a party secretary and the members of his lineage. Thus, the patron role used here is 
a role of providing favour and benefit for nothing. It is really like a father who 
distributes favours and benefit from his bounty.3
The role of lineage patron is, thus, defined as a role to provide special favour 
to one’s lineage members who do not necessarily have to reciprocate.
B. The practice of patronage
1. The precondition for the role of lineage patron
How can a village party secretary become a patron? What condition leads him to play 
the role of patron? A village party secretary is always considered as "the top man"
2
See, section two below.
J
For a systematic discussion on patronage, see Paine, Robert. "A Theory o f  Patronage and 
Brokerage." in Robert Paine (ed.), Patrons and Brokers in the East Artie. Newfoundland: Memorial 
University o f  Newfoundland, 1971, pp. 8-19. Cf, Mayer, Adrian C. "Patrons and Brokers: Rural 
Leadership in Four Overseas Indian Communities." in Maurice Freedman (ed.) Social Organization. Essays 
Presented to Raymond Firth. Raymond: Frank Cass, 1967, pp. 167-188; Silverman, Sydel F. "Patronage 
and Community-Nation, Relationships in Central Italy." Ethnology. IV (2), April 1965, pp. 172-189.
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(di yi bashou). It has been suggested that, after Reform, rural cadres have lost their 
power over the peasants. Unlike the period of collectivization, it is argued, they can 
no longer give order to peasants.4 This argument, however, is very general. 
Although rural cadres have lost their power, it does not follow that all cadres, without 
exception, are losing their power. While the team leaders, the brigade cashiers, the 
brigade military officers, and other cadres of minor posts have lost their power, it is 
not the case with the party secretaries. This group of people still enjoy a high degree 
of power, wealth, and prestige.
A party secretary indeed no longer has the enormous administrative power to 
the degree of that in the period of collectivization when peasants had to obtain many 
different sorts of permission and remuneration from him. After Reform, however, a 
party secretary still occupies the highest position in the village and maintain almost 
absolute power. A report based on an investigation of 100 party branches from 66 
counties in Guangdong Province in 1989 reveals that party secretaries are wrapped 
with such power. It says that there are 26 bad party branches which operate under 
"fengjianjouzi" (feudal chief).5 Specifically, it mentions Hukang village in Lufeng 
County. As a feudal chief, the party secretary could wantonly order about the Party 
branch committee, about wantonly changing the decision of the Party branch. The 
Party branch simply loses its fighting ability."6
Nongmin ribao (Farmer’s Daily), 16 May 1986, published a national survey 
on the situation of the Party in the villages by the Research Office for Village Policies 
of the Central Party Secretary and Research Centre for the Development of Villages 
of the State Council.7 One of the findings suggests that party secretaries in the 
villages continued to exercise domination. "There are three boards on one door, but
4N ee, Victor, "Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism: Between Redistribution and Markets 
in China," in American Sociological Review. LVI, June 1991, pp. 267-282.
5Lai Daoming and Hou Wailin, "Guangdong nongcun 100 ge dangzhibu de diaocha (An investigation 
on 100 village Party branches in Guangdong Province) Kexue shehui zhuvi vaniiu. 1989, No. 9, pp. 56-59
& 18.
6O p.cit.. p. 58.
7
"Nongcun gaige de xianzhuang vu qushi" (The current condition and trend o f  village reform) 
Nongmin ribao. 16 May 1986, p. 2.
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when speaking, there is only one person." The three boards refer to three jobs: party 
secretary, chairman of villagers’ committee, and director of a village enterprise. In 
doing this, the power of a village party secretary is greatly enhanced.
Power opens the way to a wider access to other scarce resources. Two scarce 
resources in high demand in villages are personal connection (guamd) to higher 
officials and local businessmen, and information on new policies and business 
opportunities.8 A typical example is the story of the Party Secretary of Beiguan 
Village (Jimo County, Shandong Province), Ge Chengyu. He was trying to mobilise 
his villagers to develop their economy but the villagers had no capital at all. Here is 
the conversation between peasants and the party secretary: "Party secretary Ge, I 
want to set up a cigarette-wine shop, but I don’t have my money." "Borrow some 
money from the bank, and I will act as guarantor (baoren)." Another peasant said: 
"Party secretary Ge, I want to set up a clothing processing factory, can I borrow 
money from the bank?" "Do it, and I will act as guarantor."9 The party secretary can 
act as guarantor because he is known by people in the bank in the county who 
recognise his power in his village.
Power and easy access to resources, thus, are the main capital of a party 
secretary to become a patron.
2. The practice of patronage
A lineage whose member becomes a party secretary is stirely fortunate and blessed. 
The lineage members can enjoy benefits and favours; the most common one is a 
share in administrative position in the village. A case is reported in Dongjia Village 
(Gansu Province). Here, the Dongs constitute the majority of the village population. 
The party secretary, however, comes from the Shens, and two of the nine members 
of the villager’s committee are from the Shens. Apparently, the party secretary, at 
that time, was not yet able to bring more of his men into the villagers’ committee
8
R olf Wirsing, "Political Power and Information: A Cross-Cultural Study," American Anthropologist. 
N o. 75, 1973, pp. 153-170.
9
"Beinuan you Ee shuii" (Beiguan Village has a party secretary) Nongmin ribao. 13 September 1988,
p. 3.
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where the Dongs still had five members.10
A typical case is from Changtang Village (Guangdong Village) where the 
Chens constitute the largest lineage in the village. The party secretary is from the 
Chens, then all other important positions are occupied by the Chens: village head, 
village secretary, cashier, chief of security department, and chief of the people’s 
militia. Furthermore, 12 out of 25 staff members of village organizations are from 
the Chens. Other lineage such as the Dengs, the Lis, the Zhangs, the Zhous, the 
Huangs hold minor positions. The highest position held by non-Chens is chairman of 
the villagers’ committee which is held by one of the Lis. n
If there are not enough positions in the administration, party secretaries - the 
top men in a village - just create new positions. Nongmin ribao (Farmer’s Daily) in 
1993 reports what it calls "the swelling of s ta ff in village organizations where it can 
reach on average 30 people. The writers of this report argue that the lineage factor 
significantly contributes to it. They write: "In order to minimise conflict, the
township authority must ’xi shi ning ren’ (make concessions to avoid trouble) and 
adopt ’united front’ strategy. This means that they must be fair to all major lineages, 
individually reinstate ’masses’ leaders’ with a hope this will be accepted by all 
parties." This report comes from Jiangsu Province.12
By taking his own members into the staff, a party secretary naturally creates 
tension in the leadership team. In some articles, this situation is often referred to as 
"leadership is not united." For example, Zhong Zhushan in his article argues that 60 
per cent of 1358 village party branches who belong to the category of "quite good" 
show the sign where "the leadership squad is not united" because "it is plagued by 
lineage factions." The party secretary and the members of his lineage, evidently, 
clashed with members of other lineages in the leadership team. His investigation was 
conducted in provinces in both north and south China: Shaanxi, Hebei, Henan,
10Guo Jiaoyang, "Gansu: Dongjia zhuang" (Gansu: Dongjia Village), in Wang Huning, Dangdai 
zhongguo cunluo iiazu wenhua (The village clan culture in contemporary China), Shanghai: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1991, p. 493.
n Chen Suoshi, "Guangdong: Changtang cun" (Guangdong: Changtang Village), in Ibid. p. 385.
12 "Cun ganbu banzi ving ’xiao zhong'" (Cadre squad in the countryside must ’subside in swelling’) 
Nongmin ribao. 11 October 1993, p. 3.
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Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Zhejiang, Anhui, Guangdong, Sichuan, Guizhou, and 
Qinghai. 13 This study further demonstrates that lineage is not only strong in the 
south but also in the north.
The three studies mentioned above show how party secretaries deliver special 
favour to their relatives of their lineages to occupy administrative positions. For 
peasants, becoming a cadre is something which is desirable because he/she can draw 
salaries, gain respect, and more importantly, it could serve as a ladder to becoming 
state cadre in township or county.14 If the latter is not probable, at least, he/she can 
still enjoy a free salary in addition to their earnings from the field. For the party 
secretary himself, it is good that he is surrounded by people of his lineage. This is 
even truer if factionalism in the village is very acute where lineages are really 
jockeying for power.
In business, the party secretary will usually choose people from his own clan 
to become his staff. For instance, in the case of Fujian, four people managed a village 
enterprise, two of them came from Du lineage, and the boss was that of Du 
lineage.15 An observation made by Changping County party Committee Secretary 
(Hunan Province) in 1991 demonstrates a similar pattern. He said: "In one village, 
the father becomes the party secretary, his son becomes a driver, daughter the 
chairman, daughter-in-law a book-keeper."16
Patronage in business is a common practice in the whole of China. Normally, 
the party secretary will occupy the highest position, and his relatives will take up the 
number two to number four position in the enterprise. In some cases, distant relatives 
may also be given position and jobs.
Yet, patronage in business is larger than the giving of positions and jobs. It
13Zhong Zhushan "Zhengdun nongcun houiin dangzhibu de gongzuo ke bu ronshuan" (Do not slow 
down the work o f  rectifying backward party branches in the countryside) i>ang jian* *990, No. 2, p. 33.
14"T o the peasants, the greatest demand is to become the state em ployee, that is ’zhuan zheng,n See, 
Zhong Zhushan, on.cit.
15Liu Guochen, Fuiian: Hongjian cun (Fujian: Hongjian village), in Wang Huning, op .cit.. p. 399
16 Yang Chaoren, "Guanyu dangqjan nongcun dang-oun guanxi wenti de diaocha vu vaniiu" (The 
investigation on current problem regarding the relationship between the Party and the masses), Renmin 
ribao, 16 October, 1991
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can develop into a separate colony where the party secretary, as head, allows the 
members of his lineage to use the facility of the village. The regulation issued by the 
party committee secretary of Wuhe County (Jiangsu Province) in 1985 can give us 
a good look at the practice of a family business colony which is banned.17 It states: 
"Party cadres are not permitted to promote sales to one’s family members (jiashu), 
to borrow money or use the money of the unit for one’s family members, to use any 
means of transportation belonging to the state, collective, or individuals to transport 
the goods of the family members, to serve as shop assistant for family members.1 
Clearly, a party secretary, by acting as patron, can do many things for the members 
of his lineage either to develop or facilitate their business.
Beyond these two areas (administrative position and business), members of 
a lineage can also benefit from the party secretary. The most sensitive issue of the 
village is birth control. The party secretary can grant extraordinary favours to the 
member of his lineage in this issue. He will not fine them if they violate the birth 
control regulation. An interview with 15 peasants in Jili District, Henan Province, in 
1988, confirms this. Peasants are reported to have said: "Those who belong to the 
family of the village cadres can have two children and they are not fined. Whereas, 
if we, ordinary people, have two children, they will probably not impose a fine, but 
they will tear down our house."18
A similar case is reported in Xiangtan County, Hunan Province, from an 
interview with peasants in 1991. They said:
"Speaking about birth control, it is indeed difficult, but it is implemented 
anyway. Nevertheless, ’a bowl of water is never level’ (vi wan shui meivou 
duanping). If they fine, they only fine innocent people. If you have a patron 
(kaoshan), having more than one child, you only have to pay 400 yuan instead 
of 2000 yuan. There is someone who has five children, but only paid 300 
yuan."19
17"Wuhe uuzheng dangzhens ganbu iineshane waifeng (Wuhe County check all Party cadres engaged 
in illegal activities in doing business') Nongmin ribao. 8 February, 1985, p. 1.
1 O
N N , "Shenchen de huhuan" (A dark call), Nongmin ribao. 12 September, 1988, p. 1,
19 Zhou Shaoguang, "Nongmin de xinlihua" (The innermost thoughts and feelings o f peasants), Neibu 
wengao. N o. 22, 1991, p 25
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The delivery of grain is another area where a party secretary can pay his favour to 
his lineage. Peasants complained that cadres (including the party secretary) treat them 
unfairly.
"If the family members of cadres cannot fulfil the requirement, the higher 
authorities will turn a blind eye. Whereas, if we, ordinary people, are unable 
to fulfil the requirement, we will not get our contracted land back, or our 
children will not be allowed to go to school, or we will not get land to build 
a house.20
As a lineage consists of a large number of people, the pattern of patronage 
must follow a more or less fixed rule. According to the investigation of Zhang 
Xinmei, it follows an order like this: xian fuxi hou muxi. xian diqin hou pangqin. 
xian nanxing hou mixing.21 The paternal line takes priority over the maternal line. 
This principle is to be complemented with the other one: those who are directly 
related to one’s life takes priority over those are not directly related. These two 
principles have to be carried out according to another rule, the male will be 
prioritised over the female.
This means that benefits are distributed according to the distance that someone 
actually has with the Party secretary who is invariably a male. The Party secretary 
is the measurement. He will, for instance, help his elder and little brother first and 
then his nephews. If he has a son, this son will certainly get the benefit first. After 
they are already looked after, he will pay his attention to the relatives of his wife. 
Last, he will take care of the distant relatives. There is no doubt that dissatisfaction 
may arise from this method because of the complicated relations existing within this 
network.
The role of lineage patron, however, is not performed with the same intensity 
everywhere; it is easy to perform in some villages, and difficult in other villages, 
depending on the character of the village. As it is known, villages in China can be 
divided into three main types: single surname villages, one-dominant surname
20N N , "Shenchen de huhuan" (A dark call), op.cit.
21 nZhang Xinmei, "Xianshi nongcun shequ zhong de shili renwu" (Powerful persons in the 
contemporary village community), Shehuixue vu shehui diaocha: 1992; No. 3: pp. 38
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villages, multi-surname villages.22 In a single-surname village, a party secretary can 
perform the role much more easily than in the other two types of villages. The most 
difficult place is certainly the multi-surname village. While in single-surname and 
one-dominant-sumame village, the strong lineage can give backing simply on the 
basis of their number, it is not the case in a multi-surname village. Here, a party 
secretary who wants to perform patronage to his lineage will face resistance and 
challenges from other lineages.
The report by the party committee secretary of Yishui County (Shandong 
Province) is not very clear about the struggle, but it may give us a hint. 23 The city 
party committee secretary, at that time, was trying to reform all village party 
branches under his jurisdiction. In the process, he encountered "factionalism along 
the line of lineage" or "zongfa paixing." It seems that this term refers to factionalism 
in those villages where there were a number of lineages of equal strength. None of 
them were willing to let the other lineage to dominate their village. A report of 
an investigation conducted in villages in Changping county ( Beijing Municipality) 
may give another clue. The writer is the County Party Committee Secretary, Yang 
Chaoren; and he discovers that cadres in villages are involved in lineage contentions.24 
"They do not only seek wealth for their own but also for their relatives." He says 
that, as a result, the leadership team is not united. For an apparent reference to 
struggle between lineages, he then continued to say that "since 1984 one year has one 
party secretary." Many lineages mean many changes of party secretaries.25
22This classification is according to Wang Huning, op .cit., pp. 78-81.
23 "Jiuji qian iiuii wu, bum jian ge hao zhibu" (It is better to have a good party branch rather than 
relief fund or relief material) Nongmin ribao. 23 December 1986, p. 2.
24"Guanyu dangqian nongcun dangqun guanxi wenti de diaocha yu vaniiu" (The investigation on 
current problem regarding the relationship between the Party and the masses) Renmin ribao. 16 October, 
1991, p. 5.
25 *Many party secretaries resigned because they simply could not stand the pressure from conflicts 
between lineages. See, Tang Yimin "Bufen cun dangzhibu shuii cizhi de yuanvin he iiejue de banfa" 
(Causes and solution to the resignation o f village Party secretaries) Hunan gongchandang ren, 1989, No. 
3, pp. 34-35. This article reports a result o f  an investigation conducted in 10 townships, over 171 Party 
branches in Hunan Province in October 1988. It was discovered that, out o f 170 Party secretaries, 42 o f  
them (24.7%) have asked for resignation. One o f the reasons is that "they feel that there are a lot o f  
complicated entanglements (masha)." Party secretaries belonging to this category consist o f  40.5% . 
According to Tang Yimin, "in villages where these Party secretaries stay, cadres do not want to unite, the
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To avoid conflicts, Lineages will then try to find compromise among them. 
This is reported in Qilihu Village (Huangmei County, Hubei Province) In this village, 
leaders are elected among the Lis, the Hus, and the Qius. "They create a situation of 
’san xing dingli’ (the three surname groups as tripartite balance of forces).26 This 
kind of compromise certainly constrains the role of patronage held by village party 
secretary, something which will not happen in a single-surname or one-dominant- 
sumame villages.
A village party secretary, although playing a patronage role, is not necessarily 
the senior member of the lineage simply because not all lineage members join the 
Party. As it is known, a lineage is structured according to iron law of seniority or 
beifen.27 Members of a lineage always look to the most senior for guidance; in most 
cases, he has the final say on various major decisions.28 This bears a serious 
consequence for the patronage performance. If the party secretary in question is of 
the younger generation in terms of seniority,29 he will be severely under the control 
of the senior members. He may be forced to distribute favours not in accordance with 
his desires, or maybe even forced to serve the senior members.
An investigation by Qian Hang and Xie Weiyang unveils this situation. They 
say that villagers often blindly obey a "strong man" within their lineage, and this man 
can control and drive people of his lineage to do many different sorts of activities, 
including illegal ones.30 The party secretary is under the shadow of this strong man. 
The following article in Nongmin ribao (Farmer’s Daily) reports a similar situation.
masses stick to the deep-rooted clan tradition." As a result, "there are numerous ’unsolved judicial cases, 
unsolved disputes, etc."
26Zhong Zhushan, "Zhengdun nongcun houiin dangzhibu de gongzuo ke bu ronehuan" (Do not slow  
down the work o f  rectifying backward party branches in the countryside) Dang iian. 1990, No. 2 , p. 33.
On beifen. see Wang Huning, op .cit.. pp. 81-85
28For example, in Dongjia Village (Gansu), see Guo Jiaoyang, op.cit.
29High beifen does not necessarily mean high in age, although it is always the case.
30Qian Hang and Xie W eiyang, Zongzhu wenti: dangdai zhongguo nongcun vaniiu de vi ge shijiao" 
(Clan problem: one point o f  view on the investigation o f  present day Chinese villages), Shehui kexue. 
1990, N o. 2, pp. 21-24 & 28.
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A certain village under Fuqunmiao Township (Jianghai County, Tianjin) was in a 
disarray where the party branch did not function. Why? The reporter points his finger 
to the influence of lineage. "Selecting village leaders, making an important decision, 
doing a certain small thing, all are covered by the lineage."31 Evidently, the party 
secretary in this village does not dare to override his senior members.
If the senior members of a lineage continue to dominate the lineage, and the 
party secretary is from a junior member, then there is no way for the village party 
secretary to maintain his autonomy. He may just have to listen to the decisions of his 
senior members, and do what they want. One article published in 1980 aptly 
summarises this experience: "When the superstitious activities of a lineage run wild 
[...] the lineage headmen (touren) replaces the grass-root cadres, lineage authority 
replaces state authority, lineage regulations replace state laws."32
What happens if the party secretary is the most senior member? There is no 
doubt that the party secretary can freely exercise his role as patron to his lineage, and 
that he will stay as long as possible in the position, supported by the lineage. The 
following case may illustrate this. This is an investigation done in Long County 
(Shaanxi Province) over 240 village party secretaries.33 The authors discover a 
number of party secretaries who stay in power for many years, and find that this is 
something ’roly-poly’ (budaoweng)." To explain this phenomenon, they argue that 
the most important factor is old age combined with high seniority. "Some of them 
entered the Party in the 50s or 60s." As they grow older, these party secretaries are 
never replaced because, in peasants’ eyes, they are "laohaoren" (a benign and 
uncontentious person); the peasants like them. Apparently, this is not the only reason 
why they can stay in power. They further write: "Relying on the power of one’s 
lineage within the ranks of the Party and the absolute number they command, and 
employing so many benefits of the representatives, they succeed in maintaining their
31 "Sanluo de sha iucheng bao (The scattered sand is assembled together into a bastion) Nongmin ribao. 
20 June, 1989, p. 3.
32 "Jianiu zhizhi fengjian zongzu shili huodong" (Vigorously stop the activities o f feudal clan) 
Zhongguo nongmin bao. 20 October 1983, p. 1.
33Shi Tiecheng and Zhu Baiming, "Dui nongcun zhibu shuii sunzhi de djaocha." (An investigation to 
the quality o f village Party branch secretaries. Kexue shehuizhuvi vaniiu. 1990, No. 9 , pp. 63-66.
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positions as village party branch secretaries."34
This case reveals that a party secretary with a high level of seniority can play 
the patronage role more effectively. He can distribute favours to the relatives of his 
lineage without any challenge from other rival lineages. This, in turn, will satisfy the 
members of his lineage, and accordingly, they will continuously support him to stay 
in his position. In our case, apparently, the majority of the party branch members 
are from the party secretary’s own lineage. The party secretary is elected again and 
again by the party branch which is dominated by members of his lineage. Here, there 
is a correlation between patronage and length of office term. The more a patronage 
is effective, the longer the patron will stay in power.
The higher authorities (both township and county) are, reportedly, rendered 
helpless to tackle this. For instance, a strong lineage of the party secretary can 
prevent any action being taken by them. A reporter from Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ 
Daily), 1985, made an investigation in 35 villages under Guanli Township (Liaoshan 
County, Shandong Province) and gives his report on the selection of cadres in those 
villages. The party secretaries, apparently, could stop the intervention from the higher 
authorities. "The higher authorities had conducted a public opinion poll, they wanted 
to release them from their office. Nevertheless, because of their magical power, their 
lineage, and their physical prowess, they could block good cadres, secretly 
eliminating them, not letting them take their places."35
To what extent has the influence of lineage spread across China’s contryside? 
A survey conducted by a number of academicians confirm the growing influence of 
lineage in the countryside. For instance, in 1988, Song Jucheng and Qiao Runling 
conducted an investigation in Shanxi Province;36 in 1989, Qian Hang and Xie 
Weiyang in Hunan Province and Jiangxi Province,37 and in 1990, Chen Shuiping and
^ Ibid.. p. 65.
35 "Wo de diaocha" (My investigation) Nongmin ribao. 3 May, 1985, p. 3.
36Song Jucheng and Qiao Runling, "Jiazu shili de bianhua ii oi dui nongcun shenghuo de vinxiang" 
(The transformation o f  the power o f  jiazu and its influence on village life), in Shehuixue vu shehui diaocha. 
No. 3, 1988, pp. 17-19 & 35
37Qian Hang and Xie W eiyang, op.cit.
148
Li Weisha in Hubei Province.38 The largest investigation was made by a team led 
by Wang Huning; they conducted a survey over 12 provinces, south and north China: 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Anhui, Sichuan (south), 
Gansu, Shaanxi, Liaoning, Hubei (north).39 These scholars discovered a widespread 
and growing influence of kinship in villages.
The issue of lineage came out in the national press from the early period of 
Reform. For instance, in 1983, a Fight between lineages (zongzu) broke out in the 
Hong’an County, Hubei Province. The local Party Committee issued a sharp 
statement, saying:
In places where lineage power is strong ... social order declines, local 
headmen replace grass-root cadres, lineage authority replaces government 
authority, lineage laws replace legal statutes, Party leadership is harmed, and 
Party and national policies and regulations are undermined.40
Five years later, presumably as lineages in the countryside became increasingly 
influential, Song Ping41 took up this issue at a seminar organised by the Research 
Bureau of the Central Committee and the State Council in June 1990. He forcefully 
asked the participants of the seminar "to help peasants to resist and cast off the 
phenomenon of clanism (zongzu sixiangL" 42 In August of the same year, clanism 
was discussed at the National Seminar on the Construction of Village-Level 
Organizations (August 1990), and appeared in the document. The village party 
branches were asked to "educate the peasants to resist and cast off the phenomenon 
of clanism, feudal superstition, bourgeois class rotten thinking and other backward
38Chen Shuiping and Li Weisha, "Zongzu shili: dangqian nongcun shequ shenghuo zhong vi gu qianzai 
de pohuai liliang" (The power o f clans: a potential destructive force in the present village life and society), 
Shehuixue vaniiu. 1991, No. 5 , pp. 31- 36
39Wang Huning, on.cit.
40"Jianiue zhizhi fengjian zongzu shili huodongH (Strictly ban all activities related to the power o f 
feudal clan), Zhongguo nongmin bao. 20 October, 1984, p. 1
41Song Ping, at that time, was member o f the Politburo who is in charge o f  the party organization.
42Song Ping, "Jiaqiang _nongcun gongzuo. shenhua nongcun gaige" (Strengthen the work in the
countryside, and deepen reform in the countryside) in Xin shiqi nongve he nongcun gongzuo zhongyao 
wenxian xuanbian. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992, p. 623.
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views."43
These two statements are explicit admission by the central leadership of the 
resurgence of clan44 in the countryside. It is so serious that they asked party 
branches in the countryside "to resist" and "to cast off." Indeed, what worries the 
central leadership is much deeper than clan influence in the work of party secretaries, 
namely the erosion of the Party in the countryside.45 This is why the central 
leadership does not waste time in taking up the issue at various national seminars.
H. LINEAGE BOND
Why, then, is it that party secretaries perform the role of lineage patron? Why is it 
that this role emerges quite conspicuously during the period after Reform? This 
emergence of the role is, I will argue, the result of the resurgence of kinship network, 
especially that of lineage, and this is prompted by the introduction of Reform itself. 
As Reform in 1978 carries out the strategy of nominal encapsulation, the Party 
retreats from day-to-day control of peasants’ life, which includes kinship network.
A. The emergence of lineage
Long before 1949 Mao Zedong made an investigation in villages in Hunan Province, 
and specified four main problems in China, "four thick ropes binding the Chinese 
people, particularly the peasants." Clan was singled out as one of those four thick 
ropes.46 Clan destruction, therefore, was one of main targets of the Communist
43m
Quan euo cun 11 zuhzi iianshe gongzuo zuotanhui iiyao H (Summary o f  minutes o f  national seminar 
on the construction o f  village-level organizations) Xin shiai nongvehe nongcun gongzuo zhonevao wenxian 
xuanbian. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992, p. 653.
^ H ere, I am using the term "clan" because clan, according to anthropologists, is larger than lineage 
in terms o f  membership and has well structured organizations and activities.
45"Clan Influence on Rural Politics Increases," Zhenli de zhuiaiu (Pursuit o f  truth), No. 6, 11 June 
1995, pp. 31-33 in FBIS-CHI-95-180, 18 September 1995, p. 15.
46Mao Zedong, "Hunan nongmin vundone kaocha baogao" (Report on an investigation o f  the peasant 
movement in Hunan), March 1927, in Mao Zedong xuanii. Vol. I, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1966, p. 
33.
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Party after it came to power. The first stage was carried out between 1947-1949 in 
the liberated area, and the second stage between 1950-1952 in the newly liberated 
area (Jiangnan, Xinan and Xibei).47 This campaign, which was vigorously conducted 
in combination with Land Reform, confiscated not only lands owned by landlords but 
also lands belonging to clans, on which they set up temples, ancestral halls, schools, 
etc. In fact, many temples and ancestral halls were destroyed or burnt.
Since then, clans and lineages are put under strict control and made illegal 
(under the term "feudal superstition" or fengiian mixin). The resurgence of clans 
after 1978, especially lineages, are partly related to the fact that peasants continue to 
live on the basis of surname division. Peasants of a surname group together and live 
in a clearly demarcated area (in Chinese, it is called "juzu"). This residential 
settlement, which is crucial to group consolidation, has not altered for hundreds of 
years until today, even during the period of Mao.48
Another factor which contributes to the resurgence of lineage is the household 
responsibility system itself. If, before Reform, peasants only thought in terms of their 
production team, it is no longer the case after Reform. Now, peasants only think in 
terms of their household; each individual thinks hard how to survive in a competitive 
situation. Negatively speaking, each household must also learn how to defend itself.
With residential settlement and external pressures to households, both factors 
converge to contribute to the resurgence of lineage. As peasants are desperate for 
help, and look around, what they find are their own relatives living next to each 
other. Song Jucheng and Qiao Runling conducted, in 1988, an investigation of eight 
villages under four townships in three counties (Linfen, Changzhi, Yanbei) in Shanxi
47Tu Yangjie, Zhongguo jiazu zhidu shi (The history o f  Chinese clan system), Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1992, p. 466.
48Chen Shuiping and Li Weisha, on the basis o f an investigation conducted five natural villages under 
Xiantao city in Hubei Province, observe that "natural village grows out, slowly, o f  groups o f people who 
live together connected by blood relations," and that this situation has not changed from 1949 to this day. 
See, Chen Shuiping and Li Weisha, Zongzhu shili: dangqian nongcun shequ shenghuo zhong vi gu qianzai 
de pohuai liliang (The power o f  clans: a potential destructive force in the present village life and society). 
Shehuixue vaniiu. 1991, No. 5, p. 31; further discussion on iuzu. see Qian Hang, Zhongguo jiazu zhidu 
xin tan (A new exploration on Chinese lineage system), Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1994, pp, 75-85. 
Parish and Whyte confirm this: "Though first deprived o f arms and then, later, o f  corporate land, lineages 
were not dispersed but remained clustered in their home villages." Parish , William L. and Martin K. 
Whyte, Village and Family in Contemporary China. Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1978, p. 28.
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Province. They argue that, although the trend of the family is towards the nuclear 
family, due to the introduction of household responsibility system, all families have 
to ally to each other, to help each other, even to protect each other. "After the 
introduction of the household responsibility system, disputes among villagers are on 
the increase. Land allocation, fertilizer, irrigation water, electricity, land for houses, 
the arrangement of contract, etc. have become sources of disputes. In order to defend 
their interest, to fend off bullying by others, all various types of relatives who, 
previously, were distant, naturally ally together and become close again."49
A large survey was conducted to find out peasants’ attitude toward kin 
relations; peasants were asked to answer three questions: (1) Who would you look to 
when you are in difficulty? (2) From whom do you expect to obtain assistance? (3) 
In selecting a partner, whom do you prefer? The interviewees had to select five 
groups of people: relatives, neighbours, friends, village cadres, and functionaries of 
the economic organization. Table II below is a simplified form of three tables found 
in Wang Huning’s book.50
These statistics show that members of a lineage tend to ally among themselves. 
Peasants, in consistent pattern, selected their direct relatives as their first priority of 
choice to all three questions, 29%. They are parents, and brothers and sisters. To 
take all types of relatives, the number is higher, 54%.
B. The m oral obligation of the party secretary
An individual in Chinese peasant society does not live for him/herself. First of all, 
he/she is only one small part of his/her own family, and secondly, this family is one 
small part of the lineage. Indeed, as Baker argues, Chinese individuals stand in what 
is called "Continuum of Descent," meaning that "Descent is a unity, a rope which 
began somewhere back in the remote past and which stretches on to the infinite
49Song Jucheng and Qiao Runling "Jiazu shili de bianhua ii oi dui nongcun shenghuo de vinxiane" 
(Changes o f the power o f  clans and its influence over village life) Shehuixue vu shehui diaocha. 1988, No. 
3, p. 18.
50Wang Huning, op .cit.. pp. 113-115.
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future."51 An individual, especially the male, is only a part of a big family, past, 
present, and future.
Table II - A Survey of peasant tendency of kinship solidarity
Questions no.
1 2 3
A. Relatives
I . direct relatives 29 27 29
2. collateral relatives 12 10 7
3. relatives by marriage
9 12 12
4. relatives of the same 
lineage 8 5 6
B. Geographical relatives
1. neighbour 11 5 11
2. villagers 2 4 4
C. Party and village cadres
1. township cadres 3 7 5
2. party cadres 5 4 1
D. Economic organization 3 8 3
E. Friends 17 19 21
The obligation of an individual is precisely to take care of and protect the big 
family in its three dimensions: past, present and future. Each individual is under 
obligation to take care of the big family. More specifically, he/she is to contribute to 
the glory of the lineage or clan, and this means that Chinese individuals are to help 
each other to attain that glory. It is within this perspective that money and titles 
matter much. More money and more titles are not only vital for people’s living, but 
even more so for the glory of the lineage/clan. The more members of a lineage 
become rich or become officials, the more glory they add to the lineage.
The obligation imposed on someone who manages to become an official in the 
village (in our case, party secretary) is exactly how to help his lineage to attain that
51Baker, Hugh D.R Chinese Family and Kinship. London: Macmillan, 1979, p. 26.
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goal. As this is a moral obligation, then, there is no reward for what he has done. 
A sense of satisfaction that he has done his duty is perhaps the only reward. A failure 
to deliver help, however, is to be punished.
How do peasants formulate this obligation? Peasants do not use abstract words 
but words which are concrete and effectual. The word renqing is such a word; it is 
readily available in Chinese society as a word to express different kinds of human 
relations. The word renqing has a very rich connotation in Chinese. The Pinvin 
Chinese-English Dictionary explains that it has four different meanings: (1) human 
feelings, human sympathy, sensibilities; (2) human relationships; (3) favour; (4) gift, 
present.52
In peasant society in China, according to Madsen, the word renqing contains 
even richer nuances:53
"To have ’humanity’ means to be aware of one’s roots in the past and to hope 
that one’s life will be carried on in future generations of progeny. It means to 
respect, cherish, and be faithful to the ties that bind one to one’s 
contemporaries by virtue of a common ancestry; to have sympathy for one;s 
friends (who in rural context often consist of one’s relatives), who kindness 
and courtesy toward them, exchange favors with them; to be ale to relax and 
enjoy good food and comfortable lodging if one can and share such goods on 
occasion with one’s humbler relatives and friends in return for favors in 
accordance with their means."
Party secretaries in the countryside are bound by this renqing. Three cases 
reported in Zhongguo nongmin ribao (China Farmer’s Daily) may illustrate this point. 
Party secretary, Zhang Guangming from Yezhuangtou Brigade, (Ji county, Hebei 
Province) was trying to become a good party cadre, and was very eager to implement 
state policy faithfully. One day he saw the brother of his wife cutting down peanut
52
S ee> The Pinyin Chinese-English Dictionary. Hongkong: Commercial Press, 1992. A number o f  
studies have been done on renqing. for example, Hsu, Francis L.K. "Eros, affect, and pao," in Francis Hsu 
L -K- (ed-) Kinship and Culture. Chicago: Aldine, 1971, pp. 439-475; King, Ambrose Y .C . "An Analysis 
o f renqing in interpersonal relationships: a preliminary inquiry," (in Chinese) in Proceedings o f the 
International Conference on Sinology. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1980, pp. 413-428; Lin Yu-tang, Mv 
Country and My People. N ew  York: Reynal and Hitchcok, 1935; Wilson Scott, "The Cash Nexus and 
Social Networks: Mutual Aids in Contemporary Shanghai Villages," paper presented at the Annual Meeting 
o f AAS, Washington DC, 4-11 April, 1995.
53
Madsen, Richard Morality and Power in a Chinese Village. Berkeley, CA: University o f  California, 
1984, p. 61.
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trees. According to law, he had to pay 13.5 yuan. But the villagers said: "The 
brother in law penalised the little brother. It’s really something new!" The mother 
intervened, and demanded leniency. In her view, Zhang Guangming should spare his 
feeling (liu qingmian). The party secretary stayed in his decision. "Good!," said the 
mother, "You really don’t understand human feeling (renqing)."54
The second case is from Fanjia Brigade ( Zhoucun District, Shandong 
Province). Party secretary, Li Kongzhi, was named as a model of a party member by 
the district and by the city, and then nominated as a delegate to the Provincial 
People’s Congress. The newspaper of that day reported his other exceptional deed. 
In 1972 the commune gave him a list of opening job for three people. His younger 
brother thought that he would give one of the positions to him, because he was 
qualified for the job, and moreover, he was Party secretary Li’s younger brother. 
However, party secretary Li refused to give him the job considering that there were 
many more people in the village who were in difficulty. His wife was angry when he 
did that, reprimanding him for "liuqing buren".55
The third case is from Licun Brigade (Huolu County, Hebei Province)56 The 
party secretary who was a woman, Zhang Xinxiang, displayed much courage when 
she sacked three teachers who were not up to standard. One of them, however, was 
her own "tang d i" (cousin on the paternal side). This aroused anger on the part of the 
father of the teacher who went to look for the father of the party secretary. Party 
secretary Zhang stuck to her decision, saying that she considered only ability. Her 
father couldn’t stand this, and he yelled at her: "You, you ... how can you refuse to 
recognise to have anything to do with all your relatives (liuqing buren)?"
All the three party secretaries were criticised as ignoring renqing. Qingmian 
and liuqing both are rooted in the idea that people must show human feelings which 
can be manifested in showing mercy, sensibilities, forgiveness, etc. To the Chinese,
^ " Jiefu fa neidi" (The brother in law penalized the little brother) Zhongguo nongmin bao. 7 November 
1980, p. 3.
55wZhang quan shi ba nian. si li bu zhanbian" (To hold power for 18 years, but never touch personal 
gain) Zhongguo nongmin bao. 24 January, 1984, p. 3.
56"Yjge you yuaniian de nu zhishu" (A female Party secretary who has a vision) Zhongguo nongmin 
bao. 8 March, 1983.
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those criticisms are very harsh, tantamount to saying "immoral." In Chinese there are 
numerous criticisms which use the word renqing such as "bu jin renqing" (not 
amenable to reason) or "bu dong renqing shigu" (not know the ways of the world), 
etc. All of these criticisms are so harsh that no Chinese would want to hear them.
Village cadres, including party secretaries, admit that they could not stand 
being criticised to ignore renqing. Lineage members abide by renqing. One article 
published in journal Dang iian (Party construction) in 1989 reports that "at present, 
the majority of Party secretaries are elected out of their own village, 95 % are local 
people and local leaders. These people have little contact with the outside world, and 
suffer many different sorts of limitations related to ’worldly wisdom’ frenqing shigu). 
traditional customs, etc."57 Apparently, party secretaries in the countryside, 
according to the author of this article, provide favours to their relatives of their 
lineage out of renqing. To know renqing shigu basically means to know how to help 
one’s relatives, and give special treatment to them.
A study conducted in eight villages under four townships in three counties 
(Linfen, Changzhi, Yanbei) in Shanxi Province in 1988 reveals a similar result.58 
"No matter how big or small, a village always comes across with clan networks at 
its back door which are very complicated. [...] Village cadres themselves admit it to 
us that in carrying out a job, one is ’half doing renqing. and half doing the job’ (yi 
ban renqing. vi ban gongshiV'59 In real terms, this means that many party secretaries 
must bow to the pressure of their lineage members.
Here again we are also witnessing a clash - in Madsen’s words - between two 
moral discourses.60 There is the moral imperative from Central Committee of the 
CCP; at the same time there is the moral imperative from the lineage. Every village
57This report is based on an investigation carried out by the Research Centre o f  Dongtai City Party 
Committee, Jiangsu Province; it investigated 745 Party secretaries. NN. "Nongcun dangzhibu shuii houji 
fan ren xianxiangchu tan" (A preliminary investigation on the phenomenon o f  the dearth o f successors to 
the post village party branch secretary) Dang iian (Beijing), 1989, No. 6 , pp. 12 & 47.
58Song Jucheng and Qiao Runling, "Jiazu shili de bianhua ii qi dui nongcun shenghuo de yinxiang" 
(Changes o f the power o f  clans and its influence over village life) Shehuixue yu shehui diaocha. 1988, No. 
3, pp. 17-19 +  35.
59Ibid., p. 19.
60Madsen, op.cit.
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party secretary is confronted by two moral discourses: to become "fighting 
bastion"61 and to know renqing.62 But, as Madsen points out, in a moral 
community, there is no easy way to reconcile the conflicting moral discourses.63 A 
village leader eventually must chose which path he would like to follow.
At this juncture, a village party secretary chooses the peasant way by allowing 
himself to play the patron for the members of his lineage. This role places a party 
secretary at the side of his lineage vis-a-vis the state. As the lineage exerts greater 
pressure for him, he will opt to take advantage of his position and provide favours 
and benefits to members of his lineage. The role of lineage patron, here, is distinctly 
different to that of in a patron-client relationship. This is not a dyadic relationship, 
but one person with the whole lineage; neither is it instrumental in nature. More 
importantly, it is not friendship or any variant of it.64 The patron must accept it as 
moral obligation, with or without reward.
CONCLUSION
The role of lineage patron that a village party secretary is performing encompasses 
a wide range of activities. He could provide formal favours such as positions in the 
village administration, positions in business (xiangzhen give!, to informal favours 
such as grain delivery, and birth control. The latter can even go as far as petty 
activities such as using cars belonging to the village to transport the goods of his 
family or relatives.
61This is already discussed in Chapter V.
62Indeed, when speaking about renqing. Madsen speaks about a specific moral discourse, namely 
moral discourse according to Confucian paradigm where lineage is put at the centre o f  it.
63Ibid. p. 257. Here, Madsen proposes a synthesis o f  moral discourses which - in my view - is 
impossible to do.
64Patron-client relationship is "a special case o f  dyadic (two persons) involving a largely instrumental 
friendship in which an individual o f higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and 
resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person o f lower status (client) who, for his part, 
reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron." Scott, 
James C. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science 
Review. March 1972, No. 66, p. 92.
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The precondition of becoming a patron is that a village party secretary is 
invariably the most powerful leader in the village, and that he is well connected to 
the "outside world." This power and control of connection serves as the most 
important capital. However, their performances vary from village to village, 
depending on the type of village (single surname, one-dominant-sumame, multi 
surname). The role of lineage patron is relatively more easy to perform in single- 
surname village and one-dominant-sumame village than that in a multi-surname 
village. Here, a party secretary may have to face fierce challenge from other lineages.
The status of seniority in the lineage is also an important factor. If the party 
secretary is the most senior member of the lineage, then he will be much freer in 
carrying out his role as patron. Conversely, if the party secretary is only a junior 
member in the lineage, then he may have to consult his senior members, or he may 
just have to listen to their instructions. These two variants can be found in the three 
types of villages.
To play the patron, for a village party secretary, is not something he does out 
of his generosity but out of obligation. This obligation is also not an ordinary 
obligation but a moral obligation from which he could not escape. As such, the party 
secretary should not expect a reward for performing the role. In fact, he could be 
punished for failing to do so.
The policy of Reform in 1978 is responsible for the resurgence of lineage. The 
household responsibility system drives the peasants to produce more, but it also 
increases the feeling of insecurity among peasants which originates, from competition 
or various disputes. The only possible option is to ally oneself with people of the 
same lineage who are around them. As a matter of fact, it is better to ally with one’s 
own kin rather than with those who are not. In her discussion of clientilism in the 
countryside, the lineage perspective is entirely absent in Oi’s book.65 She contends 
that patron-client relations existing in Chinese village is between cadres and peasants, 
and that this relationship can take place with any member of the village, regardless 
of his or her lineage. Given the intensity of relations within a lineage, it is more 
probable that patron-client relations occur within lineage than outside lineage.
650 i ,  Jean C State and Peasant in Contemporary China. Berkeley, Ca: University o f California Press,
1989
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE RURALISATION OF AUTHORITY
But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes a prince by the favour o f the nobles, 
ought, above everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may 
easily do if  he takes them under his protection." (Machiavelli)
In the preceding chapters, chapters three to six, we have identified four roles which 
a village party secretary should play. He must play two roles which derive from his 
relationship to the state,1 namely the role of state agent and the role entrepreneurial 
agent. On the other end, he also must play two roles which originate from society,2 
the role of moral middleman and the role of lineage patron.
One intriguing question which arises from this dichotomy is: Why is it that 
village party secretaries play the two roles which come from society? Why is it that 
they are unable ignore the role of moral middleman and the role of lineage patron, 
and concentrate on playing the role of state agent and the role of entrepreneurial 
agent? The answer derived from data presented Chapters Five and Six is that village 
party secretaries are subjected to the internal moral pressure, both by their fellow 
villagers and their lineage.
The answer needs further elaboration. Certainly, party secretaries are under 
severe pressure to accept the two roles from society. Yet, they are in a legitimate 
position to ignore it, and stick to the job assigned by the state. In this chapter, I will 
argue that party secretaries, despite the legitimate position, are unable to disregard 
playing the role of moral middleman and the role of lineage patron, because,
*The state is defined as all institutions which are differentiated from the rest o f  its society as to create
identifiable public and private spheres; see Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O ’Leary, Theories o f the State. 
The Politics o f Liberal Dem ocracy. London: Macmillan, 1987, p. 2.
2
"Society" here refers to the rural sector.
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crucially, doing so they will lose their authority to rule the village. Villagers will 
ignore them, disobey them, and on occasions bring pressure to bear for their 
dismissal.
Thus, in order to maintain his authority, it is important for village party 
secretaries to play the additional roles assigned to them by their fellow villagers. I 
identify this as the "ruralisation of authority." The authority of village party 
secretaries are "ruralised" in order to be able to rule and draw obedience from their 
fellow villagers.
To elaborate this argument, this chapter will be divided into four major 
sections. The section on Max Weber, the first section, is to serve as a background 
to the discussion of authority. Weber, indeed, intends that his typology is taken as -an 
ideal-type. The second section forms the core of this chapter in which I describe and 
discuss the nature of the thesis of ruralisation of authority. The following section is 
to understand further the ruralisation of authority within the perspective of Chinese 
peasants in their relations with authorities. The fourth section is to explain the 
incidence of ruralisation by using the theory of structuration.3
I. AUTHORITY ACCORDING TO MAX WEBER
In his short article, "Politics as Vocation," Max Weber asked one simple question: 
When and why do men obey?4 If men or women obey, after all, Weber, then, argues
3There is a vast literature on the theory o f  structuration, see, for example, Colin Hay, "Structure and 
Agency," in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science. London: Macmillan, 
1995, pp. 189-206. This dissertation is following the theory o f structuration as developed by Anthony 
Giddens, the main proponent o f  the theory o f  structuration. On Anthony Giddens, see Ian Craib, Anthony 
Giddens, London: Routledge, 1992. See also: Archer, M argarets. "Morphogenesis versus Structuration, 
on Combining Structure and Action," The British Journal o f  Sociology. 1982, XXXIII(4), pp. 455-483; 
Cohen, Ira J. "Structuration Theory and Social Praxis," Anthony Giddens and J. Turner, eds. Social 
Theory Today. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987, pp. 273-309; Herry Priyono, Bernardino, "Anthony 
Gidden’s Theory o f Structuration," 22 November 1994, Unpublished manuscript; Thompson, John. "The 
Theory o f  Structuration," Held, David & J. Thompson, eds. Social Theory o f  Modern Societies. Anthony 
Giddens and His Critics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 56-76.
“^ Max Weber, "Politics as Vocation," in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology. A new preface by Bryan S. Turner, London: Routledge, 1991, p. 78. For further 
discussion, see Bendix, Reinhard Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait. London: Methuen, 1959; Giddens, 
Anthony Politics and Sociology in the Thought o f Max Weber. London: Macmillan, 1972; Lukes, Stephen 
"Perspectives on Authority," in Joseph Raz (ed.), Authority. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp. 203-217; 
Parkin, F. Max W eber. London: Methuen, 1982.
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that such an act of obedience is to be explained by what he calls "legitimation." 
Legitimation is a method to justify someone’s act of asking obedience in accordance 
to law. Without legitimation, one is forbidden to demand obedience. According to 
Weber, there are three types of legitimation.
The first legitimation is by tradition or - in generation; they simply followed 
the "mores sanctified through unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual 
Weber’s words - "of the eternal yesterday." Men obeyed an authority because it is 
handed down from generation to orientation to conform," according to Weber.5 
Evidently, obedience to authority is a matter of fact. Weber writes: "This is 
’traditional’ domination exercised by patriarch and the patrimonial prince of yore."6
The second is legitimation by one’s personal "gift of grace" or charisma. Men 
obey because they are fascinated by something extraordinary in the person such as 
"revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership." Here, Weber talks 
about "devotion." Obedience, in this case, is given and acquired for free, without any 
further explanation, simply out of devotion. According to Weber, this type of 
legitimation is usually used by prophets, but also by "elected war lord, the 
plebiscitarian ruler, the great demagogue, or the political leader."7
The third is legitimation through rational-legal procedure. Men or women 
obey someone due to the sanctity of the social contract and perceived legitimacy in 
the state via the accountable rule of law. Thus, in contrast to the first ideal-type, they 
do not obey the person but the rules. Weber, indeed, shifts his argument from 
obeying persons to obeying rules. Yet, this is exactly what rationality demands. Men 
and women obey "by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and 
’functional’ competence based on rationally created rules."8 In Weber’s view, this 
kind of legitimation is what is used by the "modem ’servant of the state’ and by all 
those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him."
5Ibid.. pp. 78-79.
6Ibid.. p. 79.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
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What is the relation between legitimation and authority? Authority essentially 
means the right to rule. Therefore, authority comes after legitimation. One cannot 
claim to have an authority before he/she is legitimised to do so. Thus, there is a 
direct relation between legitimation and authority. As a consequence, there are also 
three types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational.
The legal-rational authority is key to Weber’s conceptualization of authority 
in a modem state. This is to answer the question on the authority of state officials: 
On what basis can they draw obedience from the population? In his view, state 
officials or "servant of state" can demand obedience from the population merely 
because the law of the state confer him the right to do so. In other words, the 
authority of state officials is legal-rational authority. If one obeys a state official, 
he/she does not obey the person but obeys the law which is created by the state.
Thus, what ultimately matters most is the state. Weber defines the state as "a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory."9 Clearly, at the core of this definition lies 
the sovereignty in the state’s claimed territory and the fact that the state can expect 
voluntary compliance with their rule or need to resort to coercion. In other words, 
the state is the legitimate basis for authority. Because it enjoys political legitimacy, 
the state creates laws, and on the basis of the laws, the state expects compliance. In 
Weber’s view, apparently, this is sufficient to explain the source of the authority of 
state officials over the population.
The fundamental question which is not sufficiently addressed by Weber, 
however, is the legitimacy of the state itself. What legitimises the state that it can 
confer authority on its officials? Why does the state have such power? Should the 
citizens obey the authority conferred by the state if the state itself is not legitimate 
(for instance, a state which is created through coup d’etaf). Weber evidently does not 
delve into this matter which is, as a matter of fact, a philosophical problem for 
philosophers.10
9Ibid.. p. 78.
10See, for instance, Anscombe, G .E.M . "On the Source o f  the Authority o f  the State," in Joseph Raz 
(ed.) Authority. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp. 142-171.
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The contribution of Weber, however, is that he provides us with an ideal-type 
which is useful to make analysis of the phenomenon of authority in a modern state. 
In our case, Weber demonstrates that, in a modem state, citizens do not obey 
traditional or charismatic authority but to a legal-rational authority which is 
sanctioned by the state. Citizens must obey all state officials who are conferred with 
authority by the state. This sovereign principle is to be held in the state’s territory, 
in the cities as well as in the countryside.
H. THE THESIS OF RURALISATION OF AUTHORITY
After the introduction of Reform (1978), as we have seen in Chapters Three and 
Four, party secretaries are assigned with the job as agents, first they have to 
implement policies on agriculture and secondly, they have to lead villagers toward 
xiaokang. Party secretaries are - as I term it - to play the role of the state agent and 
the role of entrepreneurial agent. Their exact job is to mobilise their fellow villagers 
toward the goal set by the central leadership. They do not have to do anything more 
than that.
If party secretaries stick to this job description, there would have been no 
question of the ruralisation of authority. Party secretaries, however, must pay 
attention to the demands of their fellow villagers. The strategy of nominal 
encapsulation not only transforms the role of cadres but also peasants’ behaviour. 
Liberated from different sorts of constraints and limitation, peasants become more 
assertive to pursue their interests. They want their party secretary to become a 
middleman who does not pressure them with demands from the state but who shows 
benevolence and mercy by lessening the demands. The members of his lineage also 
want the party secretary to provide them with special favouritism.
Party secretaries, actually, are demanded to play the role of moral middleman 
and the role of lineage patron. From the state point of view, these are roles which 
subvert the interest of the state. By playing the role of moral middleman, party 
secretaries do not fully implement the policies from the state on agriculture. By 
playing the role of lineage patron, they even further undermine the state’s policies. 
The two roles from society are considered by the state as illegal.
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Thus, we have a situation where party secretaries who are pulled in two 
directions simultaneously. Village party secretaries embody precisely the interface 
between the state and society. Being at the interface of two conflicting structures, they 
are squeezed from two sides. On the one hand, they must satisfy the demand "from 
above" (the state) which has conferred power on them; yet, on the other hand, they 
also must satisfy the demands "from below" (the village community) with whom they 
shared a community life. They must simultaneously perform the two roles which 
come "from above" (state agent and entrepreneurial agent) faithfully, and at the same 
time, the two roles "from below" (moral middleman and lineage patron) 
satisfactorily.
Caught in the middle, a party secretary has two possible options: he may 
either lean toward the state or toward society. Both options bring different 
consequences. If he leans heavily toward the state, he will be praised as "model 
secretary" but ostracised by his fellow villagers. If he lean toward society, his fellow 
villagers will love him but the state will punish him. These two options are not ideal 
for any party secretary who would like to stay in his power. The incentive to become 
party secretary is quite strong as the position provides wealth, power, and status.11
The best strategy for village party secretaries is to adopt a middle ground 
position: to try and play all the four roles without harming oneself. This will make 
them continue to play the roles "from above," the role of state agent and the role of 
entrepreneurial agent and yet they will also agree to play the roles "from below," the 
role of moral middleman and the role of lineage patron. Obviously, party secretaries 
concede to the pressure from their fellow villagers, or the pressure "from below." 
Yet, this is perfectly in line with the advice given by Machiavelli:12
"But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes a prince by the favour of 
the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek to win the people over to
^See, Yuoxiang Yan, "The Impact o f Rural Reform on Economic and Social Stratification in a 
Chinese Village," in The Australian Journal o f Chinese Affairs. No. 27, January 1992, pp. 1-24; Odgaard, 
Ole "Entrepreneurs and Elite Formation in Rural China," in Ibid.. No. 28, July 1992, pp. 89-108. Both 
authors demonstrate that, invariably, rural cadres and the party secretaries, occupy the highest place in the 
social stratification in the villages in China since Reform. It is logical, therefore, if this becomes a strong 
incentive to stay in power as long as possible.
12Machiavelli, The Prince. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 1993, Ninth Chapter, pp. 75-76.
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himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them under his protection."
The acceptance of the two roles "from below" greatly helps strengthen their
authority in their villages. Villagers more readily listen to them, and carry out their
instructions. The key to understand this is the fact that party secretaries are usually
local peasants. Peasants tend not to obey to one of their fellow peasants, despite the
fact that he is granted authority by the state. If a village party secretary would like
to induce obedience from his fellow villagers, then he must establish his authority by
agreeing to meet their demands. (See Section III below for further elaboration)
In this dissertation I describe this process as the "ruralisation of authority."
It is a situation where a party secretary agrees to take up the roles demanded by his
fellow villagers in order to enhance their authority. The "ruralisation of authority"
does not undermine or diminish authority. The image of ruralisation of authority is
like one map superimposed on another. The first map does not disappear by the
superimposition, yet the outcome is a new map having an entirely novel appearance.
The same is true with ruralisation of authority; the authority granted by the state is
not totally undermined, only ruralised.
Currently, there exist party branches which are categorised by the central
leadership as "middle ground" (zhongjian zhuangtai). These are party secretaries who
do their job - according to CCP’s central leadership - neither excellently nor poorly.
The Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee (1994) states as follows:13
"The building of leading bodies of middle-ground villages should be 
strengthened, their economic development should be speeded up and greater 
efforts should be made to build spiritual civilization in these villages to attain 
the objective of enabling their residents to live a more comfortable life." 
(emphasis added)
What does "middle-ground villages" refer to? Zhong Zhushan in his article 
published in the journal Liaowang described party branches under middle-ground
13"CCP Circular on Strengthening Rural Primary and Grass-Roots Organizations," in SWB, 2 
December 1994, FE/2168 G/4. This translation uses the term "average village"; I deliberately alter the 
translation.
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category as follows:14
"Party branches under the middle ground situation, in general, can implement 
Party’s line and policies, their leaders are quite sound, and the party branches 
work quite hard. Nevertheless, for various different reasons, their works are 
ordinary (vi ban hua). their coagulation ability and appeal ability are not 
strong."
Compare this description with that given by Wang Guangqian. Party branches
at the "middle ground," according to him, displayed five characteristics:15
(1) the structure of the leadership team is not excellent, (2) party activities are 
not quite effective, (3) activities within the party are limited, (4) the members 
of the leadership have little enthusiasm, (5) no breakthrough in developing 
"commodity economy."
These middle-ground party branches clearly demonstrate a mixture of 
willingness to implement policies from the state and also a readiness to compromise 
it. In Zhong Zhushan’s words, "their coagulation ability" is low, or in Wang 
Guangqian’s words, "the members of the leadership have little enthusiasm." I take 
this as an official admission of the prevalence of party secretaries compromising their 
authority. This admission is significant in that it underlines the thesis of ruralisation 
of authority.
HI. RURALISATION OF AUTHORITY AND PEASANTS
The argument of ruralisation of authority is that the authority of village party 
secretaries is strengthened as soon as he agrees to play the two roles "from below." 
This immediately begs the question: why should the authority be strengthened?
"filiis description is the result o f  an investigation o f  1358 village party branches in 12 provinces 
(Hebei, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, 
and Qinghai) where 32 .6  per cent belong to category "good," 59.5  per cent "fair," and 7 .9 per cent "not 
good." See, Zhong Zhushan "Nongcun iiceng dang zuzhi xianzhuang tanxi." (Analysis o f  current situation 
o f  village grass-root party organization) Liaowang (Jing), 1990, No. 1, pp. 12-14 in Zhongguo renmin 
daxue shubao ziliao zhongxin. 1990, No. 3 , pp. 133-134.
This article is based on his investigation over 519 village party branches under Fengcheng City 
(Jiangxi Province). He found, in 1986, 51 % per cent o f  519 village party branches were under the category 
o f "middle ground." Wang Guangqian, "Dui nongcun zhongjian zhuangtai dang zuzhi de diaocha vu sikao" 
(An investigation and reflection on village party organizations at the middle ground) Lilun daobao 
(Nanchang), 1992, No. 6, pp. 41-42. in Zhongguo renmin daxue shubao ziliao zhongxin. 1992, No. 7 , pp. 
159-160.
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Authority, in Weber’s view, is to be accepted, and not to be strengthened or 
compromised. To him, authority in a modem state is conferred by the state as an 
institution with the highest authority in a territory. There are other possibilities for 
legitimating an authority: by "tradition'' and by "charisma." But, the authority of state 
officials are not to be legitimated in that manner. As a modem institution, the state 
is to operate according to rational-legal procedure. Thus, state officials can only have 
authority which is legitimated through rational-legal procedure.
This kind of legitimation is rejected by peasants because peasants do not want 
to obey a peasant who is legitimated by an "outsider." Indeed, the state is a very far 
outsider as peasants used to say that "the Heaven is high and the emperor is far 
away." State-legitimated officials, in peasants’ eyes, are considered to be an 
imposition from outside. This is even truer when the official concerned is someone 
whom peasants dislike. To the peasants, a piece of paper does not prove someone’s 
authority.
Peasants, however, will readily obey anyone who can deliver material benefit 
for them, irrespective of the source of authority. "Material benefit" may range from 
health to riches, from having sons to having good harvests. As Geertz reports it in 
a village in Java (Indonesia): a religious leader, kiiaii. gains more respect and 
authority because he can deliver a promise of heaven to the villagers.16 Bailey also 
shows that peasants in a village in Orissa (India) followed a "ch ief because he can 
provide them with protection and largesse. They leave him without "an agony of heart 
searching," if he fails to do so.17
Thus, a peasant with an authority from the state must also convince his fellow 
peasants with the same strategy. In other words, he must be able to deliver "material 
benefit" from the source of his authority, the state. As made clear in Chapters Five 
and Six, peasants in contemporary China have three unnegotiable demands - namely 
grain, money and male babies. By delivering benefits in this three areas, the party 
secretaries can enhance their authority in their village. Villagers, in turn, are more
16Clifford Geertz, "The changing role o f  the cultural broker: the Javanese kijaji," Comparative Studies 
in History and Society. 1960; No. 2: pp. 228-249.
17Bailey, F.G. "The Peasant View o f  Bad Life," in Teodor Shanin (ed.) Peasants and Peasant Society, 
Fourth Edition, Harmnondsworth: Penguin, 1971, p. 306.
167
ready to cooperate with them, and more willing to obey them.
To understand this phenomenon we must take Weber’s theory of authority 
critically. By taking a Weberian approach, some scholars tend to hold the view that 
as long as it runs against the state’s legitimate policies, it is an act of corruption.18 
This Weberian perspective of authority is too one-sided, or as Stephen Lukes has 
argued, "only taking account of perspective A," namely the perspective of the 
ruler.19 Weber’s theory of authority, apparently, grows out of his preoccupation 
about domination (Herrschaft). That is why - as Parkin contends - Weber never asks 
"whether the legitimation put out by traditional, charismatic and legal-rational 
authorities differed in the degree to which they were actually endorsed by the 
masses."20
The endorsement by the masses is particularly stressed in the thesis of 
ruralisation of authority. Richard Friedman systematically elaborates this argument 
in his article. He argues that the authority implies "some mutually recognised 
relationship giving the one the right to command or speak and the other the duty to 
obey." He continues: "Authority thus involves a form of influence that can only be 
exercised from within a certain kind of normative arrangement accepted by both 
parties."21 Friedman clearly emphasises the mutual aspect in the authority relation, 
and by doing so, fundamentally corrects Weber’s theory that authority is a one-way 
traffic.
As this approach emphasises the notion of mutual recognition, Friedman adds 
that recognition may be based on a very wide range of possible "marks" or 
credentials of authority - "office, social station, property, ’great’ power, pedigree, 
religious claims, ’miracles’ (Augustine), etc."22 In other words, the ruled do not
The clearest example, see Oi, Jean C. "Partial Market Reform and Corruption in Rural China," 
Richard Baum, (ed.) Reform and Reaction in Post-Mao China. London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 143-161.
19Lukes, op .cit.. p. 207,
20Parkin, F Max W eber. London: Methuen, 1982, p. 78.
Friedman, Richard B. "On the Concept o f Authority in Political Philosophy," in R. Flathman (ed.),
Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1973, p. 134.
22Ibid. p. 133.
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obey a ruler if he is not able to demonstrate any mark of authority. This is exactly 
a point which is missing in Weber’s theory of authority.
What are the criteria by which these "marks" are recognised as marks of 
authority? Friedman is silent about this. "Is it just up to the parties in an authority 
relationship to fix on anyone they wish to recognise as authoritative?" thus criticises 
Lukes.23
This question is taken up by Richard Flathman who argues that the authority 
relation has to be placed within a wider "practice" of authority. Here, Flathman 
introduces a new element in the argument on authority. The authority relation does 
not hang in the blue sky, but is "grounded in shared values and beliefs to which we 
are referring as the authoritative. "24 Obviously, Flathman emphasises the importance 
of values and beliefs which differ from one community to another. The marks of 
authority are not universal as Weber thought; they are determined by the community.
Thus, from Friedman and Flathman, we learn two new components of 
authority: first, authority is a mutual recognition; and secondly, this recognition is 
grounded on values and beliefs characteristic to the community. In this new 
conceptualization, authority is understood neither as something imposed nor 
ahistorical. As a consequence, any analysis of authority should take into account of 
the perspective of the ruled and their values and beliefs. In our case, to understand 
authority in a village, it is imperative to find out how peasants accept the authority 
and with what criteria.
We are now in a better position to understand why authority from the state is 
not readily accepted by peasants. As authority is a mutual recognition, not one-way 
traffic as Weber conceived it, peasants have the right to determine the "marks of 
authority" that their village party secretary should have. As mentioned earlier, to 
peasants, the mark of authority of a village party secretary is the ability to defend 
grain, to reduce taxes, and to have sons. Peasants find it difficult to obey a party 
secretary who is unable to do so. Although a party secretary is conferred with
23Lukes, op .cit.. p. 209.
24Flathman, Richard E. The Practice o f Political Authority. Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 
1980, p. 124.
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authority by the state, it does not necessarily mean that he will be able to incur 
obedience from peasants.
At this juncture, it is appropriate to emphasise that peasants are not "a sack 
of potatoes,"25 who just sit passively and take whatever given to them. Peasants 
scrutinise their leader, and see what he is able to do for them. They may approve 
him, yet may also not approve him. On the dynamic nature of peasants, Scott aptly 
describes it:26
"The inevitability of the weather has not prevented every group of traditional 
cultivators from personifying this natural force or from developing rituals to 
influence its course or, when their efforts have failed, from cursing their fate. 
Thus, far from removing it to the realm of the inevitable, the peasantry has 
historically considered even the weather t o . be amenable to human 
manipulation. If there is any ’mystification’ of natural laws in traditional 
societies, it is in the direction of bringing them under human control, not the 
reverse."
If this assertion is correct, why is it that peasants in China only recently can 
ruralise the authority of their party secretaries? The answer to this question cannot be 
separated from the strategy of nominal encapsulation adopted by the central 
leadership. The dissolution of the three-tier commune structure liberated peasants 
from the control by party secretaries. Secondly, the removal of class labels further 
freed peasants’ mind from psychological constraints. These two factors combine to 
make peasants more assertive in demanding their rights. This newly found 
assertiveness is, indeed, instrumental in shaping the authority of the village party 
secretaries.
IV. TOWARD AN EXPLANATION OF RURALISATION OF AUTHORITY
Why is it that ruralisation of authority is possible in Chinese villages after Reform 
(1978)? Why is it possible that village party secretaries opt to play both the roles
25According to Marx, peasants are "barbarians in civilizations," or "anachronism in history," or 
"potatoes in a sack that form a sack o f  potatoes." Marx, Karl "The Eighteenth Brumaire o f Louis 
Bonaparte," in Selected Works. Vol. I, pp. 302-308.
26Scott, James C. Weapons o f  the Weak. Everyday Forms o f Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985, p. 324.
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"from above" and those "from below" notwithstanding controls from both parties? 
To explain the ruralisation of authority, the theory of structuration offers an important 
insight. I will start by briefly outlining Giddens’ theory of structuration.27
At the heart of the theory structuration lies the notion of the human agency or 
actor. In Giddens’ view, human actors’ intrinsic feature is that they can act 
otherwise.28 This is directly linked to what he calls "the power to intervene in a 
course of events," 29 or to "make a difference." Giddens writes that "an agent 
ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to ’make a difference,’ that is, to 
exercise some sort of power.”30 Where does this power come from? To clarify 
point, Cohen writes that "power in this generic sense is logically prior to all matters 
regarding subjectivity or the reflexive monitoring of conduct."31
Giddens uses one term to describe this power: "transformative capacity,"32 
which, simply put, means that human actor has the capacity to transform some aspect 
of a process or event. A case in point is the behaviour of subordinates in an 
administrative system. Although the superior possess the ability to control and 
discipline, his subordinate can evades it, even within a highly repressive form of 
organization. "The more tightly-knit and inflexible the formal relations of authority 
within an organization, in fact, the more the possible openings for circumventing 
them." 33 Giddens calls it "the dialectic of control."
At this juncture, some commentators say that this capacity implies that all
27For useful summary o f  Giddens’ thought, see Cohen, Ira J. Structuration Theory. Anthony Giddens 
and the Constitution o f  Social Life. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989; Craib, Ian Anthony Giddens 
London: Routledge, 1992.
28Giddens, Anthony The Constitution o f Society. Cambridge: Polity, 1984, p. 14.
29Ibid. pp. 14-16. See also, Giddens’ other books: Central Problems in Social Theory: Action. 
Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis. London: Macmillan, 1979, p. 88; New Rules of 
Sociological Method: A Positive Critique o f  Interpretive Sociologies. London: Hutchinson, 1976, pp. 110- 
111)
3ftThe Constitution o f Society, p. 14.
31Cohen, op .cit.. p. 24.
32The Constitution o f  Society, p. 15.
33Central Problem o f Social Theory, p. 147.
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actors exploit a generous degree of freedom in their conduct.34 It seems that this
freedom is linked to what Giddens calls a "stratified" conception of the actor, or
agent. There are, he argues, three levels involved: the level of motivation, the level
of rationalisation of action, and the level of the reflexive monitoring of action, each
of which are grounded in unconscious, "discursive consciousness" and "practical
consciousness," respectively.35 The level of the reflexive monitoring of action is
central in day-to-day social encounter. "Actors not only monitor continuously the flow
of their activities and expect others to do the same for their own; they also routinely
monitor aspects, social and physical, of the contexts in which they move."36
The discussion so far seems to indicate that structure does not exist at all. To
what extent structure plays any role? By re-defining the term "structure,"37 the
answer is both "constraining and enabling."38 While human agency is subjugated to
structure, structure also empowers human agency. To explain this, Giddens uses the
analogy of language:39
Language exists as a ’structure,’ syntactical and semantic, only insofar as 
there are some kind of traceable consistencies in what people say, in the 
speech acts which they perform. From this aspect, to refer to rules of syntax, 
for example, is to refer to the reproduction of ’like elements’; on the other 
hand, such rules also generate the totality of speech-acts which is the spoken 
language.lt is this dual aspect of structure, as both inferred from observation 
of human doings, yet as also operating as a medium whereby those doings are 
made possible, that has to be grasped through the notions of structuration and 
reproduction.
Giddens, evidently, is not of the opinion that "structure" and "agency" are two 
different things for one reason, namely structure is never external to subject, or that
■^Archer, Margaret loc.cit. p. 459.
35Giddens modifies Freud’s model o f the psyche: id, ego, and super-ego.
36The Constitution o f  Society, p. 5
37In Giddens’ vocabulary, "structure" is defined as "rules and resources, recursively implicated in 
the reproduction o f social systems." See, Ibid.. p. 377.
38Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 69.
*3Q
New Rules o f  Sociological Method, pp. 121-122.
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there is a dualism of structure and agent.40 The comments made by Cohen can, 
perhaps, further elucidate this: "The first thing that must be understood with regard 
to all concepts pertaining to structure in structuration theory is that structure qua 
structure does not produce patterns, nor does it actively coordinate and control social 
systems."41 When Giddens speaks about structure, however, it is always about "the 
duality of structure" where structure is both produced by human action and the 
medium of human action.
It is very difficult to sum up the theory of structuration. The attempt made by 
Craib is as follows: The theory of structuration, in the end, is the process of 
production, reproduction and transformation of structure.42 The position of human 
actor is at the centre of this process.
Theory of structuration, as such, helps to explain the acceptance of four roles. 
Party secretaries, being human agents, are perfectly aware of the existence of the 
structure. Firstly, they certainly know the two roles "from above" that they must 
perform in their villages. Nevertheless, one cannot expect a party secretary to solely 
do the jobs prescribed by the Party. Party secretaries, as actors, are definitely 
controlled by their superior, but this control does not always produce the desired 
outcome.
The same is true with moral obligation imposed "from below." Party 
secretaries are fully aware of the demands made by their fellow villagers. They fulfil 
the demands, yet they cannot always do it because such an action will harm them. 
Like in the above case, party secretaries often have to defy the demands of their 
fellow villagers.
The issue here, therefore, is not that the superior of those party secretaries (or 
the elders in the village) is not strict enough, but dialectic of control. As human 
actors having the transformative capacity, they indeed can "make a difference." Party 
secretaries themselves, following their "reflexive monitoring of action," decide when 
and how they will play the roles "from above" or those "from below."
40The Constitution o f  Society, p. 25.
4lCohen, op .cit... p. 199.
42See, Craib, op .cit.. p. 44.
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Thus, it does not make sense to say that party secretaries always obey the 
Party, neither does it to say that they capitulate to the pressure of fellow villagers all 
the time. Party secretaries can agree to the state as well as to their fellow villagers. 
Although the four roles appear to be conflicting to each other, village party secretary 
can play them.
Giddens, as part of the theory of structuration, also speaks about "the 
unintended consequences." Contrary to Robert Merton’s view, unintended 
consequences are as much the result of action as intended consequences because they 
would not occur if the action did not take place. "The unintended consequences are 
regularly ’distributed’ as a by-product of regularized behaviour reflexively sustained 
as such by its participants."43 The clearest example given by Giddens is one about 
an individual who, in his intention, only wants to illuminate the room. As a result of 
this action, not only that the room is illuminated but also a prowler who flees down 
the road, is caught by a policeman.44 Within this perspective, ruralisation of 
authority is just the unintended consequences. Party secretaries may never intend to 
ruralise the authority, but as soon as they agree to play the four roles, they bring 
about the ruralisation of authority.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have tried to answer one question: why a village party secretary 
must play four roles? I argue that, although it is the right thing to do, a village party 
secretary cannot afford to play only the roles assigned by the state, but also the other 
roles demanded by society. A village party secretary, being located at the interface 
of the state and society, is squeezed from both sides. To overcome this, he has little 
option but to allow his authority to be "ruralised."
The key to understand this situation is the fact that he is a local peasant. 
Peasants will not obey one of them if he does not bring real material benefit and
43The Constitution o f  Society, p. 14.
^ Ibid.. p. 10.
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prevent harm caused by the state. Not to meet this demand will lead to ostracism or 
even retaliation, and this will eventually lead to the loss of authority. Thus, if they 
want to stay in power, it is imperative on the part of party secretaries to agree to take 
up the roles demanded by their fellow villagers.
Authority in a modem state, according to Weber, is something to be accepted, 
and not to be negotiated or "strengthened." In the light of this ideal-type, I term what 
is happening in Chinese villages after Reform (1978) as "ruralisation of authority." 
It is authority granted by the state, yet to be effective it has to be "ruralised" or 
adapted to the peasants’ demand. Here, I acknowledge the strength of peasants of 
pursuing their interests, who, under the situation of nominal encapsulation, become 
increasingly assertive.
To explain the phenomenon of ruralisation of authority, I rely on the theory 
of structuration. The behaviour of village party secretaries is one which shows both 
the dependency and independency of the human agency from structure. A party 
secretary uses his authority according to the state, and yet he also accepts the 
demands of his fellow villagers.
The ruralisation of authority is only possible after the adoption of the strategy 
of nominal encapsulation after 1978. As peasants. are freed from radical 
encapsulation, they become more assertive, and therefore, manage to "ruralise" the 
authority of their leader. Before Reform, there was only clientilism (as argued by 
Jean Oi) which was effective to mitigate the power of rural cadres but not to ruralise 
the authority of their authorities.
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CONCLUSION
Our study on the roles of village party secretaries will conclude with the discussion 
of three issues. The first one is the review of major findings in terms of the roles that 
a village party secretary plays. The second one concerns theoretical implication of the 
finding of this research. In the last section, I will discuss' the political implication of 
the ruralisation of authority.
I. THE FOUR ROLES
The four roles of a village party secretary derive from two sources: ’’from above" and 
"from below." With respect to that "from above," a village party secretary has to 
play the role of state agent and the role of entrepreneurial agent. The role of state 
agent refers to a role of implementing policies to develop agriculture and develop 
"modem" society. Or, in CCP’s terminology, a role for developing "agriculture 
work." The role of entrepreneurial agent refers to a role of accelerating the economy 
of the village towards xiaokang by becoming an entrepreneur himself. The CCP’s 
terminology for this task is "to take a lead towards prosperity" or daitou zhifu.
The two roles "from above" have developed gradually, in response to the 
evolving situation in China. The role of state agent, in the beginning of Reform, 
begins with a role which refers to leadership in ideology and politics, but develops 
into primus inter pares where the party secretary is posited as the "core" with other 
leaders of mass organizations surrounding him. Here, the Leninist propensity of the 
central leadership, especially Song Ping, is crucial in re-orienting the role of state 
agent. The role of entrepreneurial agent was initially designed to allow party 
secretaries to set up enterprises by which the villagers would be expected to follow 
suit; it was eventually integrated into a wider scheme of developing the economy of 
villages to the level of xiaokang. In this case, the spectacular development of village 
enterprises and their economic potential have become the main drive towards the 
assignment of the role of the entrepreneurial agent.
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With regard to the roles "from below," a village party secretary has to play 
the role of moral middleman and the role of lineage patron. In playing the role of 
moral middleman, he must accommodate himself to the demands of his fellow 
villagers who are not willing or resistant to the state policies, especially policies on 
grain, taxes, and birth-control. In playing the role of lineage patron, he must 
accommodate himself to the demands of his lineage who also resist similar state 
policies, by giving them special preferences over those who do not belong to the 
lineage.
These two roles also do not come into being suddenly, but develop over time. 
As peasants are liberated by the strategy of nominal encapsulation, they become 
increasingly independent and assertive. Peasants, slowly but surely, make their party 
secretaries listen to their demands, something unheard of before Reform.
There are two different types of control mechanism. The two roles "from 
above" are carried out under administrative control, using a reward and punishment 
system, by the township or the county authorities. From time to time, the central 
leadership conducts a rectification campaign. The two roles "from below" are carried 
out under the moral obligation rooted in the very nature of the village as a moral 
community. The discourses on renqing and fumuguan informs the party secretary that 
he must play the role of moral middleman, whereas the discourse on lineage solidarity 
informs him of the role of lineage patron. Villagers, in extreme cases, will use threats 
and violence to pressurise their party secretary.
The thesis on "ruralisation of authority" is a term to capture the phenomenon 
where a village leader, given the pressures, is to play both roles, those which come 
"from above" and those "from below." This may deviate from the ideal-type of Max 
Weber, yet it adds a new perspective to our understanding of authority in villages in 
China after Reform (1978).
H. THEORETICAL IMPLICATION
This study on the roles of village party secretaries has several important theoretical 
implications. First of all, this demonstrated that party secretaries behave according 
to both the state directives and society’s demand. The thesis of the ruralisation of
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authority helps us to understand the centrality of human agency in the face of 
structure.
Secondly, the relations between the state and society should be conceived as 
one which is connected with myriads of "knots" which are occupied by party 
secretaries. This dissertation shows the crucial position of party secretaries who 
connects the state and society. The state cannot reach society without going through 
the party secretaries, and society cannot permeate the state without passing through 
the party secretaries. These party secretaries interweave both structures.
Thus, it is not that the state is "fragmented" or that society is "weak" which 
cause problems to arise in Chinese politics, nor is it that the concept of "state-society" 
being too Western-oriented that causes our failure to understand the dynamics of the 
interaction between the state and society in China. As the relations between the state 
and society are linked by knots (there are about 730.00 party secretaries in the whole 
of China), the focus of attention should be directed on these knots, and not on the 
working of xitong or organizational systems.
Thirdly, the concept of "Leninist party" characterised by the spirit of 
revolution and high-discipline is no longer tenable in China after Reform. Party 
branches and their party secretaries, as this study demonstrates, are neither dedicated 
to revolution nor highly disciplined. The CCP is more and more concerned about 
"modernization" by giving more emphasis on political stability and economic 
development. Perhaps it is more fitting to label the CCP as the "development Party" 
similar to those found in many developing countries, especially in single-party 
countries. Fourthly, the concept of "peasant resistance" as proposed by James 
Scott should be amended. Peasants do resist the state’s attempt to extract agricultural 
surpluses, yet peasants can also accept some policies of the state if they are 
implemented by paying attention to their feelings. This study shows that party 
secretaries are crucial in mitigating the peasant resistance. Indeed, the concept of 
"peasant resistance" itself is too large.
m , THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF RURALISATION OF AUTHORITY
These points raise the following issues: any attempt by local leaders to alter the
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operation of their authority, will inevitably influence the operation of the state. More 
specifically, it will bring an impact on the relations between the state and society. 
This section considers the political implications of the ruralisation of authority in the 
countryside in China. I will argue that there is one important political implication: as 
ruralisation of authority is an attempt to reconcile the roles "from above" and the 
roles "from below," it ultimately also functions as "shock absorber" between the state 
and the peasantry. It absorbs the shocks which may come upon the society from the 
state or which may come upon the state from society. In this way, I am assuming the 
clash between the state and the peasantry, each with its own interests to protect.
A. The clash between the state and the peasantry
Peasants’ resentment against the state is directed toward state’s policies which, in 
their view, make their lives intolerable. As we have seen in Chapter Five, peasants 
resent what they call "san vao" or three demands: the demand of grain, the demand 
of life (birth control), and the demand for money. These are three things which are 
vital to the peasants. Grain, to the peasants, is vital for three needs (according to Eric 
Wolf): a caloric minimum, a replacement fund and a ceremonial fund.1 Thus, 
peasants must produce grain more than they need for food which they use for seed 
for next crops and to maintain social relations. These needs "are both functionally and 
logically prior to the demands of the outsider, whether lord or merchant," thus says 
Wolf.2 An old-age Chinese proverb, indeed, says: "The peasants take their grain as 
heaven."3 Peasants, so anxious to protect the grain surplus, used every strategy to 
defuse state’s action.4
‘W olf, Eric Peasants. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-hall, 1966.
2Ibid.. p. 13.
3In Chinese: min vi shi wei tian
4According to W olf, peasants used two groups o f strategies to protect their grain: 
singlestranded (which consists o f  dyadic and horizontal, dyadic and vertical, polyadic 
and vertical, polyadic and horizontal) and multistranded (dyadic and horizontal, 
polyadic and horizontal, dyadic and vertical, polyadic and vertical). See, Ibid.. pp. 
60-95.
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Birth-control in Chinese language is jihua shengvu meaning "planned giving 
birth." If that is the case, it may not cause so much anger among peasants as they 
may plan as they like. "Planned giving birth" is actually birth-control where peasants 
are controlled to have only one child if the first child is a boy, or two children if the 
first child is a girl. To have a son, to the peasants, is a traditionally instilled belief 
(zhong nan qing nu). This belief, however, is actually rooted in real economic 
calculation. To have a son means additional labour force, and in the long term, he 
also serves as old-age insurance.5
Money is becoming more and more important for peasants as there are more 
and more goods which are essential for their life but they themselves cannot make. 
These are industrial products such as radio, television, bicycle, kitchen utensils, and 
certainly, fertilisers and plastic sheet. The phenomenon of "price scissors," however, 
puts peasants in the disadvantaged position as the term of trade of grain and the 
industrial products is biased toward the industrial products. One commentator argues 
that "agricultural terms of trade had deteriorated so badly in recent years that from 
1989 onwards an inverse relationship was observed to exist between the gross 
agricultural value of output (GAVO) and farm income."6
To the state, it is impossible not to impose those demands on peasants, namely
grain, birth control, and taxes. Surplus of grain, for example, is essential to feed the
urbanites who form as crucial factor in the maintenance of political stability in China. 
Riots or demonstrations in big cities (such as in the Spring 1989) will seriously 
undermine the authority of the state, and worse, will cause its collapse.7
5This is documented in White, Tyrene "The Population Factor: China’s Family
Planning Policy in the 1990s," in William A. Joseph (ed.), China Briefing. 1991. 
Boulder: W estview Press, 1992, pp. 103-106.
6He also gives an example: "In Hunan province, for instance, GAVO rose by
4.4% in 1992 over the previous year, but peasant income only recorded a negligible
0.7% real growth." See, James K. Kung, "Peasants in a ’Hot Pot’: Pushing the
Limits o f  a Biased Strategy against Agriculture," in Maurice Brosseau and Lo Chi 
Kin (eds.), China Review 1994. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995,
p. 11.6.
•J
On the centrality o f  cities in the politics in developing countries, see Huntington, 
Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1968, p. 73-74.
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Economically, the increase of grain procurement will reduce import of grain, and 
eventually alleviate the state budget.
Birth-control is not less essential than surplus of grain to the state’s 
maintenance of power. Unchecked growth of population has a very wide repercussion 
for China, economically, politically, and socially. Economically, the rapid growth of 
population8 will certainly undermine the economic growth which so far, has 
developed rapidly (9 per cent a year). Socially, the increase of rural population will 
lead to a flood of rural migration to cities, and put severe pressure on social services 
in the cities such as health, education, transportation, etc. Politically, as a 
consequence from social impact, there will grow dissatisfaction among the urbanites 
as they see their well-being is threatened by the coming of the rural migrants.9 This 
dissatisfaction will add more oil to the fire of dissatisfaction which have arisen due 
to economic reason.10
Taxes are undoubtedly linked to the survival of the state. In China, peasants 
pay two types of taxes, in kind (grain) and money. These taxes are to be delivered 
to the State, the township and the collective.11 The demand for taxes is not only 
vital to the coffer of the national state, but also to the survival of the local state 
(township and village). Robert Ash points out that recently "departments and regions"
8According to James Kung, between 1978-1984 rural population grew at 0.28% but shot up during 
1985-1992 to 0.92% . See his article, op .cit.. p. 11.12
9Yan Yunxiang "Dislocation, Reposition and Restratification: Structural Changes in Chinese Society,"  
in Maurice Brosseau and Lo Chi Kin (eds.), China Review 1994. Hong Kong: The Chinese University 
Press, 1995, p. 15.8.
10For further elaboration on the problem o f population in China, see Lester Brown, Who Will Feed 
China. London: Earthscan, 1995, pp. 35-43.
^Editor "Shenme shi heli fiidan? Shenme shi luan tanpai?." (What is reasonable burden? What is 
arbitrary fee?) Nongmin ribao. 26 January 1991, p. 1. This editorial distinguishes three types o f  taxes: to 
the State, to the collective, and to the township which are to be considered as "reasonable burden." Taxes 
to the State: agricultural taxes (nongye shuiJ. village special production tax (nongcun techan shui). tax on 
slaughtering animals (tuzai shui’). Those are engaged in commerce, have to pay product tax (chanpin shui). 
business tax (vinve shuil. and income tax (suode shui). Tax delivered to the collective are used for 
accumulation fund (goniiiin). public welfare fund (gongyijin). and costs o f administration (guanlifei) from 
which cadres draw their salary. Tax delivered to the township is used to finance schools managed by both 
village and township, birth control, provision for servicemen’s families, provision for households o f  old 
persons with no child or infirm to enjoy five guarantees (wubaohu). and training for the people’s militia.
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also impose different kinds of levies upon peasants.12
Thus, the state and peasants are locked in continual battle. Peasants try to 
protect their surplus, and the state struggles to extract surplus as much as possible 
from peasants.
B. The ruralisation of authority as "shock absorber"
Party secretaries who agree to play the role of moral middleman, help to reduce anger 
and outrage of the peasants toward the state. In playing the role, party secretaries 
avoid using pressure, and use persuasion instead. This certainly takes a lot of time. 
A survey in six villages under Hengyang City (Hunan Province), for instance,13 
shows that birth control and disputes among villagers consume most of cadres’ time, 
44.7% for birth control, and 16.8% for handling disputes. There are three other 
sensitive areas in which rural cadres also must spend a lot of time, namely collecting 
grain (12%), collecting fees (10,5%), agriculture (10.3%).
The techniques of persuasion helps to cool down peasants’ anger. Yet this does 
not necessarily mean that party secretaries simply give in to peasants’ demand. 
Although they allow peasants to delay the delivery of grain and the payment of taxes, 
they do not release peasants from the obligation. They, eventually, must pay; this is 
evidenced by the steady flow of grain and taxes.
Party secretaries also use indirect methods to implement birth-control program. 
As put forward in Chapter Five, they allow babies bom with "black card". From 
what I heard during my stay in the village, the party secretary could manipulate the 
quota given to the village. The quota of Shijia Village per year is 8-9 babies a year 
(five thousandth). Thus, if this year there are more pregnant women than the 
permitted quota, the above quota can be allocated to the following year. Of course, 
the party secretary must work hard to make sure that in the following year there will
12Ash, Robert "The Peasant and the State," in China Quarterly. No. 127, September 1991, p. 510.
13H,Chun feng’ wei he nandu *yu men guan’?" (Why does the "spring wind" cannot pass through the 
’gate o f  heaven’?") Nonemin ribao. 13 January, 1987, p. 3.
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no pregnant women.14
These various techniques and methods help to keep the anger and resentment
of peasants under control. The evidence for this is the relative quiet situation in the
countryside despite the fact that there is widespread dissatisfaction among the
peasantry on the falling of their income in the last five years.15
This is not to negate the various reports on "peasant revolts" in various places.
For instance, in 1993, it was reported that such incidents broke out in various parts
of China, Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Guizhou,
Guangxi.16 In the same year, in Renshou County (Sichuan Province) there happened
the worst peasant revolt since the CCP took power in 1949.17 Yet there has been
nothing happen to seriously threaten the local government, or the national
government. This fact should correct the assessment made by Vivienne Shue when
she said that after Reform, peasants are left unprotected and the state can penetrate
the countryside more deeply than before.18
"What we may find ourselves witnessing over the next several decades, 
therefore, under the rubric of liberalization and reform of the excessively 
dictatorial state-socialist bureaucracy, may not in fact be the retreat of the 
state from stringent rule over the peasantry, but the rerooting of a 
religitimised and reinvigorated state power in new social groups, and the 
reorganization, restaffing, and reconsolidation of the state apparatus itself in 
new, more effective forms."
The state, accordingly, can extract agricultural surplus more efficiently. Shue, in her
14Interview with Huang Jingshen, 12 November 1993.
15Hua M in, "Nonemin wenti. zaidu qiandong guoren xin" (The peasant problem: once again affects 
the hearts o f the fellow  countrymen), Xin shiii. No. 5, 1994, p. 4.
16"Jinnian vilai guanvu nongcun wenti de ji iian da shi." (Several big incidents related to village 
problem since beginning this year) Ming bao. 26 July 1993, p. 8.
17"China’s season o f discontent" South China Morning Post. 16 June 1993, p. 21; Liu-si shiiian 
keneng zai sichuan renshou xian chong van (The June Fourth incidence is probably repeated in Renshou 
County, Sichuan Province) Xinbao. 10 June 1993, p. 20; "Renshou xian qiehi Hanging nongmin fudan" 
(Renshou County implement the policy o f  alleviating peasant burden) Sichuan ribao. 27 May 1993, p. 1; 
"Sichuan renshou da-za-qiang shiiian xiangqing" (The details o f  smashing-looting case in Renshou, Sichuan) 
Wenhui bao, 13 June 1993, p. 2 . See, "The Social Unrest in the Countryside," China News Analysis. No. 
1492, 1 September 1993.
18Shue, Viviene op .cit.. p. 152.
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analysis, overly emphasises the structural factor of Chinese villages. It is true that, 
after the introduction of Reform in 1978, villages no longer form - what she calls - 
"honeycomb pattern" as commune system which created it were abolished in the early 
1980s. The disappearance of the structure of honeycomb pattern, evidently, does not 
make the state penetration easier. As I have argued above, peasants, after Reform 
(1978), are more assertive, and because of that party secretaries, despite their status 
as state agents, will accommodate to their demands.
The higher authorities may go down and put pressure on party secretaries to 
carry out their duty well. They may even go as far as threatening the party secretaries 
with dismissal. The party secretaries, using their skill of negotiation, however, will 
tell the higher authorities that there would only be delay. Or, party secretaries may 
just use their savings to fill the gap while waiting for the villagers to deliver. In this 
way, the party secretaries avert the state’s merciless, pressure on their fellow 
villagers.
The ruralisation of authority should also disprove Joel Migdal’s thesis that, in 
developing countries, society is so strong that society can permeate the state.19 In 
his opinion, the Third World societies "are not mere putty to be moulded by states 
with sufficient technical resources, managerial abilities, and committed personnel." 20 
He compares Third World societies with "intricate spider’s web" which "host a 
melange of fairly autonomous social organizations."21 The state is simply rendered 
helpless.
Migdal’s generalisation about Third World societies is probably limited by the 
data that are available to him. As evidenced in this study, a village as community and 
lineages in it can indeed exert influence the operation of the village governments, but 
village governments are not totally incapacitated to the extent that not a single state’s 
policies can be implemented. Village party secretaries do not totally let themselves 
be trapped by the spider’s web; they can keep a distance from a it.
19Joel S. Migdal Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Societv Relations and State Capabilities in 
the Third W orld. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
20Ibid.. p. 35.
21Ibid.. p. 37.
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Villagers may apply heavy pressure, and party secretaries may give in. But 
they can never be completely overcome. On occasions, villagers may threaten their 
party secretary. If the party secretary is skilful enough, he might be able to persuade 
his fellow villagers to back down. He will negotiate and bargain with them; he will 
eventually get their agreement not to cancel, only to delay the grain delivery. In doing 
so, he has cooled down the anger of the peasants to flare up. Thus, party secretaries 
can absorb the shock that may come from society upon the state.
The ruralisation of authority is not favoured by the central leadership. This is 
because it jeopardises the full implementation of the program. As we have seen, the 
central leadership in 1994 decided "to strengthen" it. By this action, they expect that 
party secretaries will return to their original mission as state agents. Ruralisation of 
authority is disliked by peasants as well because party secretaries, sooner or later, 
will come to visit them and demand their grain and their money. This partly explains 
why peasants, from time to time, rise up and rebel against their party secretaries.
Despite all this tension, it is now becoming apparent that by embracing the 
ruralisation of authority, village party secretaries can perfectly serve as a "shock 
absorber." When the state tries to penetrate too deeply into society, they reduce the 
force as minimally as possible, and cause little shock upon society. When society 
struggles hard to permeate the state, they minimise it in such a way that it does not 
cause shock to the state.
Being a "shock absorber" is not an easy job. The press report complaints made 
by party secretaries on the difficulty of their job. Cheng Baocheng and Qiang Yushan, 
in 1991, conducted a large survey on village cadres, including their complaints, in 
Rudong County (Jiangsu Province).22 Two hundred and ninety four (294) Party 
branches and 9642 Party members were surveyed, and 1504 peasants of 126 villages 
were interviewed on their opinion about Party branches, about joining the Party, etc. 
The most important finding were the statistics on the opinion of the Party secretaries 
over "their attitude toward working in the Party branch." Out of 294 Party 
secretaries, 245 (83%) party secretaries complained. They complained that the work 
to be done was very difficult whereas the salary was quite low.
22Cheng Baoheng and Qiang Yushan "Nongcun gaige vu xingzhene cun de iianshe" (Village reform 
and the construction o f administrative village) Nantong xuekan. 1991, No. 4, pp. 9-15.
185
The degree of difficulty varies from place to place but also varies from 
individual to individual. To some party secretaries, the job as party secretary is too 
heavy that they decide to resign. A survey in 28 villages in Jing Perfecture (Hubei 
Province) reports that party secretaries resigned because they found that the job of 
party secretaries is too difficult (gongzuo nandu da).23 "Now, ’the living have to be 
castrated (birth control), the dead have to be burnt (cremation), the irrigation task 
have to be shouldered, every sorts of money has to be delivered,’ All of these work 
are really tormenting. [...] If I carry out the task heartlessly, then the masses will 
insult my father."24
Resignations of village party secretaries are reported somewhere else. There 
were 47 village party secretaries under Jingmen City (Hubei Province) submitted their 
resignations, they were part of 120 other village cadres who resigned plus 513 cadres 
at village groups.25 Out of 170 Party secretaries, 42 of them (24.7%) had asked for 
resignation. This was the finding of Tang Yiming in ten townships in Hunan 
Province.26 In all these cases, the main reason given for resignation is that the job 
of party secretaries are difficult.
Given this enormous burden, one last intriguing question arises; why are there 
so many rural cadres willing to take the job as party secretaries? I have asked similar 
question to the party secretary of the village where I stayed. He said: "As a party 
member, I should be prepared to take a job which the Party wants me to do." This 
kind of answer sounds a cliche of Party propaganda. But, upon reflecting further, I 
can see a grain of truth in it.
Lindblom, for instance, argues that in communist countries (China and Cuba, 
in particular), "moral incentives" play identical role as do material incentives in 
capitalist countries. Peasants and workers are asked to work simply out of ideological
23Bao Houcheng "Cun zhishu liao tiaozi gei women Qiao xiang le iingzhong." (Village party secretaries 
throwing up their job, it strikes an alarm bel for us) Xiang-zhen luntan. 1990, No. 4 , pp. 12-13.
24Ibid.. p. 12.
25
"Wei shenme daliang cunzhu ganbu yaoqiu cizhi." (Why do so any village cadres want to resign?) 
Renmin ribao. 11 M ay 1993, p. 5.
26Tang Yimin, "Bufen cun dangzhibu shuii cizhi de vuanvin he iieiue de banfa." (Causes and solution 
to the resignation o f  village Party secretaries) Hunan gongchandang ren. 1989, No. 3 , pp. 34-35.
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correctness such as "Serve the People," or "Plain Living, Hard Work." If they 
compete, the do not compete for material gains but moral recognition. They compete, 
in LindblonTs words, "for a badge, banner or title of rank, like the Soviet ’Hero of 
Labor, the Cuban May Day banner or Heroic Guerrilla award, and the Chinese Labor 
Hero award.’" He adds: "Workers also compete for travel opportunities, expensive 
consumer goods, attendance at prestigious meetings, even an interview with Premier 
Castro or Chairman Mao."27
Lindblom, surely, wrote when China was universally under moral incentives. 
As such, his arguments are not applicable in China after Reform (1978) when material 
incentives are also utilized. I do believe, however, that moral incentives do not 
evaporate entirely. This is especially true among peasants. This is not because peasants 
are stupid, but because they still highly regard any type of appreciation from the State. 
In any office of party secretaries one cannot fail to see banners or certificates 
appreciating their achievements which they proudly show to their visitors.
The central leadership, knowing this tendency, continues to utilize moral 
incentives as a tool to encourage village party secretaries to do their jobs. Thus, in 
Chapter Four, I mentioned two names of party secretaries, Shi Laihe and Li Yuzong. 
Mr- Shi is party secretary of Lizhuang Village (Henan Province), who has been 
awarded the medal of "national model" four- times, and has, reportedly, met in person 
national dignitaries such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Deng 
Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, etc Mr Li is party secretary of Hechengli Village (Longjing 
City, Jilin Province); he has been elected as "national model of worker" (quan guo 
laodong mofan).
Moral incentives can surely inject an extra endurance to cadres who volunteer 
themselves to become party secretaries. They will take up the burden notwithstanding 
the pressures which come from their superiors or from their fellow villagers.28 If that 
is the case, then we can expect that village party secretaries will continue to function 
as shock-absorber between the state and society.
27Lindblom, Charles Politics and Markets. N ew  York: Basic Books, 1977, pp. 286-287.
28 *One o f  the characteristics o f  moral incentives, according to Lindbloom, is that "they owe something
to austerity which calls for incentives that are less costly than real income." Ibid.. p. 286.
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APPENDIX A
VARIOUS POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 
EXISTING IN A VILLAGE IN CHINA
I. PARTY BRANCH (DANGZHIBU)
A party branch or "village party branch" (cun dangzhibu) is the lowest unit in the 
CCP structure of organization. It is to be established at every locale where there are 
more than three Communist Party members.1 In a village where there are more than 
50 members, a general party branch (zong zhibu) may be established.2 The 
governing structure of a Party branch is composed of two main bodies: the Party 
branch congress and the Party branch committee. The party secretary is responsible 
to the party branch committee which elects him; he must write regular reports both 
to the party branch committee and the party branch congress, also to the township 
party committee.3
H. VILLAGERS’ COMMITTEE (CUNMIN WEIYUANHUD
A villagers’ committee is designated as "mass organization" and not part of the state 
administration. It is to be established by villagers, and consists of three to seven 
members including a chairman and vice chairman who are elected by villagers.4 In 
its operation, it enjoys autonomy which is defined as "self-management, self- 
education, and self-service." This committee is responsible to the "villagers’ council" 
(cunmin daibiao) which consists of representatives of each household, enterprises,
Art. 30; cf. Art. 8
2
"Dangzhibu sheli de yuanze" (The principle o f  the establishment o f  a Party branch), Jing Bin (ed.), 
Zhongguo gongchandang da cidian (Grand dictionary o f  the Communist Party o f  China), Beijing: Zhongguo 
guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1991, p. 347.
Further discussion, see Appendix C.
4"The Organic Law Governing Villagers’ Committee o f  the People’s Republic o f  China (Trial), 1987, 
Art. 8. English translation see, FBIS-CHI, 27 November 1987, pp. 21-23.
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institutions or mass organizations.5 This council has the power to dismiss and elect 
members of the villagers’ committee.6 The committee is both under the leadership 
of the party branch and the township. The job of the villagers’ committee is defined 
in Art. 2, 4 and 5 of the "The Organic Law."
A rt. 2 [..] They are responsible for handling the public affairs and utilities of 
the village, mediating disputes among villagers, assisting in maintaining public 
order, and reporting villagers’ opinions, demands, and suggestions to the 
people’s government.
Art. 4 The villagers’ committees should support and organise villagers in 
promoting production, supply and marketing, credit, consumption, and other 
forms of the cooperative economy. The committees should also coordinate and 
provide services to production in the village for developing socialist 
production and construction and the socialist commodity economy in rural 
areas.
The villagers’ committee should respect the decisionmaking power of the 
collective units in their legal economic activities, and protect the legal assets 
and other rights and interests of the collective units, villagers, contract- 
business households, and joint-business households.
The villagers’ committees should manage the land and other assets owned 
collectively by the villagers according to the law, and teach them the rational 
utilization of natural resources and protection and improvement of the 
ecological environment.
A rt. 5 The villagers’ committee should publicise the Constitution, laws, 
regulations, and government policies; teach and urge the villagers to fulfil
5 Art. 10.
6 Art. 11.
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their legal responsibilities; protect public property; safeguard the villagers’ 
lawful rights and interests; promote the unity and mutual assistance between 
villages; and unfold all kinds of activities for building socialist spiritual 
civilizations.
HI, WOMEN’S FEDERATION (FUNU LIANHEHUI. ABBREVIATED AS 
FULIAN)
The Women’s Federation at village level is the lowest unit in the structure of the 
organization of the Chinese Women’s Federation. It has a Women’s Representative 
Conference (fudjuhui) and Women’s Committee (fuweihui) which run the daily 
affairs. Each has its own chairwoman and vice chairwoman who are elected by their 
members once every five years.
The objective of the Women’s Federation is "to strengthen the relationship 
between the CCP and women."7 In a more specific way, it takes care of women’s 
life, from birth to maturity. For instance, the Women’s Federation is "to guide 
women to use the ethics and thought of socialism to solve problems in love, marriage, 
and family."8 Birth-control, indeed, is one of the important tasks.
IV. COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE (GONGOINGTUAN)
The Communist Youth League (CYL) at village level is the lowest unit in the 
structure of the National Communist Youth League. Like the structure of CCP, CYL 
at village level is called the CYL Branch which is headed by a CYL branch secretary. 
Membership is open to people between 14-28 years of age.9 In its activities, it is
7
"Zhonghua quanguo funu Iianhe hui" (Chinese National Women’s Federation), in Jing Bin, op.cit..
p .179.
8"Fulian zuzhi de renwu" (the job o f  the organization o f the W omen’s Federation), Ibid.. p. 180.
9"Shenqing ru tuan de tiaoiian" (The conditions for appliction to enter CYL) in Jing Bin, Ibid. pp. 
174-175.
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supposed to use methods which "are suitable to the characteristics of youth."10
CYL is actually an organization directly under the Chinese Communist Party; 
in a sense, it is communist party by youths. In the Party Charter (1982) it is stated 
that CYL is "a school where large numbers of young people will learn about 
communism through practice," and in addition to that, "it is the Party’s assistant and 
reserve force." (Art. 49)
Within this perspective, CYL is not yet part of the system of CCP. Members 
of CYL are not Party members; they must apply for Party membership. Leaders of 
CYL, however, are considered as cadres. It is necessary, therefore, for the party 
branch should lead and supervise them. "Party committees at all levels must 
strengthen their leadership over the CYL organizations." (Art. 50)
V. PEOPLE’S MILITIA (MINBINi
People’s militia (minbrn) is not part of the regular army, but it plays a highly 
prominent role in the villages. Before Reform, the company leader was considered 
one of the three most powerful actors beside the Party secretary and the village 
headman. Villagers used to say: "vi dan?, er zheng. san wuzhuang" (the first is the 
Party, the second is the government, and the third is the weapon).
Currently, people’s militia no longer enjoys high prestige as before, but its 
presence is still felt in the villages.11 As the possibility of wars become more and 
more remote, it is then entrusted with various tasks: to help the public security (e.g. 
in fighting against counter-revolutionaries, criminals, and smugglers); to participate 
in the economic development of the village (e.g. to build roads, to instal irrigation, 
to build electric plants, etc.); and to participate in social and cultural change (e.g. to 
set a good example, to fight against superstition, to promote birth control, etc.)12 
The numbers of people’s militia, due to the policy of streamlining, are becoming
10"Gongqingtuan de duli huodone" (The independent activities o f CYL), Ibid.. p. 173.
n The material o f  this part is from Han Huaizhi (ed.), Danedai zhongguo minbin (Contemporary
Chinese People’s M ilitia), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1989.
12Ibid.. pp. 342-464.
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small, and there is no more fixed quota.13
Ibid.. p. 105.
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APPENDIX B
THE LEADERSHIP TASK OF VILLAGE PARTY BRANCH SECRETARIES 
OVER THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN VILLAGES
I. IN GENERAL, A VILLAGE PARTY BRANCH SECRETARY IS ASKED TO 
PROVIDE LEADERSHIP IN AREAS AS FOLLOWS:1
a. to convene meetings of the party branch committee and the Party branch 
congress according to schedule;
b. to implement the Party’s line, policies, and principles;
c. to investigate and arrange the work of the Party branch, report major 
problems immediately to the Party branch committee and Party branch 
congress;
d. to understand and grasp what the Party members think, do, and learn;
e. to examine how the Party branch fulfils the plan-, and implements decisions;
f. to develop a close relationship with the members of the Party branch 
committee and other village functionaries, to give support to their work, 
coordinate their working relations, and arouse their enthusiasm to work;
g. to encourage the Party branch committee to study, and to develop their role 
of leadership;
H. THE LEADERSHIP TASK OVER THE VILLAGERS’ COMMITTEE.
The Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth Congress (1994) clearly states: "Party branches 
should provide stronger leadership over villagers’ committees and should support 
them in carrying out work in accordance with the law. Villagers’ committees must 
place themselves under the leadership of party branches and actively take the initiative
lwDang zhibu shuji" (The Party branch secretary), Jing Bin (ed.), Zhongguo eonechandang da cidian 
(Grand dictionary o f  the Communist Party o f  China), Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1991, 
p. 349.
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in carrying out work that is within the scope of their duties."2
III. THE LEADERSHIP TASK OVER THE WOMEN’S FEDERATION
The task of the Party is "to exercise leadership over the Women’s Federation in major 
decisions and in the area of political principle and political direction."3 Party 
branches in the villages, specifically, are to do the following jobs:4
(i) to disseminate Party line and policies as well as the party branch’s own 
decision;
(ii) to help Women’s Federation in solving its difficulties in performing its 
duty such as birth control, family, social welfare;
(iii) to include the work of the Women’s Federation on the agenda of the party 
branch;
(iv) to pay serious attention to as well as train young female cadres to enter 
the Party;
(v) to solve the problem of remuneration for female cadres.
IV. THE LEADERSHIP TASK OVER THE COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE
Village party secretaries are advised that "in strengthening the leadership over the 
CYL Branch, village party branches should support the independent activities of the 
CYL which are suitable to the characteristics of the young." In addition, they must 
also "include the work of the CYL in the important work schedule of the party 
branch" which, in practice, means: "once every three months hear reports of the work 
of the CYL branch; often investigate the work of the CYL branch and solve problems 
which arise during the work; party branch meetings should invite the CYL branch
2
"CCP Circular on strengthening rural primary and grass-roots organizations," in SWB FE/2168 G/6.
3"Dana dui fulian zuzhj de lingdao" (The leadership o f  the Party over the W omen’s Federation), in 
Jing Bin (ed.), op .cit.. p. 180.
4Zhang Dianzhong, Nongcun dangzhibu shuii de shouce (A handbook for a village party branch 
secretary), Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1990, p. 97. This handbook has a foreword by Song Ping, member 
o f the Standing Committee o f  Politburo and in charge o f  organization.
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secretary." Village party branch secretaries also have to help CYL branches to select 
their leaders, train their cadres, and solve their activity funds.5
V. THE LEADERSHIP TASK OVER THE PEOPLE’S MILITIA
The Party secretary exercises his leadership by taking up the post of "company 
political instructor" (lian zhidao vuanL In general, a village party branch and its 
secretary is to pay attention to the people’s militia: to educate them both in military 
and political matters, to maintain frequent meetings with them, to give full support 
to the company head, to help them to carry out their duty.6
APPENDIX C
THE STRUCTURE OF A VILLAGE PARTY BRANCH
M ost part o f  the materials, however, are taken from The Grand Dictionary o f  the Communist Party o f  
China (1991).1
I. THE PLACE O F A PARTY BRANCH WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
CCP
The Communist Party of China, according to the Party Charter (1982), is an 
organization which is partitioned into three major sub-organizations (Art. 10, sub, 4; 
Art. 17),2 The highest is the central Party organization (zhongvang zuzhi). and the 
intermediate level is the local Party organization (difang zuzhi). While there is only 
one central Party organization which has its headquarters is in Beijing, there are 
myriads of hierarchically structured local Party organizations, spreading across the 
country. They are territorially based, existing at the provincial level (and its 
equivalent) down to the xian level (and its equivalent).3
At the third level is the "grass-root organization" (jiceng zuzhi). which 
consists of a grass-root committee and a branch committee (Art. 31). A Party branch 
(dangzhibu) is located at this level. It is to be established at every locale where there 
are more than three Communist Party members.4 A village is one of those places 
where a Party branch should be set up if the condition is met; it is called "village 
Party branch" or cun dangzhibu.
The diagram below illustrates this structure:
^ing Bin (ed.), Zhongguo gongchandang da cidian (Grand dictionary o f  the Communist Party of 
China), Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1991. Thereafter, I will refer to this dictionary as 
ZGDDC.
2"Zuzhi tizhi" (Organizational system), ZGDDC, p.212.
3See, Party Charter, 1982, art. 14
4Ibid.. Art. 30; cf. Art. 8
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Figure I The general organizational structure of the CCP 
(special reference to village context)
I. Central Party Organization
II. Local Party 
Organization
Provinces
County
III. Grass-root Township
Organization Village
It must be noted that the "general Party branch" (zong zhibu) is also part of 
the grass-root organizations. The difference between the general Party branch and the 
Party branch lies in the number of Party members. If the grass-root Party committee 
has to have at least 100 Party members, the general Party branch must have at least 
50 Party members.5 If there are more than 50 or 100 Party members but no grass- 
root Party committee, then general Party branch can be set up; the necessity of work 
can dictate this.6
In the village context, this means that a Party branch is at cun while a grass- 
root Party committee at xiang (township). A general Party branch is usually located 
at a cun, and is very few in number because Party members in a village rarely reach
5"Dangzhibu sheli de yuanze" (The principle o f the establishment o f  a Party branch), in ZGDDC, p.
347.
6Ibid.
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more than fifty. From my field work, however, general Party branches are found in 
all cun in Yangguang township, Yunnan Province.7
II. THE PARTY BRANCH CONGRESS
The governing structure of a Party branch is composed of two main bodies: the Party 
branch congress and the Party branch committee. This section will first discuss the 
Party branch congress.
The Party branch congress (zhibu dangvuan dahui'l is technically the highest 
governing body of a Party branch. It is a forum for all Party members, regardless of 
their position in the organization. Everybody is free to express their own opinion over 
all matters, even if it may lead to a disagreement. The Party branch congress is 
convened by its committee once every three months. The agenda should be made 
known in advance to all Party cells and the entire members.
The main agenda of the meeting is usually to discuss major problems within 
the Party branch, and find a solution. This includes a set of activities:8
(1) to explore decisions and instructions given by the higher authorities;
(2) to discuss and approve the work report by the Party branch committee;
(3) to admit new Party members, to confer awards to good Party members,
to decide the punishment given to guilty Party members;
(4) to select or dismiss representatives for the Party congress at the higher
level;
(5) to recall incompetent members of the Party branch committee, and select
new ones.
All decisions should be approved by absolute majority. In case there are sharp 
differences over a problem, the congress is advised not to make any decision, and to 
postpone it until the next congress. It is also possible to invite the higher level Party
7Yunnan Province and Guangdong Province, in fact, are special cases in administrative division. Most 
communes, in early 1980-s, were converted into xiang and production brigades into cun. This is not the 
case in Yunnan and Guangdong; villages in those two provinces have a comparatively large number o f  
population, some can reach 10,000. This partly explains why a village in Yunnan has so many Party 
members.
8 "Zhibu dangvuan dahui de zhaokai" (To convene a Party branch congress), in ZGDDC, p. 230
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committee to make decisions.9 In the case where a decision contravenes the 
Party’s line, principles, and policies, including the decision of the higher Party 
committee, there are two possibilities of solution. Firstly, the higher Party committee 
is invited to judge; or, secondly, a Party branch congress is reconvened to solve it.
HI. THE PARTY BRANCH COMMITTEE
The Party branch committee (dang zhibu weivuanhuH is the highest governing organ 
of the Party branch while the Party congress is not in session. It has to convene at 
least once a month, but if the situation demands, it could hold a meeting at any 
time.10 This section will discuss the structure of a Party branch committee, and the 
job of the department of organization which occupies a central position within a Party 
branch.
A. The structure of a Party branch committee
Members of the committee are elected by the Party branch congress; ideally it is 
composed of three to five members, and not more than is seven. There are always, 
as a standard, one Party secretary, one representative of othr rganization department 
and one representative of the propaganda department. In addition, if situation permits, 
other departments can be established, such as a department of discipline, a department 
of secret protection, a department of youth, a department of united front, a 
department of relation with the masses,11 The term of office is two years.12
A Party branch having less than ten members should not set up a Party branch 
committee. In this case, the Party members directly elect a Party secretary, and a
9Ibid.
t0"Dang zhibu weiyuanhui de zhaokai" (To convene a Party branch committee), in ZGDDC, p. 231
11 "Dang zhibu sheli de vuanze" (The principle o f  establishing a Party branch), ZGDDC, p. 347.
12nZhibu weiyuan hui" (The Party branch committee), in ZGDDC, p. 348
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Deputy Party secretary if the situation needs it.13 The Party branch, then, is run by 
the Party secretary and all the existing Party members.
Since a Party branch committee is created by the Party branch congress, it 
must be responsible to the Party branch congress. A Party branch committee has to 
make a report to the Party branch congress each time it is in session.
B. The job  of a Party  branch committee
The job of a Party branch committee is: "to implement the Party’s line, policies, and 
directives, as well as the decision by the higher Party organization, and the decision 
by the Party branch congress; to take care of the education of Party members; to do 
well in the construction of the Party’s ideology, organization, and work style; and to 
do well in ideology and politics and the work with the masses."14 These jobs are 
distributed to the departments.
In connection with the internal operation of a Party branch, the department of 
organization plays a key role. It has five main jobs:15
1. to monitor the activities of Party members in Party cells, including 
inspection and supervision;
2. to maintain a high degree of Party members’ knowledge on the 
Party’s ideology;
3. to organise programs for recruiting new Party members;
4. to do administrative tasks, including collecting organization fees, 
and keeping records on transfer of Party members;
5. to keep statistics on Party members and Party activities.
IV. SCHEM E
Schematically, the governing structure of a Party branch can be described as follows:
13"Dang zhibu sheli de vuanze" (The principle o f  establishing a Party branch), ZGDDC, p. 347
14"Zhibu weivuanhui" (Party branch committee), in ZGDDC, p. 348
15"Pang zhibu zuzhi weivuan" (Committee member in charge o f  organization), in ZGDDC, p. 349; 
I have reformulated the contents to make it more succinct.
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Party Branch Congress
Party Branch Committee Party Secretary
Organization department [Deputy Party Secretary] 
Propaganda department
[Department o f  disciplinary inspection 
Department o f  secret protection 
Department o f youth 
Department o f united front 
Department o f relation with the masses]
Party cells Party cells Party cells
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